Telecommunications Inquiry Draft Report Released
29 June 2000
Press Statement
from Hugh Fletcher,
Chairman, Ministerial Inquiry into
Telecommunications
Telecommunications Inquiry Draft Report
Released
Questions and Answers on Draft Report
Executive Summary from Draft Report
Copy of this
material as an Adobe Acrobat document (114 KB)
The
Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications today released
its draft report. The report sets out the Inquiry's
preliminary views on the desirable regulatory regime for
telecommunications.
The members of the Inquiry panel are Mr Hugh Fletcher (Chair), Ms Cathie Harrison and Mr Allan Asher.
The draft report says that it is critical that changes are made to the current regulatory regime if New Zealand is to move quickly to an information economy and reap the full benefits that such an economy has to offer. New Zealand must have more efficient procedures for resolving important issues in this rapidly changing industry.
The Inquiry's proposed approach, set out in the draft report, can be summarised as:
an emphasis on
commercial negotiation;
a preference for industry
self-regulation, focussed through the establishment of an
Electronic Communications Industry Forum;
the
establishment of a stand-alone regulator – the Electronic
Communications Commissioner – to regulate the industry when
necessary;
a list of regulated ("designated") services,
which would require a provider of such a service to supply
it to others at an efficient price and in a timely way. The
initial list of services would be recommended by the
Inquiry;
power for the Commissioner to quickly resolve
any disputes over designated services;
a better-defined
"Kiwi Share" service obligation, embodied in legislation,
which will maintain an unlimited free local call service for
voice and low-speed data calls; and
an Information
Society Initiative to facilitate full participation by New
Zealanders in the information economy.
Written
submissions on the draft report are now invited and will be
followed by an opportunity for cross-submissions, then
public hearings.
The Inquiry panel said "it is important to note that the draft report is just that – a draft. The Inquiry's proposed approach should now be openly debated. To facilitate this, we have built into our process an opportunity for interested parties to comment on other submissions to add to the rigour of the debate. The Inquiry is open to making changes to its proposed approach, if persuaded by submissions and in public hearings."
The Inquiry is required to make recommendations to the Minister of Communications by the end of September, including detailed implementation requirements for any changes to the current regime. Submitters on the draft report are asked to spell out such requirements, including recommended drafting of key clauses of any legislation and regulation.
The draft report follows the Inquiry's Issues paper released in early April. Nearly all submissions suggested that changes to the existing regime were necessary. Submissions on the Issues paper have served as a key input to the draft report.
The Government wishes to ensure delivery of cost-efficient, timely and innovative telecommunications services on an ongoing, fair and equitable basis to all existing and potential users.
The Inquiry's final report is due with the Minister of Communications by 29 September.
Hugh Fletcher
Inquiry Chairman END
The
Inquiry's draft report and other relevant information can be
downloaded from the Inquiry's Website. Hard copies of the
report are obtainable from the Inquiry office (04-460 1375).
A list of questions and answers and a summary of the draft
report are attached.
For further queries, contact:
John
Gilbert
Inquiry Manager
PO Box 1473 Wellington
Tel:
64-4-460 1375
Fax 64-4-460 1374
Email:
teleinquiry@med.govt.nz
Website: www.teleinquiry.govt.nz
Questions and Answers on Draft Report
1. Why
is there a need for change from the current regulatory
regime for telecommunications?
Consistent with the view
of most other countries, the Inquiry considers that, for the
electronic communications sector, reliance on generic
competition law (the Commerce Act) and recourse to the
Courts have proven inadequate to resolve disputes quickly
and efficiently. This is largely because of the dynamic,
fast changing nature of electronic communications markets
and the strong interdependence of electronic communications
networks. Changes to the regime are therefore required.
2.
How could the approach favoured by the Inquiry be
summarised?
An emphasis on commercial negotiation.
A
preference for industry self-regulation, focussed through
the establishment of an Electronic Communications Industry
Forum.
The establishment of a stand-alone regulator –
the Electronic Communications Commissioner – to regulate the
industry when necessary.
A list of regulated
("designated") services, which would require a provider of
such a service to supply it to others at an efficient price
and in a timely way. The initial list of services would be
recommended by the Inquiry.
Power for the Commissioner
to quickly resolve any disputes over designated services.
A better-defined "Kiwi Share" service obligation,
embodied in legislation, which will maintain an unlimited
free local call for voice and low-speed data calls.
An
Information Society Initiative to facilitate full
participation by New Zealanders in the information economy.
3. What is the role of the proposed Electronic
Communications Industry Forum?
The Forum would be
responsible for industry self-regulation, in the form of
Codes of Practice that would be binding on the industry.
Codes covering "designated services" (see question 4) would
need to be approved by the Commissioner to ensure they were
consistent with certain criteria. The Inquiry proposes that
the Forum would be funded by the industry and have
compulsory membership.
