Cablegate: Iaea: Hayward Delegation Tour D,Horizon with Senior Agency Officials
DE RUEHUNV #0215/01 1071030
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161030Z APR 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7796
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000215
DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA, IO/T
DOE FOR NA-20; NA-24 LERSTEN
NRC FOR HENDERSON
OSD FOR LGROSS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018
TAGS: PARM AORC IAEA KNPP IR KN
SUBJECT: IAEA: HAYWARD DELEGATION TOUR D,HORIZON WITH SENIOR AGENCY OFFICIALS Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d and h Summary --------
1.(SBU) An Interagency delegation led by ISN DAS Mary Alice Hayward held an intensive series of consultations April 7-9 with senior IAEA officials, including DDGs for Management, Safety and Security, Safeguards, Nuclear Energy and Technical Cooperation. The delegation acquired a holistic understanding of key issues in each of these Departments and discussed long-term perspectives for the Agency, including 20/20, with Management DDG Waller and Geneva Group Ambassadors. Safety/Security and Nuclear Energy DDGs addressed growing challenges of nuclear power in the developing world, and sought greater coordination with the U.S. Safety and Security officials saw promise in the Japanese 3S's (Safety, Security, Safeguards) proposal while Nuclear Energy DDG Sokolov stressed the need for economically successful implementation of nuclear power. On TC, Hayward recommended greater transparency and cooperation with the forthcoming GAO visit. EXPO also updated the delegation on Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) proposals and noted continued resistance to including this item on Board agenda.
2.(C) Safeguards DDG Heinonen downplayed Iran's Nuclear Day announcement of 3000 additional centrifuges and discussed verification priorities in Iran. He opined that disablement activities in the DPRK were at a tipping point. Safeguards officials also discussed streamlining and optimizing inspections and looked forward to further discussion of DOE's next generation safeguards initiative. In an eye-opening visit to the Safeguards Analytical Lab (SAL), the delegation became aware of acute safety and security concerns and Heinonen further explained the need for a UHS-SIMS. End Summary.
3.(SBU) Delegation members: DAS Hayward Ambassador Ragsdale (ISN/MNSA) Dr. Susan Koch (T) Laura Gross, Director, Combating WMD Policy, OSD Cynthia Lersten, Assoc Asst Deputy Administrator NNSA Dr. Karen Henderson, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor, NRC 20/20 and Management/Safeguards
4.(SBU) DDG Management David Waller provided DAS Hayward and the Interagency delegation an overview of the Agency's long-term perspectives April 7. He thanked the U.S. for its generous support to the IAEA and underlined the importance of TC for most of the 149 IAEA member-states. He then reviewed the Atoms for Peace "Grand Bargain" and the development of the Agency's responsibilities. Waller also noted that the IAEA is headquarters-centric, compared to other UN organizations, with only four offices outside of Austria -- liaison offices in Geneva and regional safeguards offices in Toronto and Japan. 5.(SBU) Regarding 20/20, Waller said the exercise was the result of the DG's attempt to look beyond the two-year budget cycle and that zero real growth is irresponsible for an Agency with a growing mandated workload. The DG selected Zedillo as Chair and the former Mexican President has participated enthusiastically. Following the recent meeting of Commissioners, a new draft is due which will be reviewed and then shared with the DG. The first discussion of 20/20 is expected at the June Board while the GC Special Event will likely be used as a venue for further discussion. Hayward noted, in particular, the need for increased transparency at the IAEA as well as enhancement of the Agency's technical capacity. She advised that 20/20 focus on what can be done. Waller agreed but observed that some Commission members may not share that perspective. He suggested that the next 20/20 draft would be more balanced in focusing on the Agency's actual activities.
6.(SBU) Hayward and Waller also discussed personnel issues in the Department of Safeguards. DOE Lersten briefed on the U.S. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, which is designed to build human and physical safeguards infrastructure. The program would also seek to place participants in junior-level positions at the IAEA. Waller suggested that the U.S. consider the World Nuclear University model in developing safeguards experts. He noted deficiencies in the demographic make-up of the Safeguards Department and cited UN-system constraints and non-competitive pay, issues which Safeguards DDG Heinonen also flagged in his briefing. On overall U.S. staffing trends, Waller, himself the highest ranking American at the IAEA, observed that the number of Amcits in IAEA permanent staff positions had dropped from 100 to a low of 85 and was now back up to the mid-90s. He asked that the U.S. "bring on good American citizen candidates." Waller was particularly complimentary of Amcit Safety Advisor Bill Travers and suggested that he apply for a Directorship which would soon be opening in that Department.
