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Cablegate: Part One of Two -- Biological Weapons Convention:

O 041535Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7137
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UNCLAS GENEVA 000752

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL, ALSO FOR EMBASSY
NSC FOR CLUTES
STATE FOR ISN, VCI, AND T
JCS FOR J5/GSP/IND
SECDEF FOR DASD FOR CN, CP, AND GT
HHS FOR TLAWRENCE/JFERNANDEZ
COMMERCE FOR DBROWN
DOE FOR NA-243 FOR SMIRABELLO
CIA FOR LALVARADO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CD PARM PREL BWC CWC CBW TBIO

SUBJECT: PART ONE OF TWO -- BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:
DETAILED READ-OUT OF EXPERTS GROUP MEETING ON BIOSAFETY,
BIOSECURITY AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LIFE
SCIENCES, AUGUST 18-22, 2008

REF: REF A: STATE 088219 REF B: GENEVA 719

Begining of text of part one of two.

1. (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and should
be protected accordingly.

2. (SBU) Summary. The second annual meeting of BWC Experts
for the 2007-2010 Work Program, focusing on biosafety,
biosecurity, and professional responsibility in the life
sciences, marked progress, registered gaps, and shared ideas
on how to move the issues forward. The meeting was notable
for the active participation in most sessions not only by
States Parties, but by Observer States, Intergovernmental
Organizations, professional associations, industry
representatives, scientific bodies, and others from the
private sector and civil society. This engagement reflected
a recognition among States Parties that the ability to
counter the BW threat is enhanced by the active involvement
of a coalition of those with interest in implementing the
actions discussed in BWC fora.

3. (SBU) There has been significant progress on biosafety
and biosecurity since the BWC held its initial meeting on the
subject in 2003, the first of its kind focused on these
issues. Gaps were noted with countries such as Pakistan,
Cameroon, and even Libya (with whom the U.S. and UK have been
working for the past 5 years) coming forward to ask for
assistance. On the professional responsibility front there
are a wealth of ideas but, with some exceptions, there has
been less forward movement in this area, perhaps because
movement relies more on civil society rather than mandatory
government regulations of one kind or another. Various
"forcing" events may be required to push this along and Del
recommends Washington give careful thought to what kind of
recommendations arising from the December Meeting of States
Parties could provide an appropriate nudge.

4. (SBU) Overall the meeting was conducted in a
professional manner and included the innovation of two
"poster sessions", several "panel" discussions and seven
early morning/lunchtime events hosted by civil society
representatives. If there were any criticism at all, it can
be chalked up to being victims of our own success. In their
enthusiasm, the Chairman and his ISU team scheduled more
guests and presentations than physical time allowed, so the
meeting provided little time for follow-up questions and
answers. At the same time, the depth and breadth of
participation provided a wealth of material on which to draw
in moving forward.

5. (SBU) The U.S. and its Allies should begin to lay
groundwork for productive results at the Meeting of States
Parties in December 2008. Further down the road is the 2009
topic on international cooperation, capacity building, and
related assistance, a NAM favorite but upon which the West
has a good story to tell. The WEOG provides the Chairman for
the 2009 meetings; Canadian Amb. Grinius has the support so
far of the non-EU members of the WEOG for the job, and we
know some EU members have supported him as well, assuming the
EU doesn't put forward a candidate. The EU is meeting soon
to discuss, after which the Canadian candidacy can be
consulted more broadly with a view to a December 2008
decision this matter. Having the WEOG candidate identified
early on will provide additional time to prepare for handling
this challenging topic. End Summary.

---------------------------------------
Opening of Meeting; National Statements
---------------------------------------

6. (U) The 2008 Meeting of BWC Experts opened smoothly on
August 18, running successfully through the usual
housekeeping items: adoption of the agenda, an amended
Program of Work, the Rules of Procedure, and participation in
the meeting. The Chairman, Ambassador Georgi Avramchev of
the Republic of Macedonia, made introductory remarks and
pointed to the four information papers provided by the ISU
(Biosafety and Biosecurity; Developments in Codes of Conduct
Since 2005; Oversight of Science; and Education, Outreach
and Raising Awareness).