4. What would be "regulated" and
why?
The Inquiry proposes that specific electronic
communications services ("designated services") should be
subject to regulation. Designation of a service broadly
means that a provider of that service is required to supply
it to others at an efficient price and in a timely way.
Designation of a service would result in industry
self-regulation and/or specific requirements set out in
regulation (e.g. mandatory obligations, pricing
principles).
The term "services" generally relates to services offered by one telecommunications company to another (e.g. interconnection between networks, wholesaling of a service), although it is also possible that retail services could also be designated.
A service would only be designated if "designation criteria" were met. The primary test is that designation would be in the long-term interests of end users of electronic communications services. Designation would also need to facilitate competition, promote any-to-any connectivity of networks, and promote the efficient use of existing networks and investment in new ones. The Inquiry has developed an initial list of services that it currently proposes would be designated immediately. The Inquiry is particularly interested in submissions on this list, which is elaborated and discussed in the draft report.
5. Why is there a need
for an Electronic Communications Commissioner and why not
simply "beef-up" the Commerce Commission?
The role of the
Electronic Communications Commissioner is significantly
different from that of the Commerce Commission. The
Commissioner would play a facilitative role, working closely
alongside industry, and encouraging reliance on commercial
negotiation and industry self-management whenever possible.
This close relationship would mean that the Commissioner is
well placed to quickly resolve any disputes, which is
critical in this fast-moving industry.
Almost every other country has chosen to establish a stand-alone industry-specific regulator, with dedicated staff, and in-depth knowledge of the industry. The Inquiry considers this is the appropriate course of action to follow in New Zealand until such a time as telecommunications markets are fully competitive. At that time, it may become possible to rely on generic competition law.
6. What would be the
costs of such a stand-alone industry-specific
regulator?
For the purpose of comparison, the
telecommunications group of the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) has 27 staff and an annual budget
of about NZ$3.5 million. The cost and number of staff would
likely be considerably less for the office of the Electronic
Communications Commissioner given the electronic
communications industry in New Zealand is considerably
smaller than in Australia. Like the Australian example, the
Inquiry proposes that the office of the Electronic
Communications Commissioner be fully industry-funded.
7.
Who would decide what should be regulated?
The Inquiry
proposes that the Minister of Communications should be
responsible for the designation of services to be regulated,
on the recommendation of the Commissioner. In investigating
whether a service should be designated, the Commissioner
would be required to undertake public consultation. As noted
in question 4, a service would only be designated if certain
criteria were met. Any person could request that the
Commissioner investigate whether a service should be
designated, or removed from the designated list.
8. How
would regulation work in practice?
In the event that
commercial agreement over the supply of a service could not
be reached, any party to the negotiation could ask the
Commissioner to make a "determination". In effect, a
determination would be a ruling by the Commissioner on a
dispute, with the regulation of the designation service
providing guidelines for such a ruling (e.g. pricing
principles for supply of the service). The regulation would
also help guide commercial negotiations between parties.
In the event that the parties cannot agree commercially and the Commissioner needs to be involved, the Inquiry proposes a two-stage determination process. First, an "interim determination" within 30 working days, which recognises the importance of expeditious decision-making.
Second, and only if the parties did not accept the interim determination, a "final determination", which would include public consultation so that all interested parties could make their views known. Final determinations could not be appealed, although judicial review would be available.
9. What does the Inquiry propose in respect of
the Kiwi Share?
The Inquiry considers that Telecom's Kiwi
Share obligations should be better defined to take account
of changes to the telecommunications environment, and
embodied in legislation. The existing Kiwi Share obligations
would largely still apply; however, the Inquiry proposes to
make it clear that the free local calling option includes
low-speed data calls. Telecom would also be required to
publicly release a programme each year that detailed
Telecom's plans to increase the proportion of its
residential customers that have reliable low-speed data
access. Telecom could choose to use whichever technology it
found most cost-effective to meet its Kiwi Share
obligations.
10. What about high-speed Internet
access?
High-speed Internet access of up to 144 kbps is
likely to be available to most of the population within 1-2
years through services such as Telecom's CDMA service and
Vodafone's GPRS service. These services are expected to have
the same coverage as the companies' existing mobile
networks. In addition, Sky has the potential to offer
high-speed Internet downloads with nation-wide coverage,
although spectrum constraints may limit the number of
simultaneous Internet users.
In the Inquiry's view, this paints a positive picture of the availability of high-speed Internet access for New Zealanders in the near future.
11.
What about broadband services?
Broadband access is likely
to be widely available within 3-5 years through services
such as Telecom's xDSL "Jetstream" and Telstra-Saturn's
"Chello". The emergence of third-generation ("3G") cellular
services will also add to broadband access over time.