Geneva Group on 20/20 Review ----------------------------
7.(SBU) At a dinner hosted by Ambassador Schulte with select Geneva Group Ambassadors on April 8 the delegation heard a surprisingly unanimous endorsement of the IAEA's mission and the need for continued resource growth. Reflecting on the ongoing 20/20 review, several Ambassadors argued that the IAEA needs to be more strategic about its mission, deciding where its core competency lies and spinning off work that can be more appropriately done elsewhere in the UN system. Reflecting on the European experience with managing the scope of EU action, UK Ambassador Simon Smith counseled an approach that always asks "do we need the IAEA to do this?" He argued, for instance, that the IAEA's role in nuclear fuel supply should be a strictly limited and a "virtual" one. Australian Ambassador Peter Shannon (seconded by several others) predicted that the IAEA will inevitably require additional resources to accomplish its vital safeguards mission. Even Japanese Ambassador Amano (who is traditionally the toughest budget hawk in this group) indicated that Japan could accept "zero real growth plus or minus alpha." What we can't do, Amano continued, "is double or triple the budget."
8.(SBU) Shannon referred to the possible IAEA role in verifying a FMCT, and also argued that the IAEA's current peer review approach to safety should give way over time to a safety inspectorate. Swedish Ambassador Lundborg likewise argued that "we should be prepared for the IAEA to take additional tasks." Most of the Ambassadors praised the IAEA's relatively economical operation, which looks better than other parts of the UN system, but Amano counseled against a lax approach that takes at face value the claim that the IAEA budget is "peanuts." That said, Amano also noted Japan's willingness to be generous with voluntary contributions, pointing to a recently notified seven million Euro commitment for strengthening safeguards and the USD 800,000 Japan is providing to develop nuclear infrastructure. Without elaborating, he added that Japan is "prepared to help at SAL." Spanish Ambassador Serra counseled that "we can't have an a la carte" IAEA and echoed German Ambassador Gottwald's reminder that the vast majority of IAEA member states are much more focused on technical cooperation and programs that provide perceived benefits. Finally, Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky made a passionate case for better prioritization of the IAEA's work, pointing to nuclear terrorism as an issue that requires greater attention, even if many member states do not see it as an immediate threat.
Safety and Security -------------------
9.(SBU) In a series of EXPO-arranged briefings on April 8, DDGs and senior officials from each of the Agency's five programmatic Departments addressed key issues and developments in Safety and Security, Technical Cooperation, Nuclear Applications, Nuclear Energy and Safeguards, and provided an update on RANF.
10.(SBU) Safety and Security DDG Taniguchi explained how improvements in safety had allowed for longer and more efficient operation of nuclear power plants, but cautioned that existing plants are now close to optimal capacity. He cited his Department's first priority as securing more reliable and predictable funding. Safety only receives 8% of the Agency's regular budget and depends on extra-budgetary contributions to perform most safety and security work. A second, related priority is increased coordination with member states and regional mechanisms so as to not duplicate effort and use resources more effectively (Note: the Department has not been forthcoming in sharing information with member states. End note). Globally, the Department seeks to increase the focus on safety and security so as to mitigate the risk of unintentional (safety) or malevolent (security) accidents.
11.(SBU) Taniguchi and Nuclear Security Director Nilsson expressed appreciation for U.S. support to the nuclear security program, which would not be where it is today absent that support, and spoke of changing public perception to promote a nuclear security culture. EXPO Director Vilmos Cserveny regretted that developing nations do not see nuclear security as a priority. Taniguchi also underlined the need to better control nuclear waste and sources. He advised that GNEP focus on safety and security, as well as safeguards, and cautioned that in promoting nuclear energy, "we should avoid another Chernobyl or nuclear 9/11." Lersten and Hayward agreed and noted that every U.S. nuclear initiative incorporates these elements. Hayward expressed support for the three "S's" proposal (safety, security, safeguards) put forward by the Japanese in the G-8 and Nilsson indicated the Agency is also working in this direction.
12.(SBU) Nilsson added that her office is trying to respond to U.S. and other member state requests to make the nuclear security report to the Board more user-friendly. She noted her office's work with the U.S. to revise INFCIRC/225, and looked forward to U.S. input and participation in planning for a March 2009 international symposium on the nuclear security plan for 2010-2013. She also encouraged member states to use Agency norms and guides to conduct bilateral physical protection inspections. Lersten cited a DOE study aimed at improving communication, coordination and cooperation on this issue.
