Cablegate: Missile Technology Control Regime (Mtcr): Results
R 082042Z JAN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 002034
PARIS FOR EST:H. SMITH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2033
TAGS: MTCRE PARM MNUC ETTC KSCA TSPA FR GR
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): RESULTS
OF THE NOVEMBER 5-9, 2007 ATHENS PLENARY (C)
REF: 07 STATE 156270
Classified By: ISN DAS Donald A. Mahley.
Reason: 1.4 (B), (D). H).
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the November 5-9, 2007 Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary meeting in Athens,
the 34 MTCR Partners reaffirmed their commitment to
strengthening missile-related export controls and thereby
discouraging missile activities and programs of concern.
They discussed trends in missile development worldwide,
including the rapid changes in technology which require the
MTCR to continuously adapt to keep pace with the evolving
missile threat, and reiterated their concerns about the
serious threat posed by the growing risk of the proliferation
of WMD and their means of delivery. The MTCR Partners noted
that regional missile proliferation continues to be a serious
problem and expressed particular concern over missile
proliferation in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and South
Asia. They also expressed their determination to exercise
vigilance and prevent transfers of any items, materials,
goods and technology that could contribute to WMD ballistic
missile programs of proliferation concern and called on all
States to fully and effectively implement the relevant
provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718,
1737, and 1747.
2. (C) The Partners also held in-depth discussions ) in
both the Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) and the Plenary )
on a U.S. proposal to modify how the Regime controls Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles. The majority of
the Partners supported the proposal, but the Partners were
not able to agree to adopt it. Russia led the opposition,
proposing as an alternative a comprehensive, zero-based
review of the Regime,s control criteria, goals, and purpose
so that Russia and other Partners that were not present when
the MTCR was established in 1987 could have a hand in shaping
the basic parameters of the Regime. Brazil and South Africa
both continued to reserve on the proposal.
3. (C) During the TEM, the Partners adopted a number of
changes to the MTCR Annex (control list) to keep pace with
technological advances and trends in proliferation
procurement. At the Law Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM),
Partners exchanged information on best practices and recent
efforts in interdiction. They also agreed to continue their
efforts to update the law enforcement experts handbook. The
Partners also shared information on priority developments in
missile proliferation and engaged in an extremely substantive
and productive Information Exchange (IE) session.
4. (C) No new members were admitted to the Regime at Athens.
However, the Partners agreed on a broad spectrum of contacts
with non-members concerning the missile proliferation threat
and the MTCR's goals and activities.
5. (C) KEY PLENARY OUTCOMES:
--Partners agreed to exercise vigilance against the export to
Iran of listed items, materials, goods and technology,
consistent with UNSCRs 1696 and 1737. They also took note of
U.S. information on Iranian front companies relevant to these
--Partners reiterated their support for UNSCR 1540 and agreed
the MTCR Chair should continue to pursue contact with the
--Partners adopted a U.S. proposal on outreach to
non-members. Specifically, Partners were encouraged to use
their national outreach efforts to actively encourage
non-Partners to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a
--Partners also agreed that the MTCR Chair, with assistance
from the TEM Chair, should inform non-Partner countries of
changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex, with a view to
facilitating the widest possible application of these
documents and enabling interested non-Partners to harmonize
their controls with MTCR standards.
--Partners agreed to a 45-day silence procedure regarding a
German proposal on suggested best practices for sharing and
using Regime denial information.
--Partners agreed to a number of changes to the MTCR Annex,
including an amendment of the payload definition for &other
UAVs;8 creation of a new control for an oxidizer substance
usable in solid propellant rocket motors (Item 4.C.4.b.5);
adoption of strengthened controls for environmental chambers;
and clarification of the control text for two polymeric
substances and a technical note for maraging steels.
--Partners agreed on the utility of holding a joint session
of the IE, LEEM, and TEM at future Plenary meetings.
--Partners reaffirmed their agreement to update the MTCR
Enforcement Officers Handbook. This project will be
coordinated by Canada.
--Partners agreed to hold a Reinforced Point of Contact
(RPOC) meeting in Paris no later than April 2008.
--Partners accepted Australia,s offer to host/chair the
Plenary in 2008 Plenary, and to serve as MTCR Chair in
6. (C) Following the formal opening of the Plenary on
November 5 by outgoing Danish Chairman Ambassador Per
Fischer, the MTCR Partners confirmed Ambassador Eleftherios
Danellis as the 2007 MTCR Chair. Greek Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Secretary General for European Affairs Dimitrios
Katsoudas then delivered opening remarks. Portugal (on
behalf of the EU states participating in the MTCR and
Norway), the Russian Federation, Australia, Japan, and Turkey
also made opening statements.
7. (C) During his remarks, Secretary General Katsoudas
stressed the importance of further strengthening the MTCR as
a means for helping to maintain regional security and
stability, and the need for the MTCR Partners to underscore
their commitment to implementing fully and effectively all
missile nonproliferation-relevant UNSCRs. He also noted the
importance of focusing on the proliferant activities of
non-state actors as well as countries with programs of
8. (C) The EU statement lauded the Regime for its
contributions over the past twenty years in slowing or
halting missile development programs around the world and its
work in establishing a standard for responsible missile
nonproliferation behavior. The EU also stressed the
commitment of all EU countries to missile nonproliferation
and urged Partners to search for new ways to further
strengthen the MTCR,s effectiveness. In particular, the EU
urged that additional emphasis be placed on outreach to
non-members and to admitting countries with long-pending
applications to membership in the Regime, e.g., Croatia,
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia. Finally, the EU urged enhanced support by the
MTCR to the UNSCR 1540 Committee and recommended adoption of
an EU proposal to give special attention to a &Watch List8
of items of particular utility to the Iranian missile program.
9. (C) Russia said that missile nonproliferation and
strengthening the MTCR are among its top foreign policy
priorities and cited Russia,s initiative to universalize the
INF Treaty as an example of its commitment to missile
nonproliferation. Russia also wished to increase the
Regime,s effectiveness to adapt to &new realities and
technology challenges,8 and suggested that it might be time
for the Regime to re-evaluate the basic parameters of the
Regime, to assess the global missile threat, and then to
collectively identify how to shape the Regime to address the
threat, including by adjusting the control parameters.
10. (C) Russia also noted that in its view the Regime would
only be &functional8 when it admits those countries that
are actively developing missile and space programs. Russia
therefore hoped the Regime would increase its outreach
efforts with that goal in mind. Additionally, Russia urged
that Partners not try to single out any one country as a bad
proliferator but to take a regional approach to
nonproliferation. Additionally, Russia reminded Partners
that the MTCR is not a sanctions Regime and said Russia would
not favor actions that attempt to duplicate or extend the
work of the UN Security Council. Finally, Russia called on
the MTCR to continue its cooperation with the 1540 Committee.
11. (C) Japan stressed the threat to international peace
and security posed by Iran,s and North Korea,s missile
programs. It also underscored the need for the MTCR Partners
to act in concert and implement the measures outlined in
relevant UNSCRs as a way to prevent the transfer to/from Iran
and North Korea of WMD-related goods and technology.
12. (C) Turkey agreed and said it had taken note of what
had been said about Iran and North Korea in the IE and LEEM.
Turkey also thought the MTCR needed to have &practical
applications8 if it were to be useful. Additionally, Turkey
noted that it hoped issues with Iran would be resolved by
diplomacy, dialogue, and negotiations for peace in the region
and the Middle East.
