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Cablegate: Dissecting Unscr 1769

VZCZCXRO6933
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0966/01 1830530
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010530Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1195
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0257
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000966

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: DISSECTING UNSCR 1769

1. (SBU) SUMMARY. As renewal of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1769 (2007) approaches on July 31, it is time to take
stock of what this resolution has accomplished during the first year
of its existence, and more critically what it has failed to do.
Identifying its shortcomings, however, should not be used as an
exercise in easy UNAMID vilification. Rather, this back-to-basics
dissection of the resolution that provides the mandate for the
Darfur peacekeeping operation should be done to reveal and rectify
areas of misinterpretation and misunderstanding, particularly in the
application of the Chapter VII elements of the mandate. UNSCR 1769
renewal presents a golden opportunity to focus on the clear
definition of UNAMID mandate terms at the operational level so that
all personnel in the Mission, from the Joint Special Representative
on down, are clear on the goals of the operation and the means at
their disposal to accomplish it. We believe it would be a mistake to
waste time "expanding the mandate," which in reality would only mean
giving UNAMID more tasks it cannot implement or comprehend. UNAMID
has already been given all the marching orders it needs to do its
job in Darfur; it just needs to be shown how to use them. END
SUMMARY.

TOP-DOWN CHAPTER VII IGNORANCE
------------------------------
2. (SBU) The biggest failing of the United Nations-African Union
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is arguably that neither its forces nor
its leadership know what their mandate actually is. They do not
understand UNSCR 1769 (2007) and accordingly have no idea how to
implement it. This inability was made unwittingly yet abundantly
clear in a recent op-ed piece written by the UNAMID Joint Special
Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada himself, in which he
characterized the peacekeeping operation as "having the resolution
to succeed."

3. (SBU) UNAMID may have the resolution, but it does not have the
know-how to implement it, which will forever keep the mission from
being effective. For example, Adada alleged that UNAMID as a
peacekeeping force could not intervene more forcefully with
belligerents in Darfur. This statement shows a lack of
understanding of the Chapter VII element of UNAMID's mandate, which
allows the force to take the necessary action to prevent armed
attacks. At another point in his commentary, Adada claimed that
UNAMID continued to protect civilians and engage all parties in West
Darfur. On June 18 a UNAMID civilian police officer was assaulted
within a hundred meters of UNAMID Sector West Headquarters in El
Geneina, West Darfur, by marauding Arab militias. UNAMID did
nothing to prevent or respond to the incident, proving again its
lack of understanding at the operational level of the Chapter VII
elements of its mandate, which allow it to take all necessary
actions to protect its personnel and facilities. The officer was
later released because of the intervention of Sudanese intelligence
(NISS) not because of UNAMID.

NECESSITY OF DEFINING 1769 TERMS
--------------------------------
4. (SBU) Rather than castigating Adada for his misrepresentations
and misunderstandings (one of Adada's Political Assistants recently
scoffed at the JSR's mention of 20 patrols per day, noting that rare
was the occasion when they ever broke double-digits) a better use of
the international community's time would be to attempt to help
UNAMID correct the problem.

5. (SBU) Deliberations on 1769 renewal would best be spent taking an
inventory of what in the resolution has and has not been implemented
to date and task UNAMID leadership accordingly. For example, OP13
states: "Calls on all parties to the conflict in Darfur to
immediately cease all hostilities and commit themselves to a
sustained and permanent cease-fire." This provision of 1769 has
gone unobserved by all players, providing a perfect example for the
UNSC to focus pressure on the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the
rebel movements to abide by 1769 expectations if there is to be any
progress in Darfur. This exercise would also provide a perfect
pretext for the Council and the international community to empower
UNAMID to oversee such implementation by calling upon its leadership
to re-invigorate the Ceasefire Commission (dormant since March 2008,
largely due to Force Commander frustration) as a way of going beyond
simply acknowledging violations to more actively investigating and
condemning violations and demanding accountability for violators.

6. (SBU) Perhaps the most important paragraph is OP15 -- UNAMID
leadership, including the Force Commander (FC), needs to be taken to
task on how to apply a Chapter VII mandate in Darfur. The FC
himself asked in a subsequent UNAMID briefing for an investigation
into why UNAMID failed to react to the June 18 incident involving
civpol and Arab militias in El Geneina. Such an instance provides a
perfect chance for the UNSC to press for accountability within
UNAMID. The Council could suggest that the results of this

KHARTOUM 00000966 002 OF 002


investigation be released in the next Secretary-General's Monthly
Darfur Report. The Council could require mandatory training for all
commanders, from the FC on down, on application of OP15 with a
progress report due as of a specific date thereafter. If the FC
does not know how or in what context to apply Chapter VII, then
there is no way any Sector Commander or infantryman on the ground is
going to know either. (Comment: We are not suggesting that it is an
easy decision for a UNAMID soldier to engage what was reported to be
a column of 1000 Arab militiamen. If this column had been fired
upon by UNAMID forces, it is likely that a very serious escalation
would have ensued. We suggest that this point should be
acknowledged by the UNSC if it is to have any credibility in
reviewing this particular incident. Nonetheless, we suggest that
the incident be used to frame a thoughtful discussion of the need
for UNAMID to review its ROE and better train its forces. End
comment.)

TIMING IS EVERYTHING
--------------------
7. (SBU) The idea of building in benchmarks to chart UNAMID progress
against resolution 1769 is not new. OP5, despite the initial
bristling it caused in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
provided definite dates by which UNAMID progress ahead of Transfer
of Authority could be measured. A similar mechanism could be used
to chart other aspects of 1769 implementation, with direction from
the UNSC and DPKO. In short, until UNAMID understands and
implements its current mandate at the operational level, post
suggests that an expansion of UNAMID's existing mandate would be an
exercise in futility. Rather, a re-evaluation of tasks, a push for
the UN to clarify terms, and a designation of duties with definite
deadlines could give the Mission the push it needs to differentiate
itself from its African Union predecessor (which now some parties
claim was more effective - a damning claim) and to prove its own
efficacy on the ground.

8. (SBU) So far the UN has taken the path of least resistance in
Darfur. It has hid behind very real logistical problems, wrangling
with TCCs, and a thorny relationship with a duplicitous Sudanese
regime, to mask its own unwillingness or inability to use the tools
it does have. Both UNAMID and DPKO need to be pressed and 1769's
renewal may be a golden opportunity to do so.

FERNANDEZ

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