13.(SBU) Hayward stressed the importance of working together, and the need for prioritization and coordination. Asked how the U.S. could assist in this area given limited resources, Cserveny offered an "out of the box" perspective, "as it takes more than money." Leadership and vision are needed and he hoped the 20/20 review could contribute in this regard. He argued that the Agency should return to its roots and realign important statutory activities on safety. For their part, member states should also look beyond national perspectives and address safety internationally, recognizing that "An accident anywhere is an accident everywhere." Citing the example of ICAO, he suggested that the international community consider mandatory nuclear safety standards similar to those in place for aviation safety. Ideally, the IAEA should be able to review all nuclear power plants annually to ensure a consistent safety level, not just review a few plants a year at the request of member states. Taniguchi took this idea a step further, suggesting that member states promote international, in lieu of domestic, standards.
Technical Cooperation/Nuclear Applications ------------------------------------------
14.(SBU) TC DDG Ana Maria Cetto and Nuclear Applications Division Director Natesan Ramamoorthy provided an overview of their departments. Cetto highlighted the importance of the member state partnerships in the TC Program, and commented on the "almost" full payment of the United States to the TCF, as well as U.S. extra-budgetary and "in-kind" contributions. She noted the need for more resources, however, adding that the budget of more than USD 80 million and a rate of attainment of more than ninety percent showed member state commitment to TC. Cetto stated that TC currently supports close to 1000 programs on a regular basis, which are now monitored from "cradle to grave." Hundreds of experts from the U.S. are working on these projects, and Cetto commented that the Agency would send more experts to the United States for training if placement of candidates "from certain countries" were not so difficult.
15.(SBU) Cetto described the primary focus of the TC program in areas of human health, nuclear safety, and food and agriculture. Given increased interest in nuclear power, she noted IAEA support for responsible development of nuclear power infrastructures. As it pertains to Nuclear Science and Applications, she cited needs based development, health, water resource management, technology transfer, and PACT, which has provided significant benefits for cancer treatment in Africa. Finally, she noted high expectations for application of the Sterile Insect Technique (SIT) for Tse Tse eradication in the Southern Rift river valley.
16.(SBU) The delegation noted the USG's continued support for TC and for programs that promote key U.S. objectives. Hayward emphasized the need for greater transparency in TC projects. She noted U.S. internal requirements for financial accountability, and added that cooperation with the GAO would facilitate future funding requests. EXPO noted that the secretariat had participated in GAO reviews before, which are SIPDIS helpful but time consuming.
Nuclear Energy -------------- 17. (SBU) Nuclear Energy DDG Sokolov saw many challenges associated with rising expectations of the nuclear renaissance and with the introduction of nuclear power into countries that have no current nuclear program. Some of these challenges include: the balance between beneficial use and non-proliferation, building of expensive and complex infrastructure, and developing review missions to countries that are concerned the IAEA will say they are not fit for nuclear power. His Department provided support to countries through guidance development, catalyzing innovation and helping to build the necessary infrastructure. Sokolov stressed the need for "effective" and economically successful implementation of nuclear power. He also cited the need to harmonize support to and from member states and develop common user criteria, and noted that U.S. support was critical in all areas. Among other priorities, the Department focused on managing the "aging," of both facilities/equipment and the knowledgeable workforce and supporting the full spectrum of fuel cycle activities, including fuel assurances, but also mining and disposal.
18. (SBU) Director of the Nuclear Energy Division Akita Omoto described some of the strategic issues facing countries considering nuclear power, including the lack of a clear government-wide commitment and focus on long-term development of human resources and other prerequisites. Often countries want to move ahead prematurely to the advanced stage, and tender bids before they have laid the groundwork. They also take an optimistic view of securing financing needed for nuclear power and think they can "outsource" human and technical resources. Another issue is the lack of stakeholder and public involvement, which is important for "successful" implementation. He noted disappointment that developing countries have paid insufficient attention to the Milestones document on nuclear infrastructure; only two countries have requested "self-assessments" and others seem "intimidated" to request support in this area. Omoto further cited "novel approaches" such as the proposal that EDF operate an Areva plant in the UAE and the regional GCC joint initiative on nuclear power. The latter is hardly "joint" in his view, given differences among these individual countries. Finally, Omoto underlined the need for coordination of activities between the IAEA, GNEP and the G-8 to reduce overlap.
