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Cablegate: Un Force in Chad: The Devil Is in the Details

VZCZCXRO6915
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0259/01 0892350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 302350Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1630
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1221
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0638
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0250
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000259

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UN FORCE IN CHAD: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

REF: SECSTATE 36994

USUN NEW Y 00000259 001.8 OF 003


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a private meeting with the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), Minister of External Affairs
of Chad Ahmad Allam-mi stressed the GOC was still in the
"exploratory phase" of its deliberations on possible UN
peacekeeping in eastern Chad and was open to discussion on
the military component for an eventual force. However, he
outlined the GOC vision of such a force as one with a
humanitarian and protection mandate based not on UNSC
Resolution 1706 (2006), but rather on the September 20
African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC)
Communique. He emphasized the GOC commitment to ongoing
dialogue with the UN and the international community on the
issue and supported the dispatching of a UN preparatory
mission to Chad. Allam-mi feared a worsening of the
humanitarian situation in eastern Chad if the crisis there
were "internationalized" to the extent of appearing hostile
to regional players. He reverted to the traditional GOC
position of placing all blame for instability in eastern Chad
on the persistence of the Darfur crisis and on Sudanese
interference with Chadian rebels, showing little faith in
attempts at reconciliation with Chad's eastern neighbor.
Members seemed content with the prospect of continued
dialogue with the GOC and called for the UN to re-engage.
USUN recommends pushing the UN for the dispatching of
elements of the advance mission authorized in the January 16
PRST to intiate movement on eventual deployment of a UN
peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad. END SUMMARY.

2. (SBU) In a private meeting with the UNSC, Minister of
External Affairs of Chad Ahmad Allam-mi explained the GOC's
(i.e., President Deby's) position on deployment of a UN force
to Chad's eastern border region with Sudan. He prefaced his
explanation by recalling the GOC's desire to re-locate all 12
refugee camps from the border but offered no elaboration on
any GOC plan for this re-location when asked by Ambassador
Sanders. Noting the complicated situation that exists in
eastern Chad, including "murderous attacks" by the janjaweed
which have resulted in the exodus of thousands of Chadians to
Darfur, Allam-mi said the GOC had welcomed offers of
assistance from the international community to protect
refugees and humanitarian workers at risk in eastern Chad.
Even Deby himself had agreed "in principle" to deployment of
an international force for this purpose, Allami-mi went on,
under the condition that it deploy with full respect for
Chadian sovereignty.

3. (SBU) Allam-mi then turned to a member of his delegation
to outline the Chadian vision of such a force, a vision
centered around police forces supported by gendarmes, both of
whom should be under the auspices of an international police
force for training and monitoring purposes. The mandate of
this mission would be solely to protect refugees and
humanitarians to reinforce security in, between and around
refugee camps and to secure safe passage for humanitarian
convoys. Only later in the course of Q & A with Members did
Allam-mi specify that IDPs would also be included in this
category, but he was clear that refugees, not/not IDPs, were
the GOC's main protection concern. The total number of
police and gendarmes proposed was 2,316: 120 in each of the
12 camps (1,440), 11 operators for each of 36 tanks at each
of 12 camps (396), 20 civilian police for each of the 12
camps (240), 190 for convoy protection and 50 for
headquarters. Air assets were envisioned for the force,
according to Allam-mi. While he rejected both options for
deployment presented in the February 23 SYG Report (repeating
several times that deployment should be based not on OP9 of
UNSCR 1706 but rather on the September 20 AU PSC Communique),
Allam-mi said the GOC did not have a definitive position on
the UN presence (adding that the Council of Ministers had yet
to take a decision) and was open to discussion on its
military component. Allam-mi agreed with Ambassador Sanders
and Ghanaian Permanent Representative (PR) Effah-Apenteng
that the UN force must be able to execute its mandate and to
protect itself.

4. (SBU) Allam-mi emphasized the GOC commitment to ongoing
dialogue with the UN and the international community on the
issue and supported the dispatching of a UN "preparatory
mission" to Chad (NOTE: It was unclear whether Allam-mi was
referring to the advance mission MiNUTAC authorized in the

USUN NEW Y 00000259 002.6 OF 003


January 16 UNSC Presidential Statement. END NOTE). He
favored an eventual UN presence that would be of "modest"
size so as to avoid creating an "internationalization" of the
situation in eastern Chad that would provoke regional
players, citing action that Libya had taken to try to calm
the situation. Allam-mi feared that Sudan would see a robust
force as an attempt to cross the border into Darfur and would
accordingly retaliate, as it was already doing in violation
of the Tripoli Accords by arming Chadian rebels and bombing
sites in the northeastern region of Chad's border. Given
these bombings, Allam-mi contended Sudan was incapable of
adhering to the terms of the Tripoli Accords, which called
for a joint Chad-Sudan border force. Allam-mi claimed the
GOC was fighting the janjaweed along its eastern border,
resulting in modest IDP returns. He offered the support of
Chadian security forces to the eventual UN operation but was
emphatic that the international presence play no part with
Chad's internal rebellion.