In the Inquiry's view, this indicates that New Zealanders living in urban areas will have access to broadband services in the near to medium term. However, for people living in rural areas, the availability of broadband services is likely to be more problematic in the absence of specific initiatives to address this problem.
The Inquiry considers that a body should be established with industry, Government and community representation, to develop and implement initiatives designed to encourage and enable New Zealanders to fully participate in the information economy. The body should be partially funded by the industry and partially by the Government.
12. What about the 0867 issue?
The 0867
dispute over Telecom's handling of Internet traffic is now
before the Courts and the Commerce Commission. A
contributing factor in that dispute has been the terms of
the current Telecom-Clear interconnection agreement.
However, Telecom and Clear recently reached a temporary
agreement on how to treat Internet traffic while the
agreement is renegotiated.
In its draft report, the Inquiry makes proposals for the regulation of interconnection agreements. Further, network management issues, like 0867, could be addressed through the proposed industry forum. If the industry were not able to work through any issues, the Commissioner would have the option of designating the service.
13. Is the overall approach
favoured by the Inquiry "heavy-handed" regulation?
No.
The emphasis would be on commercial negotiation and, to the
largest extent possible, industry self-management.
Regulation would be kept to the minimum necessary, and only
put in place where the case was well proven (as assessed
against specific criteria) and industry self-management was
not appropriate. Once in place, regulation would only apply
in the event that commercial agreement between parties was
not possible, or when such agreement was not in the
long-term interests of end users of electronic
communications services.
14. Is the approach favoured by
the Inquiry friendly to business?
Yes. Electronic
communications services are essential to almost every
business, many of which rely on such services for
communication with distant markets. E-commerce also provides
an exciting opportunity for businesses of all sizes – small
and large – in all parts of New Zealand. For businesses to
compete and succeed globally, and to reap maximum benefit
from the information economy, the Inquiry considers it
critical that New Zealand has a regulatory regime that
facilitates the delivery of benefits to end users – business
and residential alike – in the form of improved competition,
lower prices and innovation.
The focus of the Inquiry's approach is ensuring that regulation is in the best long-term interests of end users, including business. Further, regulation would only be warranted if it facilitated competition, promoted connectivity of networks and ensured the efficient use of existing networks and investment in new ones. The Inquiry also notes that TUANZ – a body representing business users of electronic communications services – proposes changes along the lines favoured by the Inquiry.
15. Is the approach favoured by
the Inquiry similar to that recently published by the
Electricity Inquiry?
No. There are certain features of
the electronic communications sector that make it markedly
different from other network industries (including
electricity), which require a different approach to be
taken.
A key difference is the requirement for electronic communication networks to interconnect. Put simply, every telephone user has an interest in having other people connected to the telephone network, so that he or she can communicate with them. The same cannot be said of a gas or electricity user. "Interconnection" of networks also has the potential for costly and time-consuming disputes. This is because existing operators may have an incentive to slow down entry of new competitors, or overcharge them (not so, or not to the same extent, in other network industries).
Other key differences are:
the rapid development of
new technologies in electronic communications is enabling
competition in access networks to emerge (not so in other
network industries);
the electronic communications
industry is dynamic and offers a wide array of services that
rapidly change over time (not so, or not to the same extent,
in other network industries); and
in electronic
communications, there is generally none of the "structural
separation" between retail and wholesale activities of the
incumbent operator (Telecom), which is a feature of other
network industries (e.g. electricity, gas).
Executive Summary from Draft Report
The draft report sets out the Inquiry’s current thinking on the approach favoured for a modified regulatory regime for telecommunications. It is intended to serve as a focus for a further round of submissions and for public hearings before the Inquiry’s final report. With the benefit of that feedback, the Inquiry’s final recommendations could vary from those set out in the draft report.
Approach to
Regulation of Electronic Communications Services
New
Zealand deregulated telecommunications services earlier and
deregulated further than most other countries.
Telecommunications services compare well to those in other
countries in many respects. It is apparent, however, that a
number of initiatives have been hindered by lengthy disputes
and the absence of a commonly agreed set of principles
governing matters such as interconnection, wholesale of
telecommunications services, and allocation of telephone
numbers.
Looking ahead, if New Zealand is to move swiftly to, and extract the full benefits of, an information economy, it can no longer afford inefficient procedures for resolving technical issues and settling disputes over access and other similar matters. An improved regulatory framework is needed to encourage and facilitate rapid innovation, high levels of investment and vigorous competition. The Kiwi Share obligations on Telecom also need to be better defined in line with the rapidly changing electronic communications environment.