19. (C) Hayward suggested that the Japanese three S's proposal to the G-8 be coordinated with the IAEA. She further noted GNEP's focus on the Milestones document which will be key to nuclear expansion. However, Sokolov wanted to "throw some cold water on the idea of 3S"; he argued that these are limiting factors and that it is difficult to sell the idea of nuclear power if your start with three "negative" statements. He preferred an emphasis on "successful" implementation of which 3S is only one part. Sokolov also saw GNEP as offering a unique venue for Ministerial engagement on nuclear power and hoped it could go beyond topics such as Milestones. Hayward noted that GNEP included working-level groups in addition to Ministerial involvement.
20. (C) In an aside, Msnoff inquired about specific requests for support from Middle East countries and whether DG ElBaradei would participate in a Jeddah symposium on nuclear power in the Gulf region, which was scheduled to take place in April but had been postponed. Sokolov and Tariq Rauf, EXPO Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination, did not seem willing to engage on this issue. Rauf indicated that he had heard about the symposium but had not received an official request for the DG's participation.
Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel -------------------------------
21. (SBU) Rauf also provided the delegation with a brief overview of current fuel assurance initiatives, noting that the Russian proposal would likely be the first to move forward. He advised the delegation that Russia wants to require consumer countries to adhere to NSG guidelines and be in "good standing," adding that the IAEA had mixed feelings about this. In his view, a proposal that could be as "universal as possible" and based solely on statutory requirements for safeguards (rather than the NPT or NSG guidelines) would be easier for India, Pakistan, and other Board members to accept. In regard to the NTI challenge grant, the IAEA is searching for the last $45 million dollars and possible sources include the EU, Japan, and the GCC. Sponsors of the "German Proposal" are holding a briefing in Berlin on their plan for a multi-lateral enrichment sanctuary on April 17. Hayward commented that a recent preview of this initiative in Tokyo indicated the proposal is drifting towards an almost academic/theoretical idea and that many of its details are not based on current commercial reality. Rauf advised that he had heard nothing further on the UK enrichment bond proposal, and other proposals also seemed to have stalled. He also noted the U.S. initiative to downblend 17.4 metric tons of HEU is moving forward, with contracts having gone out, and several tons already available.
22. (C) Rauf reported some resistance to putting reliable access on the agenda for the June Board. Recipient countries need more reassurance as earlier misconceptions about conditionality still prevail, he suggested. He encouraged proposals to be presented as additional "choices," and to steer clear of any mention of forgoing rights. In Rauf's view, any proposal will need to be explained and sold in capitals, opining that Vienna Missions are more hard-line on the subject. Finally, he acknowledged that the DG is supportive of these initiatives but delegations and NTI need to take the lead.
Safeguards: Iran, DPRK ----------------------
23. (C) DDG Heinonen provided the delegation with an assessment of Iran's April 8 announced installation of 3000 additional centrifuges and disablement activities in the DPRK. Heinonen acknowledged at the outset that the IAEA did not know how many centrifuges (presumably in the first 3000 set) were actually spinning on uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at Natanz but had reason to believe most of them are, though the uranium produced was much less than he would have expected. He downplayed Iran's Nuclear Day announcement saying that "they are about where we thought they'd be." Iran had advised Safeguards of the planned expansion in advance. (Note: Heinonen did not say he was informed of the specific number of 3000 additional centrifuges in advance.) He confirmed that these were P1 centrifuges. The rate of installation was about the same as in 2006 and he expected the additional 3000 machines to be up by late summer. Heinonen also stressed that media leaks on this issue did not come from the Agency and included inaccurate information.
24. (C) The overall verification Mission in Iran was focused on three areas cited in para 54 of the DG's February report: the major concern of the "alleged studies," on which Iran was not forthcoming; the AP; and additional safeguards measures. He believed there was sufficient time for Iran to address the first issue prior to the next UNSC and Board report, and tentative meetings are planned with Iran to discuss how to go about doing so. Heinonen wanted Iran to engage in a serious discussion on the "allegations" to understand why it considers them "baseless." He noted that Safeguards has been investigating aspects of what the IAEA includes in the "alleged studies" and first approached Iran with this information in July 2004. The IAEA has received more information in the last months, which he was also prepared to raise with Iranian officials during upcoming meetings.
