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Cablegate: China Revisits Mandatory Certification For

VZCZCXRO5710
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #2084/01 1500915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290915Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7604
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 6961
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1943
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0677
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2232
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 002084

State for EAP/CM JYamomoto, PSecor
State also for EB/CIP DGross, WWitteman
USTR for JMcHale, TWineland, TStratford
USDOC for ITA IKasoff
USDOC for ITA JEstrada
GENEVA PASS USTR

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECPS ETRD PREL EINV WTRO ECON CH
SUBJECT: CHINA REVISITS MANDATORY CERTIFICATION FOR
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS

Ref: A. 2004 BEIJING 3621 B. 2008 BEIJING 1567

1. (U) Summary: Deputy Assistant United States Trade
Representative Timothy Wineland met with the Chinese
Government and United States industry representatives
in Beijing from May 6-16 to discuss China's
unprecedented proposal for mandatory certification
requirements across a wide range of security-enhanced
information and communications technology products.
In meetings with China's Certification and
Accreditation Administration (CNCA), Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), and State Encryption Management
Commission (SEMC), Wineland stressed USG and industry
concern over the proposed regime and urged continued
dialogue to forestall the publication of implementing
regulations, which he warned may politicize the issue.
Industry representatives shared with Wineland their
varying degrees of concern over the proposed
regulations, the history of information security in
China, and the precedent the new regulations could set
if implemented in their current form. The Chinese
Government appeared committed to pushing ahead with
the measures, but showed some flexibility in the
timing of their ultimate implementation and was open
to further dialogue. End Summary.

Background on China's Information Security Regulations
--------------------------------------------- ---------

2. (U) In August 2007, CNCA notified to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) Committee 13 proposed technical regulations
mandating testing and certification for a wide range
of commercial, security-enhanced information and
communication technology (ICT) products, including:
website recovery producs, firewalls, network secure
separation card and line selectors, secure separation
and information exchange products, secure routers,
smartcard chip operating systems, data backup and
recovery, secure operating systems, secure databases,
anti-spam products, intrusion detection systems,
network vulnerability scanners, and security audit
products.

3. (U) The proposed regulations are potential trade
barriers and are a major USG and industry concern in
part because of past measures introduced by the
Chinese Government in this area. In 1999, the State
Council published the Commercial Encryption
Administration Regulations, imposing comprehensive
restrictions on the research, production, sale, and
use of encryption products in China. In 2003, China
published regulations to implement the mandatory use
of Chinese encryption algorithms for WiFi, the
wireless networking technology, under a standard
called WAPI, or WLAN Authentication and Privacy
Infrastructure (Ref A). In 2006 and 2007, China
introduced requirements for foreign companies to
register all encryption-enabled products they were
using in China. On March 1, 2008, nine Chinese
Government ministries and agencies jointly issued the
"Regulations on Government Procurement of Information
Products Containing Cryptographic Technology," which
restricts government procurement of ICT products for
national security applications to those products
specified in a catalog of approved products maintained
by the Ministry of Finance and SEMC (Ref B).

4. (SBU) In addition to these regulations, China in
December 2007 promulgated specifications related to
the Trusted Computing Module (TCM), a Chinese domestic
equivalent to the international standard Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), used to develop hardware-based
encryption in the form of a secure microprocessor chip.
The series of ICT security-related initiatives appear
to reflect China's continued interest in pursuing
ambitious programs to promote domestic standards,
control sensitive technology within its borders, and
reduce the country's reliance on foreign technology,
often despite international protest and without much
regard for the practical considerations of their
implementation.

CNCA Defends Measures, but Shows Flexibility
--------------------------------------------

5. (SBU) In a May 6 meeting with CNCA Chief Technical
Supervisor Liu Weijun, Wineland emphasized the concern
of the United States government and industry that no
country currently requires mandatory information
security certification and testing for commercial
products. Liu stressed China's concerns for
safeguarding information security, which he said was
in China's economic, social, and political interests.
He defended CNCA's proposed regulations as both within
WTO rules and in accordance with international
practice. That is, he said CNCA's notification of the
proposed regulations to the WTO was procedurally
correct; and the proposed certification system is in
line with China's existing China Compulsory
Certificate mark (CCC Mark) scheme (a compulsory
safety mark for many categories of products), which he
noted includes information technology products and is
a system that is employed internationally.