13. (SBU) Australia looked forward to a productive Plenary
and hoped the Partners would give favorable consideration to
Australia,s proposal to host the Plenary in 2008 and serve
as MTCR Chair.
Report on the Danish MTCR Chairmanship
14. (C) Outgoing MTCR Chair Per Fischer read verbatim a
16-page, written report on his tenure (the report also was
circulated to all Partners). Fischer noted that the Chair
had engaged in a number of outreach activities to promote the
MTCR and to remind non-Partners of the need for all countries
to implement and enforce effective missile export controls.
The Chair's outreach activities had included leading MTCR
missions to several non-Partner countries, as well as
participation in seminars, regional fora, and other
multilateral meetings. All of these activities helped to
enhance understanding of the goals and activities of the
Regime. They also have helped to maintain and improve
relations with countries like India, Israel, Pakistan, and
15. (C) Fischer noted that outreach was becoming
increasingly important as more countries outside of the
Regime become developers, producers, or traders of missile
technology, and urged Partners to follow his lead and make
the technical aspects of the Regime an integral part of any
outreach activities. Explaining to non-Partners what the
MTCR controls and why ) and discussing how the Partners
implement MTCR controls on a day-to-day basis ) has been
critical to the success of the Chair,s outreach activities
in 2007. It also has helped build a better understanding of
the Regime,s goals. Finally, Fischer strongly urged
Partners to consider systematically informing the 1540
Committee and other interested parties of changes to the MTCR
Guidelines and Annex directly after they have been decided at
16. (C) The Plenary thanked Ambassador Fischer for his
extremely detailed report and excellent work during the past
year on behalf of the Regime. However, while acknowledging
Chairman Fischer outstanding efforts, Russia raised concerns
about Fischer,s participation in a NATO-sponsored event in
Lithuania. Fischer responded that he had announced his
intention to represent the MTCR at the seminar via his report
to all Partners on planned outreach events. No Partner
raised objections. Consequently, per established practice,
Fischer had agreement to pursue the activities described in
his outreach plan. Russia thanked Fischer for the
explanation and undertook to pay closer attention in the
future to documents circulated by the Chair. South Africa
added that it would do likewise.
Report of the French MTCR POC
17. (C) France briefly summarized the activities of the
MTCR Point of Contact (POC) during the preceding year. It
reported that the POC had circulated 274 documents to
Partners since the Copenhagen Plenary. The POC also had
updated the Compendium of Consensus Decisions, and hoped to
distribute it soon. In addition, the POC had continued to
develop the "ePOC" computerized document distribution system
for the MTCR; organized five meetings of the MTCR country
representatives in Paris; and hosted the RPOC meeting in
18. (C) The Plenary endorsed the POC,s report.
They also thanked the POC ) and the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs ) for its invaluable services on behalf of
Report of the April 2007 Reinforced
Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting
19. (C) The POC reported on the results of the April 2007
RPOC meeting in Paris, noting that outreach to non-Partners
and relevant organizations had been a major focus of
discussion. In addition, RPOC participants had exchanged
views on the current state of ballistic missile-related
proliferation worldwide, with most contributors centering on
Iran, and agreed to discuss these issues further at the 2007
Plenary. The RPOC also considered a German proposal on
end-use controls and denial notifications, and agreed to
continue discussing membership issues at the 2007 Plenary.
Finally, the Partners confirmed Greece as the 2007 Plenary
chair/host and subsequent MTCR Chair.
20. (C) The Partners thanked France for hosting the 2007
RPOC and endorsed the RPOC report (POC 133). They also
accepted France's proposal to host the next RPOC in Paris
before the end of April 2008.
21. (C) The POC reported on the continued development of
the &ePOC8 computerized information distribution system for
the MTCR. 29 of 34 MTCR countries currently can access ePOC,
and there are 246 registered users. This is nearly double
the number of registered users reported at the 2006
Copenhagen Plenary. The POC invited all Partners to begin
using ePOC regularly as this would increase efficiency.
Ideally, the POC would like to see generalized use of the
ePOC by the time of the 2008 RPOC meeting and hoped that the
Regime will soon go paperless.
22. (C) Germany thanked the POC for its continuing efforts
to improve the ePOC. The UK also applauded the POC,s
Herculean efforts on behalf of the Regime and noted that HMG
has 18 registered ePOC users. The U.S. welcomed and
appreciated the POC,s efforts to develop ePOC, and liked the
idea of a paperless Regime. However, the U.S. noted that
ePOC can only handle documents up to the confidential level.
Higher level documents must be circulated in paper copy.
While the U.S. will continue to try to develop papers at the
confidential level, the nature of the MTCR is that some
issues are more sensitive and need to be distributed in paper
copy. The U.S. hoped that the POC would continue to
circulate paper copies of such documents. The POC responded
that this practice would continue to be followed.
23. (C) The Plenary endorsed the POC,s report on ePOC,
inviting Partners that have not yet signed up for ePOC to do
so soon. The Partners also renewed the POC,s mandate to
continue ePOC operations and agreed by consensus on the
&The Plenary entrusted the POC with the mandate to continue
ePOC operations. The Plenary expressed its satisfaction at
the current level of security of the ePOC, which was deemed
to strike a satisfactory balance between security and
Contact with Non-Partners
24. (C) Germany, Portugal (on behalf of the EU), the ROK,
and the U.S. reported on their bilateral and regional
contacts with non-Partners since the Copenhagen Plenary.
Several countries, including the United States (POC 198),
also circulated written reports on their contacts with
non-Partners. However, Russia commented that too much time
was being devoted to outreach ) a topic that Russia
considered to be a &secondary issue8 ) and said that it
would pay closer attention to the Plenary agenda in the
future to ensure that outreach was given sufficient but not
undue attention. The Greek Chair responded that the Plenary
would ignore Russia,s comment: outreach is a key focus of
the Regime and is properly placed on the Plenary agenda.
25. (C) Portugal, on behalf of the EU participating states,
presented the EU states, revised proposal for an MTCR watch
list on Iran. NOTE: This proposal was previously circulated
as POC DOC 61. It was discussed at the April 2007 RPOC, but
failed to achieve consensus. It was subsequently subjected
to a silence procedure, which failed when Russia broke
silence (POC 112). END NOTE. Portugal explained that the
proposed watch list contained items that EU experts believe
deserve special attention either because they have been
observed to be items Iranian end-users of concern are
attempting to acquire or because they are assessed to be
chokepoints for the Iranian missile program. The proposal
was not intended to expand UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 or the MTCR
Annex and would not impose punitive measures on Iran.
Rather, the EU states view the watch list as a tool that
could help MTCR Partner countries implement relevant UNSCRs.
26. (C) The U.S. greatly appreciated the EU proposal as an
effort to focus Partner attention on key technologies Iranian
end-users of concern are seeking. The U.S. also reminded
Partners that the U.S. had circulated a complementary
proposal on Iranian Front Companies as POC 190, and urged
Partners to consider the two proposals in tandem.
27. (C) Turkey supported the EU proposal. Portugal
expressed support for the U.S. proposal. Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, and Spain all
endorsed both proposals. Ukraine said it supported the EU
proposal in principal but wanted more time to review the
watch list. Ukraine also thought the Partners should
consider whether to amend the MTCR Annex to control the items
included on the proposed watch list.