25. (C) Regarding the AP, Safeguards had provided a list of places it would like to visit to Iran, and would like to implement the AP in accordance with Board and UNSC resolutions. Finally, on additional safeguards measures, Heinonen did not see any huge problem with day-to-day safeguards implementation but noted that Iran was not providing design information early enough. The Arak heavy water reactor was at an early stage of development and was not progressing very rapidly though many people were working on the site. He speculated that the Iranians may have encountered some design difficulties. All safeguards were in place at Bushehr but he did not expect operations to begin before the end of the year.
26. (C) On DPRK, Heinonen opined that disablement seemed to be progressing slowly. He noted that IAEA monitoring was fairly smooth though resource consuming. Heinonen referred several times to the findings of a February 2008 trip report by Stanford University Professor Hecker and advised that disablement activities appear to be at a "tipping point." Noting that 2000 fuel rods have been discharged but 2000 fresh rods are available, he said that DPRK could rather easily undo disablement activities to date. Once the DPRK went beyond this point, it would be much more difficult to do so. Heinonen also repeated the observation in the Hecker report that the reprocessing facility will have to operate at some point in order to process high- level waste and postulated a possible IAEA role in verification of this process. Verification of the two facilities had not presented any problem, he noted. Eventually the IAEA would like to verify plutonium levels at the nuclear test site. Heinonen also believed there must be one more plutonium metal production facility, unless DPRK had previously dismantled it. Finally, he noted that, in addition to centrifuge procurement though the AQ Khan network, DPRK also needed to explain the acquisition of other equipment such as high strength aluminum tubes.
Safeguards Inspections: Working Smarter ---------------------------------------
27. (SBU) Heinonen cited new challenges for Safeguards, particularly in information analysis with the large infrastructure project, but also in making better use of open source material and states' declarations and export-import information. The Safeguards Department is also seeking to improve its capabilities through efforts such as the novel technologies project and satellite imagery. "We need to be fit for any emergency or challenges that may come along," Heinonen said, noting that in the last 18 years the Agency has faced a number of crises - Iraq, South Africa, Iran, DPRK, and would confront more in the future. Lersten provided a brief overview of DOE's next generation safeguards initiative and said that the U.S. hoped to partner more closely with the IAEA. Heinonen looked forward to further discussion with DOE DAS Adam Scheinman on the subject.
28. (SBU) Safeguards Concept and Planning Director Jill Cooley described the Department's input to the 20/20 study, though she noted that for Safeguards the perspective was more like year 2030, since the early provision of design information allowed the Department to look 10 years beyond. Safeguards is focused on optimizing inspections and anticipated a reduction in the number of field activities in NNWS. Hayward expressed concern about reduced site presence, but Heinonen and Cooley clarified that the Agency sought to optimize inspections by prioritizing and tailoring them to countries and facilities of concern. More emphasis would be given to evaluative information to differentiate (though not discriminate) inspection priorities and to the use of unannounced inspections. This would reduce the number of visits but increase effectiveness. Thousands of working days are currently spent conducting routine inspections, Heinonen noted, with only five percent of that time dedicated to Iran. Hayward characterized this effort as "smarter" field inspections.
29. (SBU) Heinonen also flagged personnel issues and problems recruiting qualified applicants with a nuclear background, regardless of nationality. He noted attrition due to retirement and a particular deficit in the 40-55 year old age group. The rotation policy did not affect inspectors as much as support staff, whereas the problem of spousal employment was universal. Lersten recognized the need to invest in global safeguards human capital and to work on issues such as reemployment rights at U.S. national labs.
30. (SBU) Hayward raised the issue of non-state actors and getting at them through Safeguards. Heinonen acknowledged this danger and the problem of "putting the genie" back in the box post-AQ Khan. He noted that the network worked through countries with weak export controls. In this connection, Rauf said the Agency is prepared to assist member states in meeting their 1540 obligations.
31. (SBU) In response to a question from Rauf, Hayward advised that the U.S. is prepared to discuss the criteria based approach in the NSG. The NSG Consultative Group will meet at the end of the month, and the U.S. hoped for approval at the Berlin Plenary.
