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Cablegate: Outreach Request On U.S. Proposal to Expand And

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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0919 1250019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041756Z MAY 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
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UNCLAS STATE 060919

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SENSITIVE
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NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY
DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY
DOD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID
BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN

REF: A. BERLIN 000845

1. (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below.

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political
Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal
(coordinated by the NSC with strong interagency
support) to expand and extend the G8 Global
Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction (GP) for another 10 years
(2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion; other
GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging
global WMD threats. This proposal was also raised
at the April 26-27 Sherpas meeting and more
extensively in the April 23 Global Partnership
Working Group meeting (GPWG) (reftel). All GP
members recognize the evolving global WMD threat,
but most have been resistant to our proposal )
largely due to worries about cost and potential
for dilution of ongoing efforts in Russia and
the former Soviet Union (FSU). Canada and the
UK are the most supportive. Russia poses the
strongest opposition and has expressed that
the original Kananaskis priorities must be
completed before moving forward. Germany has
expressed similar concerns. Therefore the U.S.
is increasing senior diplomatic outreach to G8
partners on this proposal, emphasizing that this
commitment will help address critical global
proliferation challenges, including the requirements
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,
and other G8 priorities. END SUMMARY.

----------------
BACKGROUND
----------------

3. (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8
initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 2002
to address the spread of WMD, and now includes the
G8 plus 13 additional donor nations and the EU.
2007 marks the halfway point for the Global
Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion
commitment. GP donor pledges to date come
in at over $17 billion (including $10 billion
from the U.S.), plus an additional $6 billion
from Russia. The current GP scope addresses WMD
threats only within Russia and other former Soviet
states (the U.S. recognizes all former Soviet nations
as GP recipients, but so far only Russia and Ukraine
are officially recognized as recipient states by the
entire Partnership). The Kananaskis document
anticipated an expansion by mandating that GP
programs begin &initially in Russia8 but not be
limited to Russia. In the context of the G8, the
GP is handled by the Global Partnership Working
Group (GPWG), which reports to the Nonproliferation
Directors Group (NPDG). The GP is a unique model
of multilateral cooperation to combat WMD and missile
threats and has made great progress in its first five
years to reduce the proliferation threat, including
chemical weapons destruction; redirection of former
WMD scientists, technicians and engineers; improving
security for fissile nuclear materials, chemical
weapons stocks and biological agents; and dismantlement
of decommissioned nuclear submarines.

4. (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend the
GP to combat new and emerging global WMD threats
includes four components: 1) Immediate expansion
of geographic scope outside of Russia and the former
Soviet Union (to include the broadest possible
participation of new recipient states worldwide);
2) Immediate inclusion of broadest possible
functional scope to include all chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and missile
threats; 3) Extension of time commitment for an
additional 10 years (2012-2022); and 4) Increased
financial commitment of an additional $20 billion
for 2012-2022 with the same parameters as original
commitment (U.S. $10 billion; $10 billion from other
donors). The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement
at the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8
committed to coordinate activities to reduce the
global WMD threat through the GP. Note that the
U.S. and other G8 donors (notably Canada and the
UK) believe that the Kananaskis Guidelines and
Principles, on which the GP was formed, already
include a broad interpretation of threats (chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and missile);
however Russia has strongly argued to limit scope
to Russia,s most important priorities of chemical
weapons destruction and nuclear submarine dismantlement.

5. (SBU) After working this proposal at the level
of the GPWG and Political Directors, the U.S. has
gained some support from most G8 members for the
first two objectives (geographic and programmatic
expansion), with limited to no support for the
10-year extension and additional financial
commitments at this time. Russia objects to
the entire proposal.

---------------------------------------------
JAPAN POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
---------------------------------------------

6. (SBU) Japan has participated in the GP, but
has not committed much funding. Japan initially
expressed its concern about justifying an expansion
of the GP when the program is so associated with a
now oil rich Russia. However, we are working to make
it clear to Japan that a geographic expansion of the
GP would include Asia and could help address some of
Japan,s regional security concerns. Japan was
recently supportive of the geographic expansion
at the April 23 GPWG, but did not endorse the
financial commitment or specific time extension.