28. (C) South Africa appreciated the Partners, interest in
discussing how to respond to missile proliferation and
regional developments. However, in South Africa,s view, the
Regime needed to take a comprehensive approach and focus on
broad regional issues, not just one country. Thus far the
Regime has been focusing on two proposals that relate to UN
Security Council action on Iran as it pertains to WMD
delivery systems. However, the Security Council also has
taken action on North Korea, so the MTCR should not focus
only on Iran. Additionally, South Africa said the MTCR must
remember that it is not the UNSC. The Security Council has
committees that implement its resolutions, and any decision
to expand the lists associated with the UNSCRs should be done
by these committees. The MTCR is on dangerous ground when it
tries to reinterpret or add to what the Security Council has
29. (C) With regard to the EU and U.S. proposals, South
Africa noted that they relate to information derived from the
Information Exchange (IE) and suggested the Partners simply
take note of the relevant IE information. In the end, South
Africa said, all MTCR Partners have national obligations to
implement the relevant UNSCRs. Therefore, South Africa is
not convinced the MTCR needs to adopt additional lists to
build on or expand the relevant UNSCRS.
30. (C) Noting that Russia is a member of the Security
Council, Russia agreed that the MTCR should not try to expand
the Security Council,s work. Russia further noted that the
UNSCRs already are obligatory and legally binding on all UN
members, and that is sufficient. Russia also stressed that
the MTCR is not an implementation body of the UN and should
not be used as such, nor should it be used as a sanctions
body. In Russia,s view, the MTCR is an export control
regime and nothing more.
31. (C) Continuing, Russia said its review of the EU
proposal had uncovered no &value added.8 Instead, Russia
had concluded that the proposal raised a number of questions.
In particular, Russia questioned whether the proposed watch
list represented all items of concern with regard to the
Iranian missile program. Russia also wondered why the EU did
not submit proposals to the TEM to add these items to the
MTCR Annex. In addition, Russia was concerned that having
such a watch list would undermine the Regime,s catch-all
controls. However, in the spirit of constructiveness and
consistency, Russia offered that it would be willing to
combine the U.S. and EU proposals and simply take note of the
lists of Iranian Front Companies and dual-use technologies.
In Russia,s view, these lists then could be used to inform
Partners, national export licensing processes.
32. (C) The UK supported the U.S. and EU proposals. It
noted that while the MTCR is not a UN enforcement agency, it
also does not operate in a vacuum. Partners come to the
Plenary to exchange information, discuss developments, and
decide what they can do to deal with actual events taking
place in the real world. In the UK,s view, both proposals
directly furthered these objectives. Italy concurred,
stressing that Partners understand perfectly well that the
MTCR is not the UN but that they have a special
responsibility as producers and exporters of missile
technology to exercise vigilance with regard to missile
33. (C) The U.S. agreed that the MTCR is not a UN
implementing body. However, all MTCR Partners are
responsible for implementing UNSCRs on a national basis.
Nobody has disputed that, nor should they. Consequently, it
is appropriate for the MTCR Partners to consider measures,
such as those proposed in the U.S. and EU proposals, that
would assist Partners in their national implementation of
missile-relevant UNSCRs. At the 2006 Copenhagen Plenary, the
Partners took the following decision:
&Consistent with UNSCR 1696, MTCR Partners agreed, in
accordance with their national legal authorities and
legislation, to exercise vigilance against the export to Iran
of any items, materials, goods, and technology that could
contribute to Iran,s ballistic missile programs.8
There is no reason why the Partners could not at least affirm
that decision in Athens and also note that the EU and the
U.S. had provided relevant information to the Partners to
assist them in carrying out this undertaking.
34. (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Chair deferred
further discussion of the two proposals to the Heads of
Delegation. Following additional consideration by the HODs,
the Plenary agreed to the following consensus language:
&The MTCR Partners take note of the attached watch list and
will exercise, in accordance with their national legislation
and international obligations, vigilance against the export
to Iran of those listed items, materials, goods, and
technology consistent with UNSC resolutions 1696 (2006) and
1737 (2006). In this context, Partners also noted the
information from the United States on front companies in Iran
relevant to these endeavours.8
35. (C) Japan reminded Partners that North Korea remained a
cause for concern. Although there had been no significant
new developments on the North Korean missile front in the
past year, Japan said Partners needed to maintain their
vigilance. Japan also urged Partners to vigorously implement
the UNSCRs on North Korea so as to force North Korea to take
some positive steps in the missile area.
36. (C) The U.S. introduced its proposal on outreach to
non-Partners (POC 187), stressing the importance of
cooperation with non-members on missile nonproliferation
issues. In view of the ongoing global missile proliferation
threat, the U.S. said outreach is a critical mission of the
MTCR and Partners need to work side-by-side with
non-Partners to actively encourage their support for the
Regime,s efforts, including by implementing the MTCR
Guidelines and Annex on a national basis.
37. (C) Through national implementation of the MTCR
Guidelines and Annex, non-Partners can make a significant
contribution to the growing multilateral effort to stem
missile proliferation worldwide. As more countries establish
national controls consistent with MTCR standards, it will
become increasingly costly, difficult, and time consuming for
programs of concern to obtain missile-useful equipment and
technology. In addition, by implementing the MTCR Guidelines
and having a legally-based system to control exports of MTCR
Annex items, non-Partner countries can help minimize the risk
that their economies and exports (or the passage of goods
through their territories) will be used to aid proliferant
missile programs, either directly or indirectly. Taking such
action also would help to further the Regime,s longstanding
goal of preventing the proliferation of unmanned delivery
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction --
and related equipment and technology. It also would assist
non-Partner countries in meeting their export control
obligations under UNSCR 1540.
38. (C) The U.S. therefore had developed a proposal that
would have Partners agree that during their outreach
activities in 2007-2008, they would make a more focused
effort to encourage non-Partners to apply the MTCR Guidelines
and Annex on a national basis, while also stressing the
importance of taking measures to prevent the proliferation of
missiles and missile technology. The U.S. hoped the Partners
would adopt the proposal in Athens.
39. (C) South Africa reminded Partners that during the
Plenary,s previous discussion on regional issues, South
Africa talked about the need to look more carefully at the
mandate for, and scope of, the Regime,s outreach activities.
South Africa believes the Partners need to be clear about
the focus of their efforts and the focus of the Chair,s
efforts, to include the establishment of specific goals and
objectives. Once the Partners have identified what they want
to achieve, then organizing outreach activities will be
40. (C) In South Africa,s view, outreach should focus on
export controls and the Regime,s basic documents ) the MTCR
Guidelines and Annex. Discussion of the missile threat or
specific activities of proliferation concern should be
conducted by Partners with relevant non-Partners on a
national basis and in a confidential manner. In addition,
South Africa said Partners need to be careful not to create
misimpressions or false expectations when they discuss the
MTCR with non-members.
41. (C) Brazil noted that outreach is a way for the Regime
to pass a message to non-members. As evident from Per
Fischer,s detailed report, outreach has become increasingly
important for the MTCR over the past five years, and Partners
need to work together to convey a consistent message. In
this context, while Brazil does not have a systematic
approach to national outreach activities, it is prepared to
work with the U.S. on its proposal.
42. (C) The Netherlands pointed out that the thrust of the
U.S. proposal is what Partners can do on an individual basis
to reach non-members. This is a different discussion from
the discussion of the mandate for the Chairman. In any case,
the Netherlands supported the U.S. proposal. With regard to
the Chairman,s mandate, the Netherlands thought Partners
needed to build in some flexibility and trust for the Chair.
43. (C) The ROK agreed with the Netherlands on the need to
give the Chair flexibility. The ROK did not want to place
undue stress on the Chair by making his mandate too narrow
and also wanted to give the Chair flexibility in terms of the
composition of his delegation. The ROK supported the U.S.
44. (C) Outgoing Chair Fischer reminded Partners that they
had agreed on an outreach mandate for the Chair at the
Copenhagen Plenary. It is very clear (Fischer read it
aloud), and should be continued. Fischer noted that the
mandate does not give the Chair the authority to negotiate
with non-Partners nor does it authorize him to talk about the
results of the IE or about the HCOC. Rather, it allows the
Chair to update non-Partners on key issues such as changes to
the MTCR Annex.
45. (C) Fischer noted that participation in the Chair,s
outreach activities is open to all Partners, and encouraged
Partners to send representatives from capitals to participate
in these events. He further noted that the fact of the IE
Chair,s inclusion in an outreach delegation did not mean
that the delegation was sharing Regime-confidential
information. All Partners that want to participate in Regime
outreach should be encouraged to do so. In terms of the
mandate and format for outreach activities, Fischer thought
Partners should tailor their approach to each country they
46. (C) Poland supported the U.S. proposal, and agreed with
the views expressed by the Netherlands, the ROK, and Per
Fischer on the outreach process. Poland also thought the
Partners should talk more about target countries and outreach
priorities, including perhaps inviting non-Partners to
seminars on relevant missile issues.
47. (C) Russia complained that Partners were spending too
much time talking about outreach. Russia wanted to discuss
substance,8 and did not want Athens to be known as
the &Outreach Plenary.8 Russia also disagreed that the
Chair should have flexibility. In Russia,s view, the Chair
should be &imprisoned8 by his message. The Chair must
represent the unique voice of the MTCR and not provide
misinformation ) as was done in the past with China ) or
sensitive information ) as was done in the past with Israel.
Additionally, the Regime should prioritize outreach
activities and develop a limited mandate, as well as specific
modalities for outreach visits. In Russia,s view, the
countries that should be at the top of the list for outreach
are countries that are important players on missile issues,
including Belarus, China, and Kazakhstan.
48. (C) Russia agreed that the general mandate for the
Chair that was adopted in Copenhagen should continue.
However, Russia stressed that the Chair should not be able to
discuss issues &willy nilly8 and did not have the freedom
to talk about HCOC, UNSCR 1540, or specific nonproliferation
concerns. In Russia,s view, the MTCR is a technical body
that should stick to discussing technical issues such as
changes to the MTCR Annex. For that reason, Russia would
support including the TEM Chair on outreach activities.
Russia also believed that the Partners need to reach
consensus agreement on each of the Chair,s outreach
activities and to set priorities.
49. (C) The U.S. thought the Copenhagen mandate for the
Chair was adequate and should be reaffirmed. The
composition of specific delegations should be up to the
Chair. The U.S. also thought Partners needed to be
purposeful and intentional during their outreach activities.
50. (C) South Africa agreed that outreach is important. As
the only Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country present, South
Africa also wanted to point out to Partners the need to
approach outreach with the necessary sensitivity to ensure
the Regime is not seen poorly or seen as restricting
technology to countries that need new technology for
development. South Africa supported Outgoing Chair
Fischer,s ideas on outreach. It also supported reaffirming
the Chairman,s mandate established at Copenhagen. However,
South Africa had some concerns with regard to the composition
of the Regime,s outreach teams. In South Africa,s view,
the teams must represent the MTCR, not their national points
of view. Therefore, it might be best to have only the Chair
and heads of the working groups (i.e., the TEM) on the
51. (C) South Africa said it could support the U.S.
proposal on outreach provided the proposed outreach was
voluntary, not mandatory. It also requested changes to the
proposed consensus language. The U.S. was disappointed that
some Partners were confusing the Regime,s interest in
preventing missile proliferation with national positions.
However, in the spirit of cooperation and flexibility, the
U.S. accepted South Africa,s proposed changes. The Plenary
then adopted the following consensus language with respect to
the U.S. proposal:
&Partners encourage the use of national outreach efforts
with non-Partners to actively encourage these countries to
take steps to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a
national basis. Partners are invited to share the results of
these outreach efforts at the 2008 MTCR RPOC and/or Plenary
Outreach Priorities and Contact with
the UN 1540 Commmittee
52. (C) The U.S. said Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia,
Panama, Singapore, and the UAE should be priorities for
Regime outreach. Not all of these countries have missile
programs. However, missile possession is not the only reason
for outreach. Some of these countries are now, or could be,
potential transshipment points. Given the Regime,s
increased concern about proliferators using transshipment
points to evade MTCR export controls, reaching out to these
countries early and often will help promote the Regime,s
broader nonproliferation goals.
53. (C) South Africa reiterated its support for the
Copenhagen mandate for the Chair and suggested that the Chair
circulate a proposed outreach plan for Partner consideration.
Russia agreed. Russia also thought that technical outreach
by the MTCR could be helpful to countries needing assistance
with UNSCR 1540 implementation. South Africa said it would
have no problem informing the 1540 Committee of relevant MTCR
activities but would like more information on any proposal to
enhance cooperation with the 1540 Committee. Russia
clarified that it was simply suggesting that it would be
useful if the MTCR Chair could represent the MTCR community
at seminars organized by the 1540 Committee.
54. (C) After further discussion by the Heads of
Delegation, the Partners agreed to the following additional
consensus language with regard to outreach priorities and the
&Partners exchanged views on possible destinations for
outreach activities and renewed earlier outreach mandates.
The following destinations were proposed: Belarus, China,
Croatia, Egypt, Jordan, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Libya,
Panama, Singapore, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
It was agreed that the Chair would prepare and circulate to
Partners an outreach programme taking into consideration the
The Plenary agreed that the MTCR Chair, assisted by the TEM
Chair, as appropriate, will inform, following Plenary
decisions, non-member states, as well as the 1540 Committee,
of changes to the Guidelines and Annex for their information
and use with a view to facilitating the widest possible
application of the latest versions of these instruments and
enabling interested non-member states to harmonize their
controls with those of MTCR Partners. Contacts with
non-member states may also include information on the
rationale for changes to the Annex, while respecting the
principle of confidentiality within the MTCR.8
55. (C) The Partners also agreed on the following consensus
language concerning contact with the UNSCR 1540 Committee:
&Partners reiterated their support for UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 and the Plenary agreed that the Chair should
continue to pursue contact with the 1540 Committee.8
56. (C) Austria, as the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) of
the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (HCOC) gave a brief report of HCOC developments
since the last MTCR Plenary. It reported that HCOC
membership stood at 127 and that Bosnia-Herzegovina was the
current HCOC Chair. Hungary will Chair in 2008. Austria
said that at their annual meeting in Vienna, the HCOC
Subscribing States had discussed the importance of all
participants submitting annual declarations. There also was
detailed discussion of prelaunch notifications and the need
to promote universalization of the HCOC. However, there was
no agreement to pursue a UN resolution on the HCOC in 2007.
57. (C) Russia thanked Austria for the report but objected
to HCOC being discussed in the MTCR. Russia said that while
it is a strong supporter of the HCOC, the HCOC has problems,
and these problems should be discussed at the HCOC annual
meeting, not the MTCR Plenary. If HCOC is discussed at all
during Plenary week, it should be at the Information
Exchange. Outgoing Chair Fischer disagreed, noting that the
Plenary needs to be aware of ongoing developments in the
58. (C) The U.S. said its position on membership is
well-established: the U.S. does not support membership for
China, Croatia, or Kazakhstan. None of these countries meet
the established criteria for membership.
59. (C) Turkey said its views also are well known. As
stated at the last two Plenaries, Turkey does not support
MTCR membership for Cyprus. Greece reiterated its view that
Cyprus should be a member of the Regime and that it is
totally inappropriate for any Partner to oppose the
membership of any of the EU countries that are not yet
60. (C) Russia said the Partners know very well how Russia
views the membership issues. Although Partners think there
is a political motivation for the Russian position, Russia,s
position is really about strengthening the MTCR,s ability to
control missile proliferation. Right now, the MTCR is
limited in its ability to do this because its membership is
too narrow. In Russia,s view, the Partners should open up
the MTCR to countries that possess significant missile
technology so that Regime members are countries that can
really contribute to missile nonproliferation. Russia
therefore supports membership for China and Kazakhstan.
61. (C) The ROK welcomed membership for countries that meet
the MTCR criteria and factors for consideration established
in 1991 and 1993, but needed more time to review individual
applications to determine if there were any such countries.
Brazil shared the ROK view.
62. (C) Portugal reminded Partners that the EU countries
supported membership for Croatia and all of the new EU
countries, and had no objection to membership for Kazakhstan.
Ukraine associated itself with the EU position.
63. (C) The U.S. noted that there clearly was not consensus
on China and Kazakhstan and that if those were the only two
applicants that Russia supported, then there was no consensus
on any applications and no need for further discussion of
this topic in Athens. Russia agreed.
64. (C) The Partners agreed on the following consensus
language on membership:
&The Plenary considered applications for MTCR membership
submitted by Croatia, Romania, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Estonia,
Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia,
People,s Republic of China, and Libya. As on previous
occasions, Partners were not in a position to reach consensus
on these applications and agreed to continue examination of
all candidatures on a case-by-case basis. The Chair was
mandated to convey to each candidate country that no
consensus was reached in this Plenary.8
UK Proposal on Payload Substitution
65. (C) The UK introduced its proposal (POC 179) to amend
the MTCR Guidelines to make the ability to augment or
substitute authorized payloads on re-usable UAV systems for
the purposes of the WMD delivery a factor for consideration
when reviewing export license requests. The UK noted that as
the commercial market for UAVs grows, so does the risk of
unauthorized payload substitution. For this reason, the UK
believes Partners should routinely consider the risk that a
system may be misused for WMD proliferation as part of the
licensing review process. The UK proposal is not intended to
impede legitimate trade but to address a proliferation
66. (C) The U.S. welcomed the UK proposal, noting that as
the commercial market for UAVs evolves, so must our shared
nonproliferation goals. The UK proposal does this by drawing
Partners, attention to another factor for consideration in
evaluating the proliferation risk of UAV transfers. Japan
agreed that the proposal would help guard against the
unauthorized use of UAVs. Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, and Poland also supported the proposal.
67. (C) Russia thought the proposal was important but
viewed it in the context of Russia,s idea ) as mentioned in
its opening statement ) for adapting the MTCR to meet new
challenges. Russia also argued that nearly everything
envisioned in the UK proposal is already covered by the MTCR
Guidelines. While Russia shared the concern about UAVs
falling into the hands of terrorists and agreed that UAVs
would be very dangerous WMD delivery vehicles, Russia was not
sure that adding these controls to only one class of vehicles
was pertinent and took a very cautious approach to changing
the MTCR Guidelines. Such changes to the Regime,s
&constitution8 should not be done piecemeal. Instead,
Russia believed the Partners needed to undertake a
comprehensive review of the Regime,s goals and a broad
assessment of the missile threat. Once Partners have those
two things, they can decide what parameters they need to
establish to deal with the threat. Therefore, while Russia
thought it was good to adapt the MTCR to address new
challenges, it did not think any action should be taken until
there has been a comprehensive review of the Regime.
68. (C) The U.S. pointed out that the Partners have been
appropriately seized for sometime with the idea that the MTCR
needs to adapt and change to account for modifications in
technology, changes in the global missile threat, and the
imaginative efforts of proliferators. A good deal of work in
this area has been done over the years. More recently, the
U.S. has worked for the past 18 months on a proposal to
modernize Regime controls on UAVs and cruise missiles. But
now Russia has suggested that any proposed changes to the
MTCR are to be held up until the Partners conduct a radical
review of the foundations of the Regime. That is an
obstructionist proposal, and will put all Regime efforts on
hold until Partners can find a least common denominator
solution that will result in controls that are weaker than
the current controls. The U.S. will not support even the
concept of such a proposal.
69. (C) The ROK requested more time to study the UK
proposal, noting that it was concerned that the UK proposal
would be a roadblock to UAV exports for purely commercial
uses. The ROK would be open to revisiting the proposal at a
70. (C) The UK noted that it already had been discussing its
proposal with Partners for sometime but was willing to
consult further. The UK also urged Partners not to take too
long as technology does not wait for policy initiatives, it
71. (C) Russia saw no added value to the Regime in the UK
proposal. At most, Russia thought the intent of the proposal
should be covered in a &best practices8 document. There
certainly was not sufficient reason to change the MTCR
Guidelines, in Russia,s view.
U.S. Proposal on UAVs and Cruise Missiles
72. (C) Remarking that it was making a &free8
intervention inasmuch as one Partner (Russia) has made clear
that it would oppose discussion of proposals to strengthen
the Regime until the Partners conduct of fundamental review
of the MTCR and its control parameters, the U.S. urged
Partners to adopt its proposal (POC 171) for modernizing
Regime controls on UAVs and cruise missiles. The U.S.
believed the proposal correctly addressed critical advances
in technology as well as changes in how this technology is
used. Moreover, the U.S. has worked with Partners over the
past 18 months to refine the proposal, and believes the
proposal does what the U.S. intended all along. First, it
allows for transfers of the bigger, slower, and less lethal
systems that have a number of commercials uses and that would
be especially helpful in developing countries. Second, it
strengthens controls on highly capable cruise missile
systems, and thereby helps to make it more costly, difficult,
and time consuming for proliferators and terrorists to obtain
these systems. In short, the proposal balances
nonproliferation concerns and commercial interests, and the
U.S. strongly urges its adoption in Athens.
73. (C) Russia said it was in a very constructive mood but
sometimes had a hard time understanding other Partners,
positions or explaining Russian views so that Partners could
understand them. For example, the U.S. was critical of
Russia,s stance on its UAV/CM proposal in the Plenary.
However, Russia said, as there was no agreement on the
proposal at the TEM, it cannot be adopted at the Plenary.
But, Russia clarified, that this is not the issue. It is no
mystery, Russia said, that the real issue is military
defense, not nonproliferation. In Russia,s view, military
defense and nonproliferation are two different things, and
military defense needs should not be discussed in the MTCR.
If the issue is really about using supersonic cruise
missiles, Russia is ready to assess the cruise missile
transfer threat and then assess how the MTCR should respond
to it. But what Russia cannot understand is why anybody
would be opposed to discussing the missile threat and
assessing ways to respond to it. This is something the
Partners should want to do so the best controls are in place
to deal with the threat.
74. (C) The U.S. responded that the Partners have before
them proposals by the U.S. and the UK to modify the MTCR to
address new and emerging threats. The U.S. proposal has been
worked for 18 months and has achieved the overwhelming
support of the majority of Partners. Those Partners
recognize the value of the proposal, its utility, and what it
means for nonproliferation. The UK proposal has achieved
even broader support. Yet, neither proposal can be adopted
because one Partner is insisting that the MTCR cannot adopt
either proposal until the MTCR conducts a fundamental review
of its control parameters. That is not a constructive
75. (C) Poland, Sweden, and the UK all supported the U.S.
proposal, as did Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
and Norway. Poland reminded Partners that export controls
are not licensing bans, and there is a real need to address
the UAV/CM issue proactively since the IE has demonstrated
that certain UAVs and cruise missiles are the &first
choice8 of proliferators. Sweden noted that the proposal
had been reviewed extensively by the TEM and had improved
over time. The UK saw the proposal as a way for the Regime
to proactively address the UAV issue.
76. (C) Brazil said the issue of UAVs is of great concern,
and the Regime has been presented with conflicting
information on this subject. Russia circulated a document on
the UAV threat that raises concerns about what should be
controlled. On the other hand, there is enormous commercial
potential for UAVs and a need for them in areas such as
agriculture and forestry. Brazil could see some merit in
Russia,s idea of reviewing the missile threat and then
deciding control parameters, but Brazil also could see an
immediate need for more stringent controls on UAVs that may
have arms. Brazil also indicated that it can support the UK
proposal on payload substitution for UAVs.
77. (C) Brazil also appreciated U.S. efforts on UAVs and
cruise missiles and thanked the U.S. for modifying its
proposal to address Partner concerns. Brazil is prepared to
continue to work this issue bilaterally with the U.S. but
takes a generally positive view of the proposal.
78. (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Partners agreed to
discuss the U.S. and UK proposals again at future MTCR
Russian Paper on the UAV Threat
79. (C) Russia reminded Partners that in 2002, Russia was
the last Partner to agree to a U.S. proposal to impose
stricter controls on UAVs. This was not because Russia
opposed strict controls on UAVs, but because making such a
change to the MTCR required Russia to make similar changes to
its national export controls and this involves a great deal
of work. Nevertheless, this is serious business and as the
U.S. pointed out at the time, UAVs represent a serious threat
in terms of being used as a delivery vehicle for WMD. What
is perplexing, Russia said, is the change in the U.S.
position. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001,
the U.S. pushed in 2002 for stricter controls on UAVs. Then,
just three years later, apparently under the influence of
commercial sales interests, the U.S. decided it wanted to
change the rules. Russia does not support this.
80. (C) Instead, Russia continues to share the concerns
raised by the U.S. three or four years ago about the dangers
of UAV proliferation and the ease with which terrorists could
acquire them. For these reasons, Russia would strongly
prefer to keep UAVs under strict control. This is the
essence of the Russian paper on the UAV threat (POC 192).
Russia hoped that Partners would analyze it very carefully
and come to the conclusion that one Partner (the U.S.) did a
few years ago: nonproliferation concerns should prevail over
81. (C) The UK thanked Russia for its presentation and
commented that both the first section of Russia,s paper and
the last sentence of the paper are in line with, and seem to
support, the UK proposal on payload substitution.
82. (C) Russia responded that it is not against the UK
proposal per se. The problem is that if a change were made
to the MTCR Guidelines, Russia would need to make
corresponding changes to its national export control laws.
This would require explaining the situation to President
Putin himself, and he would need a serious argument as to why
Russia,s export controls need to be changed. For these
reasons, Russia does not support any changes to the MTCR
Guidelines. However, the essence of the UK proposal could be
included in a &best practices8 document. Finally, as
stated earlier, Russia cannot support individual adjustments
to the MTCR until after a comprehensive review of the
83. (C) The U.S. agreed that since the conclusions of the
Russian paper accorded with the basic tenets of the UK
proposal, the UK proposal should be approvable. However,
Russia would not approve the proposal because doing so would
require extra work nationally. Additionally, Russia would
not consider individual changes to the Regime unless and
until there is a comprehensive review of the Regime,s
control parameters. This in essence means that no individual
proposals can be adopted at this time or in the near future.
In the U.S. view, this is not a constructive approach.
84. (C) Russia said it did not want to debate the issue
with the U.S. because the tenor of the debate was reminiscent
of the rhetoric of the 1980s. Russia also thought the U.S.
argument about working a particular proposal for 18 months
was not a good one because some issues needed to be worked
for years before being adopted.
85. (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Plenary deferred
further discussion of this topic to a future meeting.
86. (C) Switzerland reminded Partners of the agreement at
the 2003 Plenary in Buenos Aires to report on a voluntary
basis when they have implemented in their own national export
control systems changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex.
This information is then to be compiled by the POC and the
resulting matrix distributed as a reference document.
Switzerland noted that it had not yet seen such a matrix and
wondered when it would be distributed.
87. (C) The POC responded that very few Partners had made
voluntary submissions, and urged all Partners to do so at
their earliest opportunity so the POC would have time to
develop a matrix for distribution at the 2008 RPOC meeting.
88. (C) The U.S. reported that it had provided the
requested information to all Partners in POC 116. The ROK
said it also had reported via the POC on all Annex changes
adopted by the ROKG. Russia said that the changes adopted at
the Madrid and Copenhagen Plenaries were implemented by
Russia in August 2007 via a presidential decree. Brazil
reported that it had updated its control list in March 2007.
End Use Controls
89. (C) Germany introduced its proposal on end use controls
(POC 200) and asked for Partner feedback. Hungary, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the ROK, Sweden,
Ukraine, and the UK supported the proposal. The U.S.
appreciated the work Germany had put into developing the
proposal but requested additional time to study it, as did
90. (C) Germany thanked Partners for the response and asked
for any additional input by the end of 2007, so the issue
could be discussed again at the 2008 RPOC meeting in Paris.
91. (C) Germany presented its revised proposal on denial
notifications (POC 199) and urged its adoption. Ukraine
supported the basic idea of the proposal but had questions on
the modalities of the denial renewal process. These
questions eventually were resolved in bilateral side meetings
with the German delegation.
92. (C) After further consideration of the German proposal
by Heads of Delegation, the Plenary adopted the following
consensus language on denial notifications:
&Partners agreed in principle, subject to a silence
procedure of 45 days, to apply, consistent with their
national legislation, the &Best Practices for sharing and
using Denial Information8 (MTCR/ATH/PL/025) as an outline
for denial notification and use of denial information.
Partners agreed to develop the ePOC notification database in
a way as to allow Partners to renew notifications online.
The date of the latest renewal would appear in the database
together with the notification concerned. Moreover, Partners
agree to develop the ePOC database in a way as to allow
Partners to trace revoked denials for a period of five years
after revocation. The date of revocation would appear in the
database together with the notification concerned.8
NOTE: The U.S. confirmed in side meetings on the margins of
the Plenary that the German paper on best practices for
sharing and using denial information is intended only as a
suggestion or guide for Partners. Its adoption is not
mandatory and Partners should apply it as they choose in a
manner consistent with national regulation and practice. END
93. (C) The ROK informed Partners of the successful
brokering seminar it co-hosted with Australia in Seoul on
March 22-23, 2007. The seminar focused on national and
international responses to illicit brokering activities and
concluded that there is a need for a sustained, multi-faceted
response to such activities. Australia thanked the ROK for
organizing the workshop and commended the meeting report to
all Partners for their review.
