Cablegate: Breakthrough with Nkunda
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0065/01 0231443
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231443Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7405
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000065
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL CG
SUBJECT: Breakthrough with Nkunda
REF: Kinshasa 0064
1. (SBU) Summary: After a discouraging day January 22, (reftel)
the morning of January 23 brought a breaking of the impasse with the
CNDP. Nkunda has ordered his delegation to return to Goma and sign
an agreement with a few more changes in his favor. The key was
direct telephonic contact between Nkunda and conference leaders
Kamerhe, Malu Malu, and Ruberwa. End Summary.
2. (SBU) As reported reftel, the hoped-for day of closure of the
Kivus Conference ended in huge disappointment, with the CNDP
delegation returning to its territory to confer with their boss.
The government side appeared to have hardened on language in the
opening of the draft document, insisting that it could not be seen
to be on a par with the CNDP.
3. (SBU) Tim Shortley, Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary
Jendayi Frazer, reached Nkunda by telephone early on January 23 and,
with EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer and SRSG Alan Doss, began
a long parley with him (often broken by rupture of the connection).
Nkunda insisted on five points:
-- The government would have to commit to giving the agreement the
force of law.
-- The Technical Commission established to oversee disengagement,
brassage, and DDR would need to be chaired by the government and
co-chaired by the international community.
-- The section dealing with the Commission's handling of modalities
of brassage would have to be linked with the continued threat of
-- SRSG would sign for the United Nations rather than for MONUC.
4. (SBU) Van de Geer and Shortley communicated these demands to
conference leaders Apollinaire Malu Malu and Vital Kamerhe, who were
attending a reconvened plenary of the conference and came
immediately to the Karibu Hotel, with Minister of State Denis Kalume
and Azarias Ruberwa, to confer on Nkunda's changes.
5. (SBU) After a relatively brief discussion with van de Geer,
Doss, and Shortley, and a brief private discussion among themselves,
they agreed to compromise on every point. Shortley got Nkunda back
on the telephone, put Doss on with Nkunda briefly, and then put on
first Kamerhe and then Malu Malu, both of whom spoke with Nkunda at
some length, hammering out precise language and emphasizing that
they needed to seize the historic moment. Nkunda agreed on language
for every point. MONUC gave the signal to its force to bring the
CNDP delegation (with Nkunda at Kimoka, an hour and a half drive
from Goma) back to Goma to sign the accord.
6. (SBU) The agreed changes are as follows: First, the opening
language now specifies, "We, the CNDP, Political-Military Group,
PARECO/FAP (and seven other named Mai Mai groups), with the solemn
commitment, especially as concerns Article 4 (which covers political
and judicial guarantees by the government, including amnesty for
insurrection), of the Government and the Representatives of the
International Community, facilitators of the present undertaking
("acte d'enagement") -- the International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region, the United States of America, the African Union, and
the European Union -- ..." This language much more directly commits
the government to the entirety of the document, but it avoids the
appearance of putting the government on the same level as CNDP and
other military groups.
7. (SBU) Second, the language setting up the Technical Commission
now reads: "A mixed Peace and Security Technical Commission, under
the co-chair of the Government and the international facilitation of
this undertaking (engagement), will be legally instituted by the
Government to examine and finalize the following issues, notably
..." (followed by numerous sections on disengagement, brassage, and
DDR). This language differs from wording hammered out the previous
day, by specifying co-chairmanship by the Government and the
international community (without who within the international
community), rather than merely calling for facilitation by the
8. (SBU) Third, among the responsibilities of the Technical
Commission was previously agreed: "Determination of the modalities
of brassage," to which a phrase is now added: "taking into account
the presence of foreign armed groups addressed by the Joint
Communique of Nairobi of November 9, 2007." Hereby, Nkunda signaled
his intent to integrate his forces only to the extent that
ex-FAR/Interahamwe/FDLR are adequately controlled. Fourth, the
KINSHASA 00000065 002 OF 002
signature line for MONUC was changed to United Nations, with the
concurrence of SRSG Doss.
9. (SBU) With this undertaking ("acte d'engagement") now agreed,
and the CNDP delegation on the way back to Goma, the closing
ceremony of the Kivus Conference and signature of this agreement are
now scheduled for the afternoon of January 23.