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Cablegate: Joint Monitoring Task Force (Jmg-Tf)

VZCZCXRO1428
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0036/01 0141406
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141406Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7356
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: Joint Monitoring Task Force (JMG-TF)
Meeting of 11 January 2008

REF: (A) 07 Kinshasa 1419; (B) 07 Kinshasa 1426;

(C) Kinshasa 0007

1. Reftels are reports on prior meetings of the JMG-TF.

2. Following are highlights of the Task Force Meeting of the Joint
Monitoring Group held in Goma on January 4, 2008.
Goma Report January 11, 2008: Task Force of the Joint Monitoring
Group

3. Summary: At the meeting of the Task Force of the Joint
Monitoring Group January 11, GDRC continued to ask Rwanda to provide
its list of genocidaires, and Rwanda --mercifully -- tried to
explain the difficulties in finalizing the list. MONUC's DDRRR
chief urged GDRC to be content with the existing Most Wanted list.
GDRC noted the ongoing Kivu Conference's focus on dealing with
ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The Rwandans were meticulous about the previous
meeting's minutes. End Summary.

4. The fourth meeting of the Task Force of the Joint Monitoring
Group took place in Goma January 11, with the same Congolese and
Rwandan participation as in the previous meeting, Col. Augustin
Mamba chairing the two-person Congolese delegation and Major Franco
Rutagengwa chairing the four-person Rwandan delegation.

5. Mamba said that the on-going Kivus Conference was a major
chapter in the sensitization phase of the FDLR plan, presented to
Rwanda December 1, to disarm the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The conference
was concentrating on making the local population aware of the urgent
need for these Rwandans to disarm and leave the Kivus, and as from
January 14 DRC officials and leaders of the conference would be
meeting ex-FAR/Interahamwe to stress that their time in DRC was
coming to an end. It would be helpful to the DRC, he said, if
Rwanda would provide the list of genocidaires, as called for in the
Nairobi communique. Mamba said that the DRC agreed with Rwanda that
dealing with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe was the major objective of the
Nairobi communique, but DRC needed to cope with internal armed
groups as well as a core "sub-objective."

6. Rutagengwa said that Rwanda had fulfilled, or was in the process
of fulfilling, its four obligations stipulated under the Nairobi
communique. Its short border with DRC was completely sealed. It
was providing no support whatever to any armed group inside DRC. It
was encouraging ex-FAR/Interahamwe to return home, having put in
place a full range of mechanisms for safe return: assistance with
food, tools, and building materials, health care, education, and
security. As for the list of genocidaires, it would come soon.
Rwanda wanted to provide a definitive list and was consulting with
its "gachacha" courts. Rwanda interpreted paragraph 9 of the
Nairobi communique (DRC's commitments) to mean that the list of
genocidaires did not need to be made available before the DRC had
relocated ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements to temporary reception
centers. DRC did not need the list to get on with its sensitization
campaign.

7. Mamba agreed that the list was not an essential requirement for
commencing the sensitization campaign -- indeed, this campaign was
well under way in the Kivus conference -- but having the list would
help DRC in this campaign. Mamba did not explain why it would help.
MONUC's chief of DDRRR, Phil Lancaster (present at the meeting),
noted that DRC already had Rwanda's provisional list of Most Wanted
genocidaires with 72 names (Lancaster later corrected the number to
114). He urged DRC to use that list in its sensitization campaign,
as it would help show the populace and ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements
that some of the FDLR leadership had a personal stake in "holding
them hostage," and they might therefore be more amenable to return.
However, Mamba said that perhaps "only five or ten" of the FDLR
leaders were on the list.

8. In an aside, one of the Rwandan delegates told poloff that the
complete genocidaire list, whenever it was completed, would likely
be "very long," on the order of "tens of thousands." Privately,
Lancaster told poloff that when he discussed the Most Wanted list
with Mamba after the Task Force meeting, Mamba appeared never to
have seen it. Lancaster also commented to poloff that it appeared
to be in the interest of neither party to have a list published,
since a long list would make the task of bringing about the peaceful
return of ex-FAR/Interahame much more difficult.

9. The parties had no new recommendations for the Joint Monitoring
Group. They repeated the need to for the upcoming Envoys Level
meeting to clarify the relationship between the Task Force and Joint
Verification Commission, and repeated the recommendation that the
Envoys urge the Security Council to adopt sanctions against the
ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The last JMG agreed that there would be a
serious discussion on the resources that are necessary to implement

KINSHASA 00000036 002 OF 002


the Nairobi Communique. The EU observer to the Task Force suggested
that the Task Force might propose that new allegations be put on the
table at Task Force meetings but sent to the Joint Verification
Commission for investigation, then brought back to the Task Force;
alternatively, he suggested there could be some joint Task Force/JVC
meetings exclusively reserved to dealing with such allegations. The
Rwandan delegation objected to these suggestions, observing that the
envoys had not yet decided the fundamental issue of whether
allegations should be brought to the Task Force at all.

10. Half the meeting was addressed to caviling over the minutes of
the previous Task Force meeting, in particular the characterization
of the discussion therein of whether DRC should give priority to
combating ex-FAR/Interahamwe or Nkunda. The MONUC chairman of the
Task Force, Acting Head of Office Gernot Sauer, wanted the minutes
to reflect something he had said himself during the meeting. The
offending sentence read: "MONUC referred to the statement of Rwandan
Envoy Dr. Sezibera during the 16 December JMG-Envoy Level meeting in
Goma where he declared that it was DRC's sovereign right to decide
for herself what to do next militarily." The Rwandan delegation
objected to this sentence, as giving the impression that Sezibera
had not been clear that the priority of the Nairobi communique was
ex-FAR/Interahamwe. Sauer asked whether the parties disagreed that
Sezibera had said what he quoted him as saying and whether it was
not appropriate for the minutes to reflect that he, Sauer, had
quoted Sezibera. After considerable discussion, the Task Force
agreed to keep the sentence but add a phrase to the sentence, that
Sezibera had stressed that "priority should be given to
ex-FAR/Interahamwe."

11. At the conclusion of the meeting, Sauer suggested that the
parties might in the future consider being less legalistic, as
discussion of the minutes was taking an inordinate amount of time,
even if the present meeting (five hours) was shorter than previous
meetings (eight hours).

Garvelink

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