Informing Non-Partners of Changes to the MTCR
94. (C) Outgoing Chair Per Fischer reminded Partners that
several countries outside the Regime have asked to be
informed immediately after the Plenary of any changes to the
Guidelines and Annex. The Partners agreed that the Chair
should directly inform non-member states, as well as the
UNSCR 1540 Committee, of any changes to the MTCR Guidelines
and Annex adopted in Athens.
95. (C) INTERSESSIONAL MEETINGS: Per established
procedures, Partners will decide at the January 2008 POC
meeting whether to hold an intersessional TEM.
96. (U) PLENARY: The Partners accepted Australia,s
proposal to host the 2008 Plenary in Canberra and
subsequently serve as MTCR Chair for 2008-2009.
97. (C) RPOC: The Partners agreed to hold a Reinforced
Point of Contact meeting in Paris by no later than April
2008, with specific dates to be communicated by the POC.
LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERTS MEETING (LEEM)
98. (C) The MTCR held its eighth LEEM on November 5-7,
2007, with participation from customs, investigative,
licensing, policy, and police officials. There were 18
presentations by seven MTCR Partner countries. The LEEM was
co-chaired by Mr. Klass Leenman (The Netherlands) and Ms.
Aggeliki Matsouka (Greece). U.S. presentations were made by
Dave Manglos (DHS/ICE) and Scot Gonzales (Commerce
Enforcement). Topics discussed included case studies on
enforcement successes, case studies on Iranian missile- and
UAV-related procurement efforts, end-user verification
issues, interdiction, prosecuting proliferators,
transshipment, and ITT and deemed exports.
99. (C) All LEEM participants agreed that LEEM meetings
were beneficial and provided an opportunity to share
information on key topics. They also agreed on the
importance of continued joint sessions with the IE and TEM,
and noted that the joint session with the IE had been
particularly beneficial, especially with regard to the
discussion on machine tools and brokering issues.
100. (C) It was reported that Canada is continuing to
update the Enforcement Officers Handbook and hoped to have a
revised draft coordinated through the LEEM Co-chairs and
circulated to all Partners before the 2008 Plenary.
101. (C) Co-chair Leenman presented the final report of the
LEEM to the Plenary on November 8. The Plenary took note of
the report and endorsed the LEEM Chair,s recommendations.
NOTE: A detailed account of the LEEM and its recommendations
can be found in the LEEM Co-chairs, report to the Plenary
(POC 226). END NOTE.
INFORMATION EXCHANGE (IE)
102. (C) 11 Partners submitted a total of 46 papers for the
Information Exchange (IE) held on November 5-7, 2007. The
meeting was co-Chaired by the UK's John Andrews and Greece,s
Theodora Paandreaou. ISN/MTR,s Ralph Palmiero and Josh
Casker were the U.S. Reps. ONI,s Rachel Roll also presented
for the U.S. Topics discussed in the IE included: missile
proliferation trends, missile-related procurement,
procurement networks, shipping trends, maritime
proliferation, proliferation finance, brokering, emerging
technologies, SLV/ballistic missile interchangeability,
machine tools, composite materials, visa screening, end-user
checks, ITT (intangible technology transfers), and UAV
proliferation threats. The IE also discussed missile
proliferation activities in the following countries and
regions: China, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, the Middle
East, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Syria.
NOTE: A detailed report on these discussions can be found in
the IE Co-Chairs' Report to the Plenary (POC 225). END NOTE.
103. (C) IE presentations engendered an active exchange of
views and information. Partners discussed at length
ballistic missile and UAV developments in Iran, as well as
the processes Iran employs to acquire key equipment and
technology for its program. In this context, Partners were
encouraged to exercise particular vigilance with regard to
attempts to acquire guidance and control and propulsion
technologies. Attention also was drawn to the increased use
being made of the automotive industry as a cover for
procurement efforts on behalf of Iran,s missile program.
Finally, Partners discussed in detail the operations of the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a
key carrier of ballistic missile-related cargoes for Iran.
104. (C) Missile programs in China and North Korea also
were discussed extensively, as were the role of brokers in
illicit procurement and proliferators, use of transshipment
points. Partners also were briefed on methods used in
proliferation finance and the importance of using visa
screening as a nonproliferation tool. Another key focus of
the IE discussions was emerging technologies.
105. (C) The IE hosted the first ever joint session of the
IE, LEEM, and TEM. Subjects discussed included emerging
technologies, machine tools, proliferation finance, and
brokering. Participants found the exchange highly valuable
and urged that such joint sessions be continued, noting that
sharing information on interdictions and national practices
in key areas is extremely useful.
106. (C) IE Co-Chair John Andrews presented the final IE
report to the Plenary on November 8. The Plenary took note
of the report and generally praised the excellent work of the
IE. The Plenary also reiterated the importance of
circulating IE papers on ePOC at least one month in advance
of the Plenary. In cases where classification does not
permit papers to be circulated on ePOC, Partners should
circulate a suitable synopsis.
Technical Experts Meeting (TEM)
107. (C) The TEM met November 1-6, 2007 to discuss a number
of proposals for amending the MTCR Annex. ISN/MTR,s Kennedy
Wilson led U.S. participation in the TEM. The TEM reached
consensus on the following:
--The payload definition for &Other UAVs8 was amended in
two areas to include munitions support and deployment
--Terms in entries 2.A.1.B.1 and 2.A.1.b.2 were made
consistent with other Item entries.
--The names of fuel substances in 4.C.2.b.3, 4.C.2.b.13, and
4.C.2.b.20 were changed to provide further precision.
--A new entry was created for an oxidizer substance useable
in solid propellant rocket motors (4.C.4.b.5).
--The control text for two polymeric substances was clarified
(4.C.5.a and 4.C.5.b).
--An editorial correction was applied to 4.C.6.a.3.
--Two notes were added to 4.C.6.a.5.
--The Technical Note for maraging steels (6.C.8) was
--The expression of the percentage of titanium content in
Titanium-stabilized stainless steel was corrected (6.C.9.a.2).
--A new text clarifying vibration test modes was adopted
--The scope of 10.E.1 was extended to cover systems in 19.A.2.
--An Index provided for reference as a separate document from
the Annex was created and will be updated consequent to each
update of the Annex.
108. (C) In addition, the TEM discussed at length a U.S.
proposal to significantly modify how the Regime controls UAVs
and cruise missiles. However, despite the majority of
Partners supporting the proposal, it did not gain consensus.
Russia did not identify specific technical objections to the
proposal but objected to it on principle. As an alternative,
Russia proposed ) during bilateral discussions -- a
comprehensive zero-based review of the Regime,s control
criteria, goals, and purpose for various classes of systems.
Both Brazil and South Africa said they appreciated the new
modified format of the U.S. proposal, but did not remove
their reserves, although South Africa moved from reserve to
study reserve. South Africa also proposed modified language
for the stealth criterion and indicated it has additional
unspecified concerns about the parameters in general that it
would discuss if its stealth concerns were resolved.
Privately, Brazilian officials indicated that they support
the U.S. proposal, but are still working their interagency
for approval. South Africa also indicated privately that it
remains on reserve because of political concerns about
109. (C) The Partners took note of the TEM report and
endorsed the recommendations presented by the TEM Chair.