7. (U) Introductory statements were made by many States
Parties, including: France for the EU, Cuba for the
Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Japan, U.S.,
Russia, China, ROK, Indonesia, Nigeria, Libya, Iran, Peru,
Colombia, Albania, Norway, India, Germany, and Morocco. Key
themes included: BWC universalization (and welcoming THE
UAE, Cameroon, and Morocco as new States Parties); national
implementation; 1540 legislative support; international
cooperation; and implementation of BWC's Article X;
verification protocol revival (NAM stressed the importance of
effective verification, Russia specifically called for
resumption of the Ad Hoc Group with its existing mandate);
dual-use and bioterrorism threats; and the need to balance
biosafety and biosecurity measures while avoiding obstacles
to advances in the life sciences, as well as country-specific
implementation on codes of conduct. Progress made since
consideration of both topics in 2003 and 2005, respectively,
was cited, as well requests for assistance from some
countries (Sudan, Libya, others). Georgia also made an
impassioned intervention on "ethnic cleansing" by Russian
troops, noting that Russia has yet to withdraw and requesting
assistance; Russia did not rise to the bait, but rather
insisted upon the need to stick with the agreed BWC experts
agenda, and avoid "artificial politicization". The Chair
echoed the Russian request to stay on the agreed expert's
agenda. (Note: The Georgian BWC Expert later told US Deloffs
that she was under instructions to make that statement. End
Note.)

8. (U) The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and
seven NGO's provided presentations on relevant research and
activities in support of the 2008 topics: international
measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, and the
development of codes of conduct and educational programs to
promote awareness on dual-use issues and the BWC. (See
detailed NGO presentations in the NGO Lunch Section.)

-----------------------------------
"Biosafety and Biosecurity Concepts"
-----------------------------------

9. (U) At the August 19 plenary meeting, Cameroon received
observer status. Four International Governmental
Organizations: the World Health Organization (WHO); the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD);
the United Nations Environment Program/Global Environment
Facility (UNEP/UNEF); and the European Commission (EC) gave
presentations. WHO,s Dr. Nicoletta Previsani detailed
biosecurity efforts aimed at "minimization of deliberate
release" and cited the 2001 anthrax letters and the 2003
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in
Singapore to stress that even though the event is over the
pathogens still remains in one U.S. (USAMRIID) and three
Singaporean laboratories. She noted a global increase of
biosafety level three (BSL3) labs and commented that Brazil
had twelve BSL3 labs. Georgia asked why Brazil needs twelve
BSL3 labs. Brazil responded that this wasn't enough and they
would be building more BSL3, as well as two new BSL4 (highest
containment level) labs. Sudan asked for assistance in
drafting relevant scientific/legal texts and
train-the-trainer assistance.

10. (SBU) Following the OECD's presentation on security
guidelines for access to dangerous pathogens, Iran asked if
there should be mandatory criteria for transfer of bio agents
"outside the convention?" OECD noted they have established
an approach that can be used for peer review and evaluation
for various sensitive projects and agents and their possible
transfer. Japan stated that they are "legally obligated to
store pathogens in four categories" and could OECD help them
categorize their new strain of attenuated Ebola? UNEP spoke
to biosafety/security elements of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety in relation to living modified organisms and
synthetic biology. They have been working with 123 countries
to establish biosafety policies; 103 countries are complete.

11. (U) Returning to the States Parties presentations, South
Africa, Argentina, Australia and Germany introduced their
national papers. The U.S. outlined assistance given to the
WHO and OECD on development of pathogen security guidelines.
Of particular note was Canada's overview of recently proposed
legislation ("Bill C-54" under the 1994 Human Pathogens and
Toxins Act) which will require all people working in BSL3-4
labs to have a security clearance at the SECRET level or
above. The UK presented their national paper on the 2007
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak, summarizing the
background and future considerations in handling animal
pathogens, and emphasizing the similarities of human and
animal pathogens. (This is apparently the first time the UK
has spoken about FMD in an international meeting, despite
great pressure to do so, especially in the bioterrorism
context (BTEX). It remains a highly sensitive subject in the
UK.) Norway gave an extensive presentation on the EU
"Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard"(CWA 15793) and its
applicability under the BWC on biosafety/security. They
emphasized the similarities across all BSL-levels, despite
various circumstances. Denmark noted the significant changes
in their legislation, particularly the establishment of the
Center for Biosecurity and Biosafety, which provides training
for universities, hospitals, research and private
organizations; incorporating physical, transportation,
information security, material controls and a threat
assessment algorithm.

12. (U) Nigeria focused on the extensive numbers of its
indigenous pathogens which underscore Nigeria's need for
biosecurity and urgent assistance in establishing a
biosecurity program. It has established an Office of
National Authority (ONA) for Chemical and Biological Weapons
Conventions implementation and developed a "Code of Conduct
and Laboratory Manual" for scientists and is also
establishing a "Field Laboratory Program."

13. (U) Cuba presented the main elements of its 1990 legal
instrument implementing the BWC, emphasizing its ongoing
concern about human, animal and plant toxins, especially
modified organisms and exotic species. It also mentioned its
1996 legal instrument regarding lab staff members and the
integrity of persons regarding property and information
security; it is drafting legislation on "information
protection" in sensitive labs. Pakistan's presentation on
Prevention, Control and Surveillance recognized that there
were differing opinions concerning appropriate levels of
protection and what constitutes acceptable levels of risk.
It is meeting in a number of working groups to address these
differences of opinion. It is also organizing a "National
Plan of Conduct." Bulgaria spoke of its efforts since 2006.
Morocco gave a presentation on the BWC related efforts of the
MENA region countries and emphasized their determination to
secure life sciences research by ensuring legally binding
measures are in place in each country.

14. (U) The Industry Panel Discussion had four speakers:
Gary Burns (AstraZeneca), John Keddie (GlaxoSmithKline)
Robert Friedman (J. Craig Venter Institute) and Shrikumar
Suryanarayan (India; Association of Biotechnology Led
Enterprises (ABLE). It is significant that representatives
from prominent industry attended not only their session but
several days of the meeting and made well-informed points
comparing their views to what is discussed in government/IGO
and NGO forums. The first two speakers represented large
pharmaceutical firms that recognize the security concerns but
wish to see a risk-based balance. They noted that the
pharmaceutical industry has very high Good Manufacturing
Process (GMP) standards that are directly related to their
risk. They have been involved with Advisory Groups and other
studies to ensure their input into the GMP standards, thus
they have an interest in meeting the standards they helped to
develop. Keddie expressed concern that registration of
dual-use equipment would have significant administrative
burden. He stressed the need for regulations that are simple
and can be applicable across different areas, observing that
"local" decisions have global impact. Research and
development is global, as is the industry, which needs to be
able to move material, biological samples and agents
globally. Finally, referring to an earlier question about
new delivery technologies that have a legitimate use in
medication delivery, he expressed concern that if the
research is restricted because of weaponization concerns, the
benefits of these new technologies may not be available for
medical uses.

15. (U) Friedman spoke about the genomics industry, DNA
sequencing and the benefits of their synthetic biology
program. The panel ended with the note of caution that
mechanisms for biosecurity may unduly interfere with
research, biosecurity measures should not make daily business
more difficult and controls should be proportional in
relation to risk. One speaker commented that we are drifting
from the original intent of the BWC and becoming focused on
biosecurity and synthetic biology. Another comment was that
the pharmaceutical industry should not be the focus of
concern but rather Do-It-Yourself biology (DIY-Biology).

------------------
Capacity-Building
------------------

16. (U) The August 20 session began with presentation from
professional societies. The American Biosafety Association
(ABSA) recognized the State Department for support of Former
Soviet Union scientists in attending annual ABSA meetings.
The Pacific Asia Biosafety Association (P-ABSA) requested
regional States to step forward and support, as well as
implement their "Biosafety Plan." The European Biosafety
Association (EBSA) noted concern that some States have
legislation for biosafety/security that can cause conflicts
with organizations who propose biosafety standards. ABSA
Canada recommends licensure and security clearances for
anyone who accesses BSL-3 or 4 pathogens.

17. (U) The IAP, made up of nearly one hundred national
science academies, does not have a code of conduct per se,
but rather promotes Principles of Awareness ("Scientists have
an obligation to do no harm"), Education, Safety and
Security, Accountability and Oversight. The International
Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility
(INES) emphasized that the majority of scientists remain
unaware of dual-use aspects of their work. They believe that
an approach to managing biorisks that is exclusively
bottom-up in character will have little chance of success on
its own and a top-down method is the right process, i.e.
licensing or issuing of permits. Licensure should not only
include facilities, but also the work itself and also the
principal investigators. There must also be periodic checks
of the licensing authority. Brazil commented that this is
too optimistic.

18. (U) The panel discussion on Risk Management included
speakers May Chu and Cathy Roth (WHO), Ian Gillespie (OECD),
Keith Hamilton (World Organization for Animal Health (OIE),
Paul Huntly (Det Norske Veritas, an accreditation body),
Brooke Rogers (Kings College London). Gillespie described
Risk Management as a process and presented a "Framework for
Governance." He described managing risk as needing a
proportionate response to risk; building in the human factor;
having standards and best practices but not "recipes." The
approach should be tQd harmonization, but not rigidity,
and transparency through certification and accreditation.
Keith Hamilton described "Good Risk Management Principles" as
being flexible enough to deal with complexities of life with
use of the best information available, making reasoned and
logical decisions, and being objective (i.e., based on
scientific principles.) He said that quantitative and
qualitative risk management strategies both have their
places. The qualitative approach requires a good
understanding of the real world to include &everything8
that contributes to the risk. A quantitative approach allows
comparisons, can be precise if good data is available, and
allows comparisons after interventions but may require
complicated modeling skills. The WHO presentation focused on
their plans to develop Risk Management Programs.

19. (U) The International Center for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology (ICGEB)(Decio Ripandelli) emphasized the need
to improve laboratory skills and facilities in developing
nations. The UN 1540 Committee (Olivia Bosch) walked through
the basics of UNSCR 1540 noting that implementation involves
reporting of legislation and enforcement measures and this
reporting is used as the baseline for risk management. She
emphasized that national submissions on 1540 support BWC,
counterterrorism and larger nonproliferation obligations.
Information from each of these areas should be used to
complete national submissions. When noting the 1540 staff
could now provide direct assistance, based on the May 2008
UNSC Resolution 1820, Japan surprisingly indicated they would
ask for assistance with more in-depth penal legislation as
did the Philippines. She recommended the CWC National
Authorities as a resource for smaller nations meet their BWC
and 1540 requirements. The WHO gave a presentation on the
WHO public health mandate for biosafety and biosecurity.
They referenced WHA 58.29, "Enhancement of Laboratory
Biosafety," which discusses the state of laboratories in
underdeveloped countries.

20. (SBU) Twelve countries (France, the U.S., Japan, Nigeria,
UK, Indonesia, Cuba, Australia, Turkey, Malaysia, Argentina,
and Sudan) delivered statements on their efforts to improve
biosafety and biosecurity measures and on capacity building.
Most presentations focused on recent and upcoming workshops
and conferences, supportive legislation, and educational
programs. The U.S. statement highlighted work with the UK
and Libya efforts with the UK and Libya on promoting
cooperative implementation of biosafety/biosecurity and
bioethics measures, indicating the plan to table a working
paper in December on these efforts. Japan declared its
national goal of creating "the world's safest region when it
comes to biosafety and security." Indonesia detailed its
ongoing efforts to build its first BSL 3 laboratory by
describing the challenges it faces with finding the
appropriate space, materials and technical know-how to build
the laboratory. Malaysia described its 2007 legislation, the
"Biological Weapons Bill," which expands controls over
transportation, use and quantity of toxics without
justification for peaceful use, and related punitive
measures. Sudan, noting Art. X (assistance) obligations of
all States Parties, indicated it is drafting national
legislation in this area, but pointedly called for technical
and financial assistance in promoting biosafety/security in
its region.

--------------------------------------------- --
&Oversight of Science, Education and Awareness-Raising,
Codes of Conduct8
--------------------------------------------- --

21. (SBU) During the Oversight of Science discussion on
August 21, the UK, Australia, Japan, China, Nigeria, Cuba,
Turkey, Malaysia, Argentina and Sudan either gave
introductions to national papers or said little of interest.
France delivered the EU presentation on the "EU Cooperative
Initiative to Improve Biosafety and Biosecurity," which was
adopted in 2003 to counter the WMD threat. The EU seeks
partnership with BWC States to sustain the initiatives.
France presented a paper discussing the need to "Use
Laboratory Notebooks as a Tool for Traceability of Research
Activities" and gave another presentation on "Biosafety Risk
Assessment."

22. (U) Indonesia made a presentation with Norway on a new
BSL-3 Laboratory which the Norwegians designed and built in
less than a year. Canada and the Kyrgyz Republic gave a
presentation on their cooperation under the 2002 G-8
Kananaskis Statement on WMD and its goal of counterterrorism,
particularly on guidelines and standards, training, biosafety
accreditation and a new BSL-3 laboratory and repository. A
related treaty was signed in August 2008 with ratification
expected in a few months.

23. (U) Cameroon (see details on accession para) made a
presentation discussing their legislative efforts to modify
their Constitution to enable their ratification of the 1925
Geneva Protocol and accession to the BWC in the near future.
They described their membership in the Biodiversity
Convention (Cartagena Protocol).

24. (U) The U.S. outlined the activities at the National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). A question
was raised about why the term "life science research" was
used in the NSABB's work, rather than "activities in the life
sciences" and whether "exploratory development" would be a
better term? The U.S. presenter responded that the NSABB had
consulted with many organizations as well as industry on the
term "life science research" and this term was chosen as most
appropriate for describing their work and for its brevity.
There was also a question about any interest in regulating
genomics and the response was to make clear the NSABB is an
advisory panel without the authority to make policy.

25. (U) Japan made a presentation based on the experience
with Aum Shinrikyo and how Japan approaches the challenges of
local terrorism. One concept that came from these challenges
was whether a scientist with "low future potential" should be
included in a list of possible risk factors. They discussed
the dual-use challenge in broad terms, describing types of
experiments in advanced technologies. Paradoxically,
however, Japan had concluded that the Fink Commission
criteria are too inclusive.

26. (U) The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry
(IUPAC) made a presentation emphasizing that education
concerning research potential is about choices and scientists
need to make the right choices. The WHO's Cossivi gave a
presentation on their Biosecurity Project and a summary of
the related Bangkok meeting in December 2007.

27. (U) The U.S., UK, Switzerland, France, Pakistan, Cuba,
Brazil, Germany, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
and the 1540 Committee gave presentations on oversight,
education, raising awareness and codes of conduct. The NAS
stressed its role in promoting biosecurity through in-depth
reports and workshops, and the importance of dialogue between
policy makers and scientists. Cuba explained its code of
conduct as being dictated by national priorities, where there
is national control of research, education and transfers in
the bio sector. This was in contrast to Germany's
presentation which stated that the Government funds the
majority of projects but scientists establish the priorities
and control distribution of funds. Germany's current
priority is on research for pathogens and toxins.
Switzerland distributed a fact sheet used to educate
professional associations and academic institutions on the
importance of codes and consequences of biological research.


28. (U) A discussion panel focused on the importance of
education with experts from ICRC (Robin Copeland), UNESCO,
International Center for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology, and the International Council for Life
Sciences. The panel expressed a desire for the 2011 RevCon
to include education on the agenda by requesting countries to
report back on developments on curriculum and training
programs.

29. (U) Several States Parties (Australia, Argentina, InQ
Georgia Q Pakistan) gave presentations Friday morning on
education and raising awareness. Of note, India stated that
there is national guidance on education and awareness
training, but ultimate responsibility to ensure compliance is
up to the industries and individual Ministries. Georgia's
presentation recognized U.S. efforts, specifically DTRA,s
and the $280M in funds, to help eliminate biological weapons
and improve security and surveillance systems for dangerous
pathogens in the region.

30. (U) The United States, Netherlands, ROK, Sweden, Brazil,
Bulgaria, China and Ukraine gave presentations on codes of
conduct. The U.S. presentation was well received with the
ROK asking how to close the gap between codes and law. Del
rep replied that codes apply to all life sciences, but agreed
that there are gaps.

31. (U) China, when presenting their view on codes of
conduct, indicated that violators are to self-report
themselves. There was no discussion of efforts of a national
authority ensuring the guidance. Ukraine also stressed that
code of conduct compliance is up to individual scientists.

---------------
Poster Sessions
---------------

32. (U) "National, Regional and International Measures to
Improve Biosafety and Biosecurity." This inaugural poster
session consisted of 16 posters from States Parties,
professional organizations, and NGO'S on biosafety/security.
This innovation was deemed successful with strong attendance
and an excellent opportunity for detailed, yet informal,
interaction with the mix of attendees. The second poster
session, focusing on education, awareness, and codes of
conduct, consisted of over a dozen posters and was equally
well-attended.

-----------
NGO Lunches
-----------

Synthetic Biology: Engineering Life Science (Geneva Forum)

33. (U) A presentation was given on August 18 on an
educational seminar being developed that is geared towards
non-scientific policymakers on the future of biological
advances specific to genetic engineering and the dual-use
dilemma (that peaceful scientific research may be exploited
for malicious use due to universal materials, technology and
expertise in the life sciences). They posited that the use
of synthetic biology for malicious purposes is quite
futuristic, however, the ability of non-scientists to be able
to use biology to manufacture genetic material and eventually
organisms to advance fields such as alternative energy
(biofuels) and environmental remediation is going to be
commonplace given the advances in technology.

---------------
Dual-Use at the Cutting Edge: What to do about Oversight?
---------------

34. (U) On August 19, there was an academic panel discussion
moderated by Malcolm Dando (University of Bradford). BWC
Chairman Avramchev opened the discussion by stating that "the
BWC stands ready to ensure biopathogens are used only for
good." Panelists included Dr. Alexander Kelle (Bath
University), Kathryn Nixdorff (Darmstadt University of
Technology), Dr. David Friedman (Israeli Institute for
National Security Studies) and Elisa Harris (Center for
International Security Studies at Maryland). Nixdorff
discussed the Lemon-Relman Committee report in relationship
to bioregulators and delivery techniques. She specifically
mentioned Advances in Targeted Delivery Techniques for
vaccines, cancer therapy, immunotherapy, and viral vectors.
She also focused on aerosols in relation to nanoparticles,
opiates (Moscow theater incident) and oxytocin (for a false
sense of security in humans). Dr Kelle spoke about synthetic
biology and the biosecurity implications of this new
technology. Dr. Friedman described Israel's proposed new law
based on recommendations of the "Commission of Oversight of
Biotech Research" which is nearing approval in the Israeli
Parliament. Elisa Harris made a general presentation
concerning oversight of new technologies. There was also
discussion about a new Periodic Table for Biology similar to
the Chemical Periodic Table.

--------------------------------------------- -------
BWC Universalization (Bioweapons Prevention Project)
--------------------------------------------- -------

35. (U) On August 20, the BWPP roundtable included Kathryn
McLaughlin (BWPP), