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Cablegate: Lra-Gou Peace Agreement: Implications for Northern

VZCZCXRO8202
OO RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0412/01 0781442
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181442Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0137
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE 0481
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 3439

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000412

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

KHARTOUM PLEASE PASS TO JUBA
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USAID AND OFDA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC CG EAID PHUM PREF SU UG
SUBJECT: LRA-GOU PEACE AGREEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHERN
UGANDA

REF: KAMPALA

KAMPALA 00000412 001.2 OF 003


1. (U) Summary: The Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the
Government of Uganda and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) awaits
signature, possibly by March 28. The parties will return to
Juba during the week of March 24 to determine the signature
date. Whether or not the document is signed, the peace
process has yielded significant dividends to the people of
northern Uganda, including improved security and an
opportunity to leave the internally-displaced persons camps
to return to or near their homes. The U.S. can focus efforts
on implementation of sections of the agreement that end the
perception of northern marginalization, contribute to
economic recovery and northern development, and are aimed at
reconciliation to consolidate peace in northern Uganda. End
Summary.

- - - - -
OVERVIEW
- - - - -

2. (U) The Government of Southern Sudan-mediated
negotiations between the Lord's Resistance Army and the
Government of Uganda began in July 2006, experienced frequent
delays and periods of little or no activity, and were
concluded on February 29, 2008 after a month of intensive
negotiations. The FPA will be comprised of seven sections:
The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement Addenda Six (in
effect); Comprehensive Solutions (in effect after the LRA
disarmament), Accountability and Reconciliation and Annex (in
effect); Permanent Ceasefire (in effect 24 hours after
signing of FPA); Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) (in effect after transitional period);
the Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms (IMM) (in effect
after FPA signature); and the Final Peace Agreement and
Implementation Mechanism Schedule (in effect upon signature).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND PERMANENT CEASEFIRE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

3. (U) The first Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA)
was signed on August 26, 2006, establishing assembly areas at
Rikwangba and Owiny Kibul, southern Sudan. Owiny Kibul was
dropped in a later agreement. The CHA has been renewed five
times. The Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT)
was established to verify violations of the CHA. A Permanent
Ceasefire Agreement will supercede the CHA, and the CHMT will
become the Ceasefire Monitoring Team (CMT), which will manage
the DDR process at the Rikwangba assembly area. The Sudan
Peoples' Liberation Army will provide security, logistics,
and service support to the assembly area and buffer zone.
The LRA is required to fully assemble at Rikwangba within 30
days of the signing of the FPA (extendable to 60 days). A 15
kilometer buffer zone was established. Ceasefire violations
include attacks, threats and acts of violence directed
against the other party; hostage taking; seizure of personnel
or property of humanitarian organizations; hostile
propaganda; acquisition, recovery, or replenishment of arms,
ammunition, or other military equipment by the LRA; and
recruitment of forces by the LRA.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS
- - - - - - - - - - - -

4. (U) The Comprehensive Solutions agreement covers the
political issues raised by the LRA, and it is focused on
Uganda's future. It contains mechanisms to address the
impact and causes of conflict, recognizes the Peace,
Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP) and existing Government
interventions, contains a reparations provision, sets up a
trust fund for victims, and provides for government
appointments for people from conflict-affected areas. The
Joint Liaison Group, which is comprised of both Government
and LRA, will make nominations for Government positions. The
GOU will ensure the Equal Opportunities Commission becomes
operational, actively promotes increased access to
universities for individuals from the conflict-affected areas
and strengthens the reestablishment of the legal system in
the north, deployment of the Uganda Police Force, and
district land boards. The GOU is obligated to ensure that
the security services reflect national character. The GOU
shall develop and implement a strategy for assisting the

KAMPALA 00000412 002.2 OF 003


return and resettlement of internally-displaced persons and
implement the PRDP.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION PRINCIPLES AND ANNEX
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

5. (U) The Accountability and Reconciliation agreement and
annex focus on past atrocities. The agreement allows for
legal trials for the most serious crimes and traditional
justice mechanisms for others. It requires the GOU to
establish a Special Division of the High Court. The GOU will
establish a body that analyzes the causes and effects of the
conflict, examines human rights violations, and promotes
truth-telling. The body may hold hearings and will publish
its findings. There is separate treatment for state and
non-state actors. Ugandan soldiers that committed atrocities
would be prosecuted under the UPDF Act. Traditional
mechanisms form the central part of the alternative justice
and reconciliation framework.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

6. (U) The agreement on DDR is consistent with international
principles and includes provisions for the protection of
children and attention to gender issues. The CMT is charged
with recording information about the LRA members and
determining who wants to be absorbed into the Uganda military
and security agencies. The DDR can be implemented through
existing mechanisms such as the Amnesty Commission. Initial
disarmament and demobilization will take place at Rikwangba,
southern Sudan, with reintegration occurring in Uganda. The
DDR requires liaison between Sudan and Uganda and could
involve a prolonged period during which the LRA assembles.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING MECHANISMS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7. (U) Key implementing mechanisms include the Joint Liaison
Group and the Oversight Forum, which provide both political
oversight and technical monitoring. With the establishment
of the JLG and the OF, the peace process moves to Kampala
from Juba, but the GOSS mediator maintains linkages to the
process. The JLG is tasked with facilitating and monitoring
the implementation of the FPA. It is composed of three
persons nominated by the Government, three LRA nominees, and
a person selected by the Chief Mediator, who will serve as
the JLG chair. The OF consists of the Chief Mediator (or
representative); UNSG Special Envoy for the LRA-Affected
Areas, (or representative) who shall speak for the OF; one
representative from each of the African Union observer
countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania,
Mozambique, and South Africa); one representative from the
other observers to the FPA (EU, United States, Canada, and
Norway). The OF will meet once a month during the transition
period. U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Chissano's
office in Kampala will provide the technical and secretariat
support for the OF.

8. (U) The agreement established the transitional period of
one month, with the possibility of extension. During the
transitional period, the Government must prepare the
accountability mechanisms, which include investigations,
establishment of a Special Court, and make an approach to the
U.N. Security Council for deferral of International Criminal
Court warrants for Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic
Ongwen. The LRA is obliged to observe the Permanent
Ceasefire and fully assemble at Rikwangba. The DDR process
would begin after the transition period. The CMT will verify
whether the LRA assembled at Rikwangba and whether LRA forces
in northern Uganda have surfaced. After disarmament and
demobilization, the LRA would be dissolved.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9. (U) During the last round of negotiations in Juba, the
parties decided that the FPA should be signed no later than
March 28. The FPA document is a chapeau for the other
agreements that were signed, and contains preamble language

KAMPALA 00000412 003.2 OF 003


introducing the agreements reached. Both parties have a
draft implementation schedule, which cannot be finalized
until the FPA is signed because it contains the timing of
various obligations that depend on the date of the FPA's
signature.

- - - - - -
NEXT STEPS
- - - - - -

10. (SBU) Implementation of the agreement could be slow and
patchy without sustained national and international political
support for the parties. The issue of LRA assembly remains
key to the agreement, but Chief GOU negotiator Rugunda told
the Ambassador on March 18 that he believes the LRA will sign
the final agreement. He does not believe Kony will show up
to sign, nor does he believe all LRA fighters will assemble.
Current LRA movements on the ground and Matsanga's erratic
demands appear to confirm the GOU's suspicions. (The
question of the ICC remains a key concern for the LRA, and
Matsanga now is demanding that the GOU request a deferral of
the warrants before the FPA is signed.)

- - - - - - -
IMPLICATIONS
- - - - - - -

11. (SBU) There is broad belief by a number of senior GOU
officials and northern leaders that the Juba Peace Process
has yielded results beyond the actual documents signed, or
whether Kony actually disarms at this time. Improved
security conditions allowed hundreds of thousands of
northerners to leave squalid displaced persons camps and
return to or near their homes. Currently, Government
officials at the national and local levels are confident
enough in the status quo, that they are de-linking the peace
and recovery processes.

12. (SBU) The Juba Process has helped the Government with
two key constituencies, the international community and
northern Ugandans. The Government, by spending 18 months
negotiating with the LRA, has demonstrated its commitment to
peace to skeptical northerners, and now has a document that
it could use to justify military operations against the LRA
to its domestic and international audiences. The LRA used
the negotiations to try to clean up its image for possible
conversion to a political front, stave off the International
Criminal Court, and buy time. However, frequent delays,
squabbles over allowances, the execution of LRA deputy
Vincent Otti, and claims that the LRA represented all
northern Ugandans contributed to a loss of sympathy
northerners and their elected and traditional leaders may
have had for the LRA cause. Current foot-dragging over the
signature date also is likely designed to bring the
implementation of the agreement into April, when the rainy
season starts and military operations become difficult.

- - - - -
OUR ROLE
- - - - -

13. (SBU) Enhanced U.S. involvement in Juba accelerated the
negotiations phase of process, which had been plagued by long
delays. Coupled with significant assistance programs, U.S.
actions also convinced the LRA that the U.S. was serious
about the consolidation of peace and security in northern
Uganda. Regardless of whether the LRA delegation can deliver
on its part of the bargain, particularly the assembly of LRA
forces, our role now should be to work with the Government on
implementation of its "obligations," particularly those
pertaining to reconstruction and reconciliation, which will
benefit a tentative north-south political rapprochement
within Uganda. We can also support efforts to bring as many
LRA out of the bush as possible, whether through a process of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration or through the
Government's Amnesty Program. Lastly, we should continue to
explore options with the GOU on means to end Kony's threat to
regional stability and development.
BROWNING

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