110. (C) Brazil informed the Partners of the third UN Panel
on Missiles. The panel had an organizational meeting in
2007, and will meet again in February and June 2008. Brazil
is serving as panel chair, and hopes the panel will produce a
111. (C) Russia also hoped the panel would produce a good
assessment of the global missile picture and the challenges
Partners face in this area. Russia thought the panel report
would be a good starting point for the MTCR to begin
assessing the global missile threat, with a view to
identifying where the MTCR has been successful in addressing
the threat and what more must be done to deal with new
challenges. In Russia,s view, the MTCR needs to review
where it is heading and what it needs to do to get there.
Russia appealed to Partners to give careful thought to its
suggestion and hoped that the seeds of its proposal would
find good soil and bear fruit in the future.
112. (C) Continuing, Russia said it is dissatisfied with
the organization of the MTCR, especially the IE, and thinks
there needs to be a review of how the Regime works. Russia
is interested in improving the MTCR effectiveness, starting
with the Plenary agenda. In Russia,s assessment, the
Partners spent too much time in Athens talking about outreach
and not enough time on serious matters. Russia wants to make
sure that its views will be taken into account and that the
Partners will focus on substance at the Canberra Plenary.
Russia also hoped that Partners would think seriously about
the information flow within the Regime, and take steps to fix
it and thereby reduce tensions at the Plenary. In
particular, Russia said, it is too much for the Russian
delegation to be expected to handle all of the last minute
papers. Plenary papers, especially IE papers, should be
circulated at least one month in advance.
113. (C) Portugal, on behalf of the EU and Norway, was
disappointed that the Partners had failed to admit the newest
EU countries to the Regime and urged the MTCR to give
priority to this issue in the future. Ukraine fully
supported the EU position.
114. (C) Outgoing Chair Fischer thanked Greece for its
outstanding hospitality and leadership in organizing the
Plenary. The UK echoed these sentiments, adding a thank you
for all the behind-the-scenes staff that made the Plenary a
115. (U) The Partners adopted the following press statement
for release at the conclusion of the Athens Plenary:
MTCR Plenary: Athens
7-9 November 2007
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 22nd
Plenary Meeting in Athens from 7 to 9 November 2007 to review
its activities and further strengthen its efforts to prevent
missile proliferation. The Plenary was opened by H.E. Mr.
Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, Secretary General for European
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic
Republic, and chaired by Ambassador Eleftherios Danellis who
was confirmed as Chair of the MTCR until the next Plenary.
Partners exchanged information and discussed trends in
missile developments around the world and acknowledged the
growing risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery. In particular, they expressed
concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia South
Asia, and the Middle East and reaffirmed their determination
to strengthen export controls, thereby discouraging missile
programmes and activities of proliferation concern.
Partners noted the direct relevance of UN Security Council
resolutions, inter alia, 1718, 1737 and 1747 to MTCR export
controls and expressed their determination to implement these
resolutions and to exercise vigilance and prevent the
transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that
could contribute to WMD ballistic missile programmes of
proliferation concern, in accordance with their national
legislation and consistent with international law.
Partners agreed on practical measures, including exchange of
information, inter alia, on entities and non-listed goods of
proliferation concern and called on all States to take all
necessary steps at a national level to fully and effectively
implement the missile relevant provisions of these
The Plenary discussed extensively the rapid changes in
relevant technology which demand the MTCR to continuously
adapt in order to maintain the accuracy and comprehensiveness
of its focus on curtailing the missile proliferation threat.
A number of proposals on this subject were discussed. The
Plenary agreed on changes to the list of controlled goods
In a broader context, the Plenary reiterated its support for
UN Security Council resolution 1540 declaring proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery a
threat to international peace and security and obliging all
UN Member Sates to exercise effective export controls over
such weapons and related materials. It reaffirmed the
willingness of Partners in a position to do so to assist
non-member states, as foreseen in the resolution, and that
the Chair should continue to pursue contact with the 1540
Since its establishment in 1987 the MTCR has made significant
contributions to the international non-proliferation effort.
The 34 Partners (see below) of the MTCR have established an
international export control standard which is increasingly
adhered to by non-members of the MTCR. Partners welcomed the
growing awareness of the need for export controls and the
expressed interest by many States in cooperating with the
MTCR. They confirmed their intention individually and through
the outreach activities of the Chair to consult and cooperate
with non-members to promote effective export controls over
missiles and missile technology. The Greek Chair was
mandated to conduct outreach activities with a diverse range
of non-member States.
Partners welcomed Australia,s offer to host the next MTCR
Plenary Meeting in the second half of 2008 and to take on the
chairmanship of the Regime for the subsequent term of office.
Further information on the MTCR can be found at www.mtcr.info
Partners of the MTCR: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian
Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of
116. (C) The U.S. delegation held bilateral meetings with
several countries on the margins of the November Plenary
Australia (11/06): The U.S and the UK exchanged views on
Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the
U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership, and the U.S.
proposals on Iranian front companies and outreach. The U.S.
also briefed Australia on the results of recent bilateral
talks with India on export control issues, and discussed in
detail MTCR procedures and operations. In addition, the U.S.
answered numerous questions about the &how to,s8 of
organizing a Plenary and volunteered to be a resource for
Australia in the coming year.
France (11/07): The U.S. and France exchanged views on
Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the
U.S. UAV/CM proposal, the U.S. proposal on outreach and
Iranian front companies, two Russian proposals on a
comprehensive review of the MTCR and globalizing the INF
treaty, and the EU proposal on Iran.
Germany (11/04): The U.S and Germany exchanged views on
Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the
U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership and outreach,
Germany,s proposals on denial notifications and end-use
Greece (11/05): The U.S and Greece exchanged views on
Plenary agenda items and Plenary management strategies.
Japan (11/06): The U.S and Japan exchanged views on Plenary
agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S.
UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership, and outreach.
Russia (11/05): The U.S. and Russia exchanged views on
Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the
U.S. UAV/CM proposal, membership, and the U.S. proposal on
Iranian front companies. Russia also discussed its interest
in circulating the U.S.-Russia joint statement on INF.
South Africa (11/06): The U.S. and South Africa exchanged
views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating
to the U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, outreach, and the
U.S. proposal on Iranian front companies.
UK (11/04): The U.S and the UK exchanged views on Plenary
agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S.
UAV/Cruise missile proposal, the UK proposal on payload
substitution, membership, and the U.S. proposals on Iranian
front companies and outreach. The U.S. also briefed the UK
on the results of recent bilateral talks with India on export
NOTE: The TEM delegation also held separate, TEM-specific
bilats with Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, and the
UK. END NOTE.
117. (C) The U.S. delegation was led by ISN Acting DAS Amb.
Donald A. Mahley. Other delegation members were: Pam Durham
(ISN/MTR), Ralph Palmiero, (ISN/MTR), Josh Casker(ISN/MTR),
Kennedy Wilson (ISN/MTR), Steve Clagett (DOC/BIS), Dennis
Krepp (DOC/BIS), Chantal Laktos (DOC/BIS), Jamie Fly
(OSD/TNT), Charlie Stubbs (JCS/J-5), Jesse Crump (DOD),
Timothy Williams (OSD), Geoffrey Buescher (DOD), Anatoli
Welihozikiy (DOE), Scot Gonzales (DOC/OEE), Dave
Manglos(DHS/ICE), Rachel Roll (Navy), Helen Smith (Embassy
Paris), Jeffrey Hovenier and Starr Small (Embassy Athens).