6. (SBU) Wineland stressed three main USG concerns
stemming from a lack of information on the proposed
regulations. First, he asked what additional
requirements would be placed on encryption-enabled
products during the certification process. Liu
replied that any requirements related to encryption
would come directly from SEMC, the agency behind
China's 1999 encryption regulations and the 2003 WAPI
regulations. He added that the new mandatory
certification proposal would not create new
requirements for encryption products, but would merely
follow rules that are already in place, apparently
referring to the 1999 regulations.

7. (SBU) Second, Wineland inquired whether companies
would be required to provide the source code of their
products during the certification process. He pointed
out that most countries require a limited amount of
source code only at higher levels of security
assurance typically used in national security
applications. Liu replied that all products above a
particular security assurance level would require a
source code review. He pointed out that this would be
equivalent to the international Common Criteria (CC)
system, which requires source code review for products
above Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4.

8. (SBU) Third, Wineland noted that the testing
process for certification in most cases takes many
months (4 to 24 months, according to the United States
General Accounting Office, which also projected the
cost of such testing at $80,000 to $350,000), and that
CNCA's proposed May 1, 2009 implementation is
therefore an area of concern among businesses. He
requested that more information be provided about
testing labs and processes. Liu acknowledged that the
May 1, 2009 implementation deadline does not leave
much preparation time, especially because the
implementing regulations had not yet been published.
As a result, he said that, if certain products need
more time to prepare for implementation, CNCA would
consider revising the timing of the requirements.

9. (SBU) Finally, Wineland warned that, based on
precedents set in 1999 and in 2004 with WAPI,
encryption issues could quickly become politicized and
might have a lasting effect on bilateral relations.
This is especially true now, he said, when trade
critics in the United States Congress are likely to
seize on the issue. As a means to avoid this,
Wineland suggested that CNCA not publish the
regulations, which were originally expected on May 1
(one year prior to the implementation deadline), and
instead continue a working-level dialogue to discuss
the details of the regulations and ways to best meet
China's legitimate objectives in a way consistent with
international norms. Liu was receptive to Wineland's
warnings to avoid politicizing the issue, stressing
that discussions of the matter should be exclusively
technical, and that CNCA is open to talking about how
to resolve specific disagreements on the matter to
make the system more "scientific and reasonable." He
said that the impending implementation regulations or
separate guidance would spell out many of the
program's technical details and testing requirements,
but that their publication had already been delayed in
response to feedback received from industry.

10. (SBU) Wineland also suggested that China and the
United States, in the medium term, consider
discussions on the role of the Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement (CCRA), an international
framework for specifying, implementing, and evaluating
information technology security. Liu responded that
China's own requirements were based in many ways on
the international standards used in CC.

Industry Comments on Proposed Regulations
-----------------------------------------

11. (SBU) In October 2007, following China's TBT
notifications, and again on March 25 and April 18,
2008, United States industry associations submitted to
CNCA comments on China's proposed information security
regulations. The submissions were prepared by the
United States Information Technology Office (USITO),
Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA),
Software Information Industry Association (SIIA),
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), Information
Technology Industry Council (ITI), and American
Electronics Association (AeA).

12. (SBU) In their comments, the affected industry
groups raised a series of concerns. First,
multinational companies reported that in no other
market in the world are they required to undertake
mandatory conformity assessments in the scale or
specificity outlined by CNCA. They questioned why
China's information security needs differ from the
rest of the world, and warned of a chilling effect on
trade due to unnecessary and duplicative requirements
and significant border delays for imports to China.
Next, they noted that products already broadly
utilized in the global market will be subject to
Chinese standards that have not been vetted
internationally for reliability, interoperability, or
performance to users. The requirement, they said, may
force the development of bifurcated product lines,
causing a significant barrier to trade and the
possibility of discriminatory treatment for overseas
products.