7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to reach
out, at the highest level, to Japan to garner support
for this proposal. The Draft G8 Leaders' language
proposed by the U.S. for inclusion in the
Nonproliferation statement (as mentioned in
the points below) will follow as an attachment
by email to Post.

Recommended talking points are included in Para 8.

8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND APPROPRIATE:

--In addition to meeting or exceeding our current
Global Partnership commitments laid out at Kananaskis,
the global WMD threat we face is urgent and evolving,
and our collective peace and security depends on our
response and leadership. Therefore, we must act
immediately and provide that leadership to address
the threats that all our nations face.

--Expanding the geographic scope of the Global
Partnership to focus on worldwide threats beyond
Russia and the former Soviet Union - with all G8
nations (including Russia) as partners - would
allow for greater attention to combat emerging
terrorist threats in Southeast Asia and other
terrorist hotspot regions.

--In fact, the U.S. is already beginning to address
global WMD threats, including important work to
combat nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological
threats in Southeast Asia.

--Despite a longstanding discussion on the GP,s
future within the Global Partnership Working Group
and general support for the ideas we are proposing,
our proposal to expand and extend the GP is not
reflected in the circulated drafts of the GPWG,s
midpoint 5-year review document or the NPDG,s
broader nonproliferation statement.

--We understand that the financial commitment we
are asking for - another $10 billion from other
GP donors - is substantial. We recognize that
it will not be easy and will take time for many
GP members to develop mechanisms to fund projects
to combat the global threat.

--This is precisely why we must act now to begin
the expansion and extension process.
The global threat we face is too important
to delay, and we have a chance to show
important leadership.

--All G8 nations face the threat of WMD proliferation,
including WMD terrorism, and should not stop working on
halting the spread of WMD, related materials and delivery
systems after the Kananaskis documents, terms expire in
2012.

--The original Kananaskis document stated a vision
for the future, and we are asking Leaders to reaffirm
a commitment for a vision of the future beyond 2012.

-- Global security demands that we help to eliminate
chemical weapons worldwide, reduce dangerous nuclear,
radiological, chemical, and biological materials, and
secure those which remain. In doing so, we will greatly
reduce the dangerous of WMD proliferation and terrorism.
Even as we do so, we will also facilitate access worldwide
to the economic and social benefits of the peaceful use of
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials.

--We have also committed to help the nations of the world
implement United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540, thereby filling critical gaps in proliferation
prevention around the world. Expansion and extension
of the GP would provide us with a way to help fill these
gaps.

--The GP has been successful and effective despite
numerous obstacles to implementation, most of which
have been overcome. The Partnership works without
any bureaucracy or institutional infrastructure and
is a positive model of cooperation for combating
global proliferation threats. This makes the GP
an effective mechanism for providing assistance to
reduce global proliferation threats, including by meeting
our 1540 obligations in addition to other
critical G8 commitments, such as the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to
coordinate activities to reduce the global
WMD threat through the GP. It is time now
to take the next step to continue and expand
the GP.

--We have drafted Leaders, language for your
consideration as part of the G8 Nonproliferation
statement and we hope you will support us.

--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional $10
billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that other GP donors
can also be able to match this.

IF THE INTERLOCUTOR INDICATES PREFERENCE FOR THE
CURRENT FORMAL MECHANISM OF ADMITTING NEW RECIPIENT
STATES:

--We feel that the current mechanism for admitting
new GP recipient states is cumbersome and does not
serve the G8,s need to broadly combat the WMD threat.
Five years into the Partnership, Russia has only
allowed itself and one other nation (Ukraine) to
formally benefit from the GP.

--When countries ask us for assistance in combating
terrorist threats they face, or when we identify an
important threat, we do not have the luxury of waiting
for a formal process before we act.

--Therefore, we urge you to consider the broadest
possible participation of states when the geographic
scope of the GP is expanded.

END POINTS

9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this action
request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel), NSC (Mary
Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen Newhouse),
ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff, Elizabeth Cameron,
David Evans), E (John Duncan and Benedict Wolf), P
(Maren Brooks), T (Susan Koch and Jim Timbie), S/P
(Ed Lacey), EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt, Lisa Benthien),
DOE (Joyce Connery, Gerald Stacey), and DoD/CTR
(Jim Reid, Monette Melason, Andy Weber).
RICE

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