New Zealand’s general approach of relying on general competition law and voluntary industry self-management is a desirable ideal. For telecommunications, however, this approach has not been fully effective, even when backed up by the threat of industry-specific regulation. The Inquiry accordingly favours industry self-management with a regulatory underpinning. This would be achieved through:
an
Electronic Communications Industry Forum, with statutory
backing and wide membership, to self-manage solutions to
common industry problems; and
an Electronic
Communications Commissioner, with clearly defined
responsibilities and powers, to regulate designated
electronic communications services where general competition
law and industry self-regulation are ineffective.
Electronic Communications Industry Forum
A Forum
should be established to self-manage a wide range of
industry issues, including the development of standards and
Codes of Practice. Membership would be compulsory for
registered telecommunications and broadcasting networks
operators. The Forum’s working parties on specific issues
would be open to other interested organisations. The Forum
would operate under general guidelines that encourage
competition and entry into the industry and have regard to
the long-term interests of end users of electronic
communications services.
The Forum would be funded by the industry. In the case of designated services, the Commissioner would have the power to direct the Forum to develop standards and Codes of Practice and, where appropriate, to resolve disagreements concerning them.
Electronic Communications Commissioner
The
Commissioner would:
make recommendations to the Minister
of Communications that specific electronic communications
services ("designated services") become subject to
regulation, and recommend the pricing principles to apply to
them;
encourage industry participants to negotiate their
own commercial arrangements in respect of designated
services, and only intervene at the request of a party to
such negotiations or where any agreement is not consistent
with the designation criteria;
in such circumstances,
deliver an interim determination and pursue a public
consultation process before issuing a final determination
(if necessary); and
be responsible for developing,
together with the Forum, information requirements, standards
and Codes of Practice that would apply to designated
services.
The Commissioner would also be an Associate
Commissioner of the Commerce Commission and would
participate in Commerce Commission hearings on electronic
communications issues.
Designation of Electronic
Communications Services
Electronic communications
services would be designated, or removed from the list of
designated services, through a public consultation process
managed by the Commissioner. The final decision would be
taken by the Minister of Communications, based on
recommendations from the Commissioner.
For a service to be designated, it must meet the designation criteria set out below.
The objective of designation is to promote the long-term interests of end users of electronic communication services. In determining whether any designation will promote this objective, regard must be had to the extent to which designation:
facilitates competition in markets for
services; and/or
promotes efficient any-to-any
connectivity; and/or
encourages economically efficient
use of, and economically efficient investment in, the
infrastructure by which services are supplied.
Designation of a service would not preclude parties from
reaching their own commercial arrangements. It would,
however, ensure a backstop procedure was in place for
resolving any disputes expeditiously. It would also enable
the Commissioner to intervene if any agreement was not
consistent with the designation criteria.
Initial List of
Designated Services
The regime would begin with immediate
designation of certain electronic communications services
recommended by the Inquiry. In formulating its preliminary
recommendations for the initial list, the Inquiry has
grouped them into three categories set out below.
A.
Likely recommendation for immediate designation unless
persuaded to the contrary
carrier-to-carrier call
origination and termination on fixed networks
(interconnection);
wholesaling of Telecom’s local loop;
wholesaling of mobile services to qualifying entrants
prior to network build out;
mandatory roaming between
compatible mobile networks (temporary and conditional on
network build-out);
carrier pre-selection from fixed to
mobile networks (and possibly mobile to international);
carrier-to-carrier call origination and termination
between mobile networks (interconnection);
co-location
at mobile cell sites;
B. Unlikely to recommend for
immediate designation unless persuaded to the
contrary
local loop unbundling;
C. Do not intend to
recommend for immediate designation but should be monitored
by the Commissioner
conditional access systems, such as
the ‘set-top box’ for cable and broadcast systems;
number administration and portability;
carrier-to-carrier call termination from fixed to mobile
networks;
retail mobile network services; and
directories.
The Kiwi Share
The Inquiry considers
that Telecom’s existing "Kiwi Share" obligations should be
better defined to take account of changes to the
telecommunications environment, and embodied in legislation.
The Kiwi Share should also be subject to regular review.
Telecom should be required to:
continue to make
ordinary residential telephone services available to the
extent applying today;
maintain a local unlimited
free-calling option for residential customers for both voice
and low-speed data calls;
not increase in real terms its
GST-exclusive monthly rental for ordinary residential
telephone services; and
continue to increase the
proportion of its residential customers that have reliable
low-speed data access, in accordance with a programme that
is publicly released annually.
In meeting the Kiwi Share
requirements, Telecom could choose to use whichever
technology it found most cost-effective.
The Inquiry proposes the removal of the existing Kiwi Share requirement for geographic averaging. The price cap referred to above would still apply in all areas.
Information Society
Initiative
The Inquiry considers that a body should be
established, with industry, Government and community
representation, to develop and implement initiatives
designed to encourage and enable New Zealanders to fully
participate in the information economy. The body would be
partially funded by industry.
ENDS