13. (SBU) Furthermore, United States businesses
questioned CNCA's use of only Chinese domestic (GB/T
or YD/T) standards in technical proposals, noting that
international IT companies have had no opportunity to
participate in the development and approval of these
standards, some of which appear to be out of date
compared with international standards. Companies also
raised concerns that China's testing and certification
labs are all affiliated with the Chinese Government,
and are not independent, internationally-recognized
labs that are used in other foreign countries. Among
other issues, industry noted that the proposed testing
regime raises concerns over confidentiality and
intellectual property rights protection. In separate
meetings with Wineland in Beijing, industry
representatives elaborated on these concerns.
SEMC Clarifies Encryption Requirements
--------------------------------------

14. (SBU) Finally, industry provided a separate set of
comments focused specifically on the implementation of
cryptographic requirements under CNCA's proposed
certification system. In particular, companies raised
concerns over secure databases, secure operating
systems, secure routers, and smartcard operating
systems, each of which will apparently be required to
conform to new encryption requirements, incorporated
by reference into the CCC Mark certification process.
In response to Wineland's questions on this matter,
CNCA responded that encryption matters are not within
their purview, and that such requirements are
established by SEMC. In a May 15 meeting with
Wineland, SEMC Director Mme. Qiang Zhijun confirmed
the four suspected categories of secure products would
require source code review prior to certification, and
that in fact SEMC's regulatory authority extended only
to those products. She did note, however, that the 13
product categories already notified to the WTO were
only "the first batch" of products to be certified,
and that there will be more in the future, at which
point SEMC's testing for encryption products could
expand beyond the current four products.

15. (SBU) Qiang said that SEMC would soon publish
detailed guidelines for testing procedures related to
encryption products. When asked, she said
definitively that included products would not be
required to use Chinese encryption algorithms, but
that foreign, publicly-available algorithms could also
be used, as long as they passed testing. In either
case, however, she said that source code review would
be required for testing, which would take place in
four dedicated labs, separate from CNCA testing for
the other product categories. SEMC's labs, she added,
are "basically ready" for testing. When asked, she
said that the SEMC test for the four cited products
would be in addition to, not in lieu of, CNCA testing
process.

MOFCOM Meetings
---------------

16. (SBU) In two separate meetings with MOFCOM
officials, one with Americas DDG Wang Hongbo on May 9
and one with WTO Affairs DDG E Defeng on May 15,
Wineland outlined both the substantive concerns of the
United States Government not only with the 13 draft
regulations, but also with precedents set by China in
the encryption sector. Wineland indicated to MOFCOM
that, while China's draft regulations remain in draft
form, working level consultations and dialogue are the
preferred means of engagement and progress on the
issue, to ensure that China's regulations in this area
can achieve China's legitimate objectives in a manner
consistent with international norms and practices.
However, were China to publish the final regulations
with a date-certain implementation deadline, this
would necessarily elevate this issue in the United
States to a political level, given the serious
substantive concerns of the United States Government
about the regulations as well as past precedent in the
area of Chinese encryption and information security
rules. MOFCOM officials indicated their interest in
not politicizing this issue, and Wineland agreed that
this is possible and preferred, so long as dialogue
continues and final regulations are not published.


Third Country Engagement
------------------------

17. (SBU) In a meeting with European Union officials
in Beijing on May 13, Wineland briefed the EU on USG
concerns about the 13 regulations as well as China's
response, and expressed USG appreciation for EU
support for the US intervention at the March 2008 WTO
TBT Committee meeting in Geneva, where the issue was
raised. EU officials indicated that they would report
United States Government concerns and China's response
to Brussels, and looked forward to working together
where possible. In a subsequent meeting in Tokyo on
May 16, Wineland and Japanese trade officials also
exchanged views on this issue (Septel).

Comment
-------

18. (SBU) China's proposed regulations are
unprecedented in scope because they would require
mandatory testing and certification not only for
products procured by the Chinese Government for
national security applications, but for all commercial
IT products in 13 categories, from anti-virus software
to hardware such as routers. Furthermore, the
proposed scheme requires conformity with China's
domestic standards, many of which are still
unavailable, and which do not appear to have been
developed in an open or transparent manner. Because
the current proposed regulations are based on (as yet
unknown) domestic standards, the initiative is
reminiscent of China's push for WAPI in 2003. WAPI
was met with fierce international resistance and was
ultimately suspended indefinitely. However, the
Chinese Government expressed in various meetings their
determination to move forward with the current
measures, but showed some flexibility in the timing of
implementation and a willingness o continue
discussions on the topic. End Coment.

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