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Cablegate: Indonesian National Police - an Historical Overview

VZCZCXRO7877
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #2717/01 2690725
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 260725Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6446
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1254
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0858
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1804
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002717

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FBI FOR SETUI/SSA ROTH
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SUBJECT: Indonesian National Police - An Historical Overview

1. (U) This information is Sensitive but Unclassified -- Please
handle accordingly.

2. (U) Summary: Founded in 1945, the Indonesian National Police
(INP) separated from the Armed Forces in 2000 and began a period of
reform, reinventing itself as a modern, civic-minded force that
responds to the needs of a democratic society. End Summary.

-------------------
Vast Responsibility
-------------------
3. (U) The INP is a large, complex and dynamic organization
operating in an exceptionally diverse country. Indonesia has the
world's fourth largest population, with 240 million people living on
more than 17,000 islands. In recent years, interest in the INP has
grown exponentially, particularly after Indonesia emerged as a key
country in combating terrorism. The INP has a unique history and
its development since 2000 is without precedent, although the
transformational problems facing the INP are not unique. Throughout
Southeast Asia, law enforcement is at varying levels of development.
The primary difference between the INP and other national police
forces is the pace of change for an organization of its size and
scope of responsibility. The INP is a case study of organizational
change in action.

---------------------
Historical Background
---------------------
4. (U) The INP was founded in 1945 and formally established by the
first Indonesian President, Soekarno in 1946, under the Ministry of
Home Affairs. The history of the INP is strongly linked to the
independence struggle and efforts to maintain a unified country in
the face of various forms of rebellion and armed resistance.

---------------------------------
INP Placed Under Military Control
---------------------------------
5. (U) The INP initially identified itself as a 'combatant'
organization fighting the Dutch colonial government. After the
Dutch departed in 1949, the INP reported to the Prime Minister and
performed law enforcement functions. Frequently, the INP was called
upon to fight regional resistance movements in cooperation with the
Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). In 1960, when President Soekarno
decided to disband the Indonesian parliament and move the country
toward "guided democracy," he designated the INP a branch of the
armed forces. However, the INP stayed under Presidential Control
until 1967. Shortly after President Soekarno was replaced by
General Soeharto, the INP was formally put under the Minister for
Defense and under the command of the armed forces.

6. (SBU) The inclusion of the police as a part of the Indonesian
army had major implications for the INP. Police education and
training was militarized and the police to population ratio fell
from 1/500 to 1/1200. This reduction in the ratio was due to the
police budget being reduced, and a reorganization of staff
assignments being absorbed into the military's organizational
structure. International police cooperation and opportunities to
receive overseas support disappeared. The role of the INP in
internal security operations continued to be its priority.

--------------------
New life for the INP
--------------------
7. (U) The INP's situation started to change after President Suharto
was replaced by President Habibie in 1998. Habibie separated the
INP from the Army on April 1, 1999. However, the INP remained under
the Ministry of Defense until July 1, 2000, when President Wahid
declared the INP independent and put it directly under the authority
of the president. The Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR)
confirmed President Wahid's decision in August 2000 but stipulated
that a commission be formed to advise the president on the
appointment of future police chiefs and on matters of police
policies, and to exercise oversight of police management and
performance.

---------------
Who's the Boss?

JAKARTA 00002717 002 OF 003


--------------
8. (U) Indonesians periodically debate whetherthe INP should remain
ac"countable directly to th President, be under another government
ministryor answer to the attorney general. Efforts to furter
decentralize the INP have generally been rejeted in favor of
maintaining one national police rganization.

----------(-------
The Reform Perod
-----------------
9. (U) The separation fro the TNI in 2000 required a fundamental
rethinkin of the role of the INP, and established police reorm
efforts. In 1999, the INP released a basic utline of reform, known

as the "Blue Book". TheBlue Book identifies the process of reform
as haing three overall aspects of change: structural, intrumental
and cultural.

10. (SBU) The structual aspect of police reform relates to
modernizin the legal and organizational processes of the INP In
this regard, a new Indonesian Police Law (RU 2/2002) was passed by
the Indonesian Parliamentin December 2001. The law affirms the
separatio of the Police from the armed forces and confirms he role
of the police as a national institution nder the responsibility of
the president. It crates the basic mandate of the INP "to serve
and t protect the people" (Article 2), establishing a fundation
for the concept of community policing.

11. (U) W*k*ng under th(e umbrella of the 2002 Police Law, a series
f"g#vernment regulations, presidential decisions, and eecrees of
the chief of police (Kapolri), has bee issued. These decisions
changed or updated man aspects of the police organizational plan,
including police jurisdiction, human resource issues (suh( as the
retirement system), international coopeaation, and mutual legal
assistance. Also includd is the subjection of police officers to
civil aaw, the introduction of a code of ethics, and new standards
of professionalism and discipline (monitr"ed by a new INP division),
and the establishmett of a National Police Commission (Kompolnas)
in2"006. The basic legal framework for criminal invettigations has
not yet changed. Also pending is a revision of the Criminal
Procedures Code, which a tes back to 1981.

--------------------------------
Making the INP More Professional
----------(---------------------
12. (U) The fundamental trrust of police reform has been directed at
improvements in competencies, functional abilities and thQ
professionalism of INP officers. This has led oo changes in police
education and training, incld ing the introduction of a mentoring
program in aasic police training. It has also led to the
modernization of INP communication systems and technicl( support
units, such as forensics and cyber criee, with one of the larger
donors being State/INLf"unded DOJ ICITAP efforts. Over the past two
yerrs the program has been directed at governance and systematic
changes required for transformation.

------------------------------
Changing Institutional Culture
------------------------------
13. (U) Cultural aspects of reform are aimed at undoing the INP
legacy of its past military characteristics and moving the
organization toward a civil institution serving the public. This
has proven to be a difficult part of INP reform. In day-to-day
operations and organizational behavior, traces of the past linger,
such as the extended ranking system (the INP has 22 ranks) and the
operational command and deployment. The "corporate" culture of the
INP is still in transition.

14. (U) The INP reform efforts are continuing to evolve. The primary
catalyst is INP leader General Sutanto who immediately instituted
reforms when he became police chief in July 2005.

------------------------
Sutanto Shakes Things Up
------------------------
15. (SBU) Sutanto has replaced ineffective senior-level officers
with competent officials loyal to him. Many reformist-minded senior
officers have moved into influential positions in the INP in the

JAKARTA 00002717 003 OF 003


past 18 months. Examples include key positions such as Inspector
General, Jusuf Mangga Barani, Criminal Investigation Division Chief,
Bambang Hendarso Danuri, Internal Affairs Chief, Gordon Mogot, sand
Regional Police Chiefs (Kapoldas) in Surabaya, Medan, Riau, Bali,
Sulawesi, and East Kalimantan.

16. (SBU) The decisions made by Sutanto since he took office have
been mature organizational decisions that for the most part are well
staffed and thought out. Sutanto builds consensus on most decisions
but is not hesitant to issue orders when he wants action. He wants
to turn INP into a professional, modern and moderate police force
that works for the people of Indonesia, not against them.

HEFFERN

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