U.S. Additional Protocol ------------------------
32. (SBU) Finally, Hayward noted that the President issued an Executive Order in late February, that directed the U.S. interagency to prepare the rules, regulations and other requirements necessary to prepare for execution of the AP. The interagency process is underway, she noted, and the aim is to be in the position to recommend to the President that he deposit the instrument of ratification by the end of December 2008. Once the AP enters into force, she acknowledged that it will be up to the IAEA to decide when, if and where to go but the U.S. is not expecting much in the way of inspections. The U.S. would be prepared to hold bi-lats on implementation at that juncture, but not before. In response, DDG Heinonen and Operations B Director Nackaerts said, "We are ready."
Safeguards Analytic Laboratory --------------------------------
33. (SBU) The delegation visited the Safeguards Analytic Laboratory (SAL) in Seibersdorf on April 9. Gabriela Voigt, Director of the Seibersdorf labs, and Chris Schmitzer, head of SAL provided an overview of the laboratories. Schmitzer observed that the laboratory is not collapsing, but external consultants advise there are needs that should be addressed, such as the ventilation system in the nuclear lab. The remaining life-span of the labs in the present condition is five-to-ten years, according to consultants. The DG's November 2007 report was a bold move, Schmitzer said, to draw attention to SAL so that there will not be a failure in operations. Member states are now talking about SAL and the DG has included SAL in the Secretariat's 20/20 report. The delegation toured the Clean Laboratory, Chemical Analysis Unit (Nuclear Lab) and Mass Spectrometry Unit and received a briefing on the role of each lab and shortcomings as described in the DG's report.
34. (SBU) The primary issue at the Clean Lab is the shortage of space for equipment. Ensuring no cross-contamination is vital to maintaining the credibility of environmental samples at the Clean Lab. Also due to space restrictions, the set up of the Nuclear Lab is not conducive to efficient or proper handling of samples; for example, a clean lab is situated next to the hottest lab. The "single point" failure of nuclear sample analysis is another problem as SAL conducts 99-percent of the analysis. At the Mass Spectrometry Lab, the delegation viewed the current 4f SIMS machine and was briefed on the benefits of the UHS-SIMS, which would deliver higher quality data. The lab director agreed that personnel policies must be adapted to maintain staff to run such a highly specialized machine. The IAEA has permission to build on a portion of the plot of land next to the Clean Lab (about 70 square meters), which is sufficient for a building to house the UHS-SIMS. The Japanese have provided 6.9 million Euro for the UHS-SIMS, but 3 million Euros are still needed for the construction of the building. The IAEA is also negotiating with the Government of Austria for use of a larger parcel of land to construct additional laboratory space.
35. (SBU) The delegation was particularly struck by safety and security concerns at SAL. For example, the nuclear laboratories that handle plutonium and uranium have windows, per Austrian law, and are located in a building housing the Austria Research Center (ARC). There is no way to provide perimeter security to this laboratory. The lack of space and inefficient set-up of the laboratories (scattered in the ARC building and the IAEA owned lab) increase the safety concerns for personnel. As a temporary remedy, the IAEA has established makeshift "pod" buildings for office space of nuclear lab personnel, to minimize the time spent in the labs.
36. (SBU) DAS Hayward, Susan Koch, and Ambassador Schulte also subsequently discussed SAL with DDG Heinonen who focused on environmental sample analysis, specifically the need for the UHS-SIMS. He explained that environmental samples do not have a reasonable turnover time with the exiting SIMS and cited delay in evaluation of Iranian samples. Adding to the delay is the two-lab rule for quality assurance. The UHS-SIMS would also provide the capability to look at plutonium. Finally, Heinonen pointed to sensitivities of some countries (citing Pakistan) that insist analysis take place only at IAEA labs. Heinonen stressed that this request for an increased capability is not out of distrust fro the NWAL labs, but rather to deal with these specific issues. He also conceded that some member states are always going to have superior capabilities to SAL.
37. (SBU) Asked about the 6.9 million Euro Japanese contribution, Heinonen confirmed that the funds were provided for the purchase of the UHS-SIMS, spare parts, and maintenance, and did not have time constraints. (Note: Japanese Msnoffs advise that the funding for high priority safeguards is intended for purposes other than SAL, such as DPRK and training, and should be used in a timely manner.) Heinonen hopes to have the additional 3 million Euro needed for construction sorted out in the next two weeks and mentioned approaching unusual sources if needed, including UAE and Kuwait. Heinonen expects the Agency can resolve the issue of long-term contracts at SAL in-house. He also opined that the UHS-SIMS would attract good candidates.
38. (U) DAS Hayward cleared this message. SCHULTE