New pricing limits for electricity distribution businesses
New pricing limits for 16 electricity distribution businesses
The Commerce Commission has today released its final decision to reset the default price-quality paths for 16 electricity distributors. Two of the distributors will have to reduce their prices, while the remainder will be able to increase their prices if they choose. The new price limits will take effect from 1 April 2013.
"The price limits on electricity distributors have been changed to better align their revenues with their costs. We aim to create an appropriate balance between providing incentives for these businesses to invest in their networks, while ensuring that consumers are being charged based on the cost of services provided in each region," said Sue Begg, Deputy Chair of the Commerce Commission.
Individual adjustments for electricity distributors on 1 April 2013 vary in size, from a reduction of 10% to an increase of 10% before inflation.
“In those regions where we have determined that there needs to be a larger price increase to support network investment, we have smoothed the increases over a number of years. This has helped to avoid more significant price increases in 2013,” says Ms Begg. Today’s announcement has been able to proceed due to a recent Supreme Court decision. (See background)
The final limits on the total revenue that distributors will be allowed to earn are similar to those set out in the Commission’s draft decision. Changes to the price adjustments since the draft decision are mainly presentational. They result for the most part as a result of receiving better information on the prices that each supplier would have charged if there was no reset. This provides the comparison for the path reset.
"The price reset will eventually flow through to consumers, as either a price increase or decrease on their power bills depending on where they live. The Commission does not set how the distribution price is passed through. Businesses are free to decide how to spread the prices across their customer base, or indeed, in the case of increases may decide not to take up the full amount of the allowable increase,” said Ms Begg.
Distribution charges make up about a third of a customer’s bill. Example calculations of the changes consumers might experience in their electricity bill are attached. The extent of any price changes will depend on how retailers decide to pass on the price increases or decreases to their customers.
If the prices do not suit an electricity distributor's particular circumstances, they can apply to the Commission for a customised price-quality path.
The Commission has not reset the default price-quality path for Orion New Zealand Limited, the Christchurch based electricity distribution business. Orion is currently assessing whether to apply for a customised price-quality path to deal with rebuild issues associated with the earthquakes. If Orion chooses not to apply for a customised path by early 2013, the Commission will review whether Orion's default price-quality path should be reset.
You can read the final decision at www.comcom.govt.nz/2010-2015-default-price-quality-path
Supreme Court decision
On 15 November 2012 the Supreme Court held that the Commission is not required to determine a starting price input methodology for electricity distribution and gas pipeline services. This confirmed the decision by the Court of Appeal in June 2012. Auckland-based distributor Vector Limited had argued that the Commission should not be allowed to carry out the price reset for electricity distributors without first setting this input methodology.
What is a default price-quality path?
A default price-quality path is a generic form of regulation that places a cap on prices and sets minimum standards for the quality of service provided to users. The default price-quality path usually applies for five years before it is reset to take account of new information on the performance of suppliers.
What are input methodologies?
Input methodologies are the upfront rules, processes and requirements for services regulated under Part 4 of the Commerce Act, and include default price-quality paths.
Which electricity distribution
businesses are covered by this draft decision?
• Alpine Energy Limited
• Aurora Energy Limited
• Centralines Limited
• Eastland Networks Limited
• Electricity Ashburton Limited
• Electricity Invercargill Limited
• Horizon Energy Limited
• The Lines Company Limited
• Network Tasman Limited
• Nelson Electricity Limited
• OtagoNet Joint Venture
• Powerco Limited
• Top Energy Limited
• Unison Networks Limited
• Vector Limited
• Wellington Electricity Lines Limited
Why is the Commission resetting prices now?
The Commission is able to reset the default price-quality paths during the middle of the regulatory period if there is a material difference between the paths that came into effect in 2010, and the paths we would have set if the input methodologies for default price-quality paths had been available at that time.
The Commission previously proposed to reset the default price-quality paths in 2011, however due to a judicial review challenge from Vector, the High Court required the Commission to suspend the process until further input methodologies for the paths had been determined, which occurred in September 2012.
Which electricity distribution businesses are regulated under the Commerce Act?
Electricity distributors provide electricity lines services between Transpower and end-users. All electricity distribution businesses, except for those exempt on the basis of consumer ownership as defined in the Act, must comply with the default price-quality path set by the Commission. Consumer-owned electricity distributors are exempt on the basis that their consumers have input into their business to influence price and quality.
What is the purpose of regulating electricity distribution businesses?
The purpose of regulation under Part 4 of the
Act is to promote the long-term benefit of consumers in
regulated markets, by promoting outcomes that are consistent
with outcomes produced in competitive markets. The outcomes
are that suppliers of regulated services have incentives to
innovate and invest, improve efficiency and provide services
at a quality that reflects consumer demands, share
efficiency gains with consumers, including through lower
prices, and are limited in their ability to extract