Hon Phil Goff
Minister of Defence

Address to visiting class of the Australian Defence College
Australian High Commission, Wellington

Speech Notes: New Zealand's defence policy

Address to visiting class of the Australian Defence College, Australian High Commission, Wellington

Thank you for the invitation to speak to the College today.

I want to focus on New Zealand's defence policy and the strategic considerations underlying it.

In particular, I want to make the point that the security needs of the Twenty-First Century are qualitatively different from those of a generation ago.

Traditional inter-state conflict has increasingly taken second place to conflict within states.

And unlike the Cold War, where conflicting parties were often proxies for ideological battles between super powers, today by-and-large, outsiders are not the predominant cause of the violence.

New Zealand's defence policy is set out in the Government's Defence Policy Framework published in June 2000, and in an accompanying Foreign Affairs paper, which as the then Foreign Affairs Minister I released at the same time.

The Framework acknowledges that ensuring the security and safety of the nation is a fundamental objective of any sovereign state.

It states that New Zealand is not directly threatened by any other country and is not likely to be involved in widespread armed conflict.

The Framework predated the events of 9/11. While identifying no country as being of direct threat to New Zealand, it did not however assume that we lived in a benign security environment.

It explicitly warns that circumstances can change and noted terrorism as one of the threats that the NZDF would have to counter. It makes the point that security is about more than defence simply by military means against conventional threats.

It notes that New Zealand's primary defence interests are protecting our territorial sovereignty, meeting shared alliance commitments to Australia, and fulfilling obligations and responsibilities in the South Pacific and the wider Asia-Pacific.

A strong strategic relationship with Australia in support of a secure and peaceful region is our second defence priority.

The relationship is particularly visible in our joint deployments with Australia in the Pacific - Bougainville, East Timor, the Solomons and Tonga.

The defence relationship is formalised through CDR, Closer Defence Relations.

We meet and discuss strategic issues regularly at Ministerial, Secretary of Defence and Chief of Defence Force levels.

Day to day management of the relationship takes place through a broad range of Defence Forums, frequent working level meetings, regular joint exercises and training and personnel exchanges.

We participate together in the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Proliferation Security Initiative. We look for interoperability in our equipment and doctrines.

A recent report on New Zealand Defence Strategy by Dr Jim Rolfe for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute concluded that the relationship was "strong and getting stronger".

That relationship has been forged in history beginning with the Gallipoli campaign.

Our two countries share similar histories, culture, political values and institutions, and nationals from each side of the Tasman can, and do freely move to and work in, each other's countries.

However, each country is a sovereign and independent nation.

From time to time we will express different views and take different decisions, as we did over Iraq.

That however does not detract from the overall relationship.

The Defence and Foreign Policy Frameworks set out a number of principles.

* Within a violent world, New Zealand is committed to building and keeping the peace.

* We have fundamental commitments under the United Nations Charter regarding the rule of law, human rights and maintaining international peace and security.

* However there are times when we may have to use force and the NZDF needs combat capabilities.

* As part of the comprehensive approach to security, we need to strengthen UN peacekeeping efforts, address the causes of conflict, working to reduce poverty, ensure good governance and human rights and supporting preventative diplomacy and confidence building measures.

* In terms of defence force capabilities, as well as protection of sovereignty, we needed to consider other roles such as maritime surveillance and resource protection, support for civil authorities in search and rescue, civil defence, crime and illegal migration and a counter-terrorist capability.

* Attention was drawn to our focus on the South Pacific, our wider security interests in Asia - Pacific, important relationships with Australia and the United States and the challenge of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Taking into account the strategic considerations and needs outlined, the Defence Policy Framework set out the requirements for a Defence Force for the twenty-first century.

Acknowledging the run-down of capabilities over the 1990s, it set out seven principles for shaping and rebuilding New Zealand's Defence Force.

These are that the Defence Force should be:

* equipped and trained for combat and peacekeeping;
* able and ready to be deployed;
* able to operate alongside other forces;
* equipped and trained at appropriate levels of readiness;
* able to sustain commitments;
* up to date in technology and doctrine; and
* needs to be fiscally sustainable.

In May 2001, the Government produced a Defence Statement entitled A Modern Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand's Needs.

This set out the path forward for reconfiguring a Defence Force which is modern, professional and well equipped, able to meet defence and security needs and sustainable and affordable over the longer term.

Its key components are:

* joint approach to structure and operational orientation by the three services;
* a modernised and reequipped army;
* an enhanced Navy fleet matched to New Zealand's wider security needs;
* a refocused and updated Air Force; and
* a funding commitment to provide financial certainty.

n 2002, the Government approved the Defence Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP) and committed NZ$3.3 billion over ten years to update and replace a range of equipment.

The LTDP links the Government's defence policy objectives, as set out in the Defence Policy Framework, with the capability requirements announced in the May 2001 Defence Statement.

This has seen the re-equipment of the Army, Navy and Air Force with new or upgraded equipment.

Acknowledging the need for sustainability, the approach has been to focus on achieving excellence in priority areas rather than trying to provide capacity across the board.

Hence the decision was taken to disband the air combat wing, while major capital-resourcing was put into new NH 90 and light utility/training helicopters and upgrading our C-130 transport and P-3 surveillance capacity.

Considerable investment has been put into seven new navy ships, with a focus on sea-lift capability through our new multi-role vessel and enhancing maritime surveillance, resource protection and border protection capabilities through our off-shore and inshore patrol fleet.