5. (SBU) Members were content with the prospect of continued
dialogue with the GOC. Congolese PR Ikouebe and Ghanaian PR
Effah-Apenteng called for a "meeting of the minds" between
the UN and the GOC to find an "imaginative" solution to
securing the east. French PR de La Sabliere was concerned by
the apparent disconnect between GOC and UN visions of eastern
Chad peacekeeping and called for a meeting with the UN
Secretariat to find a solution. He called for a new UN

SIPDIS
mission to the region to conduct technical discussions with
Chadian authorities, a call seconded by the Chinese, UK and
Russian delegates. To this end Ambassador Sanders, drawing
from reftel points, urged the immediate dispatching of the
advance mission authorized by the Council in its January 16
Presidential Statement.

6. (SBU) Several delegations called for respect for GOC
sovereignty. The Chinese, Russian and Qatari representatives
insisted on GOC consent before any UN deployment in eastern
Chad. The French PR said that no further action on
deployment could be taken without GOC endorsement. The
Qatari delegate stressed that the GOC bore primary
responsibility for the protection of its civilians but did
not rule out external assistance from neighboring states and
the international community. Employing a traditional stall
tactic, he raised the possibility of seeking Sudanese
concurrence on the idea of a UN border force, an idea echoed
by Russian Deputy PR Dolgov. Allam-mi acknowledged that
provisions of the Tripoli Accords calling for such
consultation had gone unimplemented, and he reiterated that
the solution to eastern Chad's problems lay in solving those
in Darfur.

7. (SBU) No next steps were explicitly outlined. The French
Mission circulated a "discussion paper" in advance of
Allam-mi's briefing, but no action was taken on it during or
after the March 23 session. Based on Members' reactions, it
was premature to begin deliberations on an eventual
resolution - Allam-mi in fact thanked the UNSC for not having
hastily tabled a resolution - until the UN returns to Chad to
continue discussions with the GOC.

8. (SBU) Poloff and Miloff subsequently met with DPKO Police
Division and Chad Operations Office to talk about next steps
in the wake of Allam-mi's proposal. DPKO police planners are
moving forward but are opposed to the idea of deploying any
police into a hostile environment without military back-up.
They mentioned that they had personnel ready to go for the
advance mission authorized in the January 16 PRST (MiNUTAC),
whenever that mission might deploy. Poloff asked what was
preventing these officers from going to Chad to initiate such
technical discussions, since the Council authorized this
departure back in January and since the police component was
the one thing to which the GOC did not object and which would
be necessary regardless of what the military component would
or would not ultimately look like. Poloff argued that
sending out such a team (for which funding already existed)
could be seen as a confidence-building measure to get the
dialogue going with the GOC, which had indicated through
Allam-mi it was open to dialogue on the peacekeeping plan
presented, and to lay the groundwork for adding on further
peacekeeping layers to the eventual force. DPKO Police
replied only that dispatching police would appear to be
acquiescing to GOC demands.

USUN NEW Y 00000259 003.6 OF 003

9. (SBU) DPKO Chad Operations Officer said he was working on
a draft letter from the SYG to President Deby that was
intended to take Deby up on his offer of dialogue on details
of UN peacekeeping in eastern Chad. He agreed with Poloff
that a third Technical Assessment Team would not be necessary
and that MiNUTAC should be used as the vehicle for dialogue
with the GOC. DPKO was concerned that Allam-mi's plan
considered IDPs as an afterthought and would make sure this
issue would not be neglected in any UN conversations with the
GOC.

10. (SBU) USUN recommends pushing the UN for the dispatching
of elements of the advance mission authorized in the January
16 PRST to intiate movement on eventual deployment of a UN
peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad. UN police experts
could discuss with GOC counterparts plans for policing
refugee camps and humanitarian corridors that would serve
Chadian interests by training local police. The planners
would need to stress, however, that this benefit does not
come for free and would require military back-up to ensure
protection and sustainability.
WOLFF

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