The Army has been re-equipped with new LAVIII's, Pinzgauer operational vehicles, new radio equipment and Javelin missiles.

Investment in equipment is being matched by investment in people and infrastructure.

In 2005, under the Defence Sustainability Initiative, the Government committed itself to a further $4.6 billion spending programme over ten years in these areas

These programmes reflect the Government's commitment to an enhanced, rather than diminished, role for the New Zealand Defence Force.

However, in the twenty-first century this role will be qualitatively different given the contemporary environment I mentioned in my opening comments.

The New Zealand Defence Force will continue to be trained and equipped for combat and from time-to-time, as it has been with the Special Forces in Afghanistan, deployed for this purpose.

But in recent years the predominant deployment of the Defence Force has been in security and peacekeeping tasks related to intra-state conflict.

We have responded to the need to re-establish security and stability to prevent human suffering and to prevent the development of an environment where criminality and terrorism can develop and flourish.

Our deployments in Bougainville, Bosnia, East Timor, the Solomons, Tonga and our PRT deployment in Afghanistan reflect these objectives, while other missions to Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia and the Lebanon have focused on removing mines and other explosive remnants of war.

Given the increasing focus on the need to intervene in failing states, further strategic thinking needs to be applied to the issue of how best to achieve and sustain security and stability in these circumstances.

Military intervention will generally be an essential component in controlling and stabilising a situation to prevent widespread death and destruction.

This was clearly the case in Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomons.

But for the resolution of conflict to be sustainable, we need more wide-ranging interventions to deal with the causes of state failure including actions to build institutions of state, and social services, and deal with issues of ethnic, tribal or religious conflict.

Stability and development are mutually dependant. Stability requires addressing poverty, under-development, economic crisis and weak or corrupt central government.

In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban and Al Qaeda will not be defeated simply by military means. Success there will depend on local populations concluding that the international intervention should be supported because it offers them not only security, but also improves the quality of their lives.

Development programmes taking place in our PRT area, Bamyan, that do improve peoples' lives as well as an effective peacekeeping operation, where our troops work with and are respected by local people, are important components in the success of our operation there.

In other deployments, such as East Timor and the Solomons, what is needed for longer-term stability, and an exit strategy for our deployments, is to build local capacity in governance, policing and defence forces and the provision of services.

What lessons can we draw from our experience*

Firstly there is the need for a holistic approach.

In each of these missions, peacekeeping and security forces are essential. They help stabilise a volatile situation as a necessary first step.

But while insecurity and violence are the most obvious and pressing problems, they are the manifestation of more deep-seated weaknesses, in particular ethnic tension, weak or corrupt central authorities, and lack of economic opportunity, which also need to be addressed.

RAMSI is an example of such an integrated intervention. While restoring law and order was RAMSI's first priority when it was established in 2003, work began immediately on the mission's other two pillars: machinery of government and economic development.

Each of the three pillars is essential to improve the lives of Solomon Islanders. Economic opportunity, good governance, and security go hand in hand.

Secondly, interventions must be balanced.

We must, as Kofi Annan put it, strike the right balance between hard and soft responses. Military forces will often be required to end instability and lawlessness where insurgents are a threat. In recognition of that we deployed three rotations of Special Forces personnel to Afghanistan.

But the use of force poorly applied can also undermine the consent environment, especially when it causes harm to local people. So-called collateral damage in dealing with insurgents or a heavy-handed approach to the local population will quickly turn them against intervention forces. Skill and sensitivity on the part of military forces is required to avoid that.

Use of force must be proportionate and highly discriminating. It needs to be balanced with the ability to get alongside the local people. Earning their respect and trust is critically important.

Thirdly, interventions must be inclusive.

The relationship between the intervening countries and the host needs to be a partnership in pursuit of shared goals. Being invited by the host government, and maintaining a consent environment, are important elements in the success of a mission. This is not always straightforward.

Likewise the local government needs to maintain ownership of its country's problems and the solutions to them. Otherwise the intervening force comes to be held responsible and to blame for what happens or does not happen.

Fourthly, the regional and international context should be factored in.

Regional participation or cooperation is important. Interventions are much more likely to succeed when neighbouring states lend their support.

The successful truce and peace missions that brought Bougainville out of conflict comprised, as well as Australian and New Zealand forces, neighbouring Pacific Island states that understood the environment and the people. The same dynamic is currently operating in the RAMSI mission in the Solomon Islands.

A stronger regional commitment in Timor-Leste, in parallel with the United Nations and bilateral commitments, is in my view essential to ensure Timor-Leste gets back on track to stability.

Collective interventions also build legitimacy with the host government, local population, and reduce the risk of the intervention being seen as a form of neo-colonialism.

Finally, we regard authorisation from the UN Security Council as vital for regional peace operations. This may be by the establishment of a UN mandated peacekeeping operation or as in the case of Timor Leste last year, by the approval of a force invited by the government in question.

To conclude, I have sought to outline today New Zealand's contemporary defence policy framework, and the considerations that contributed to it.

I have also set out the situations involving intra-state conflicts and state failure, which are currently the predominant cause of deployment of our Defence Force overseas.

I have suggested ways in which we, and others, can best achieve our security and stability objectives in such circumstances.

An effective and efficient Defence Force, trained and equipped for combat, but also with the skills for peacekeeping is essential. So too are the complementary whole-of-government actions necessary for the peace to be sustainable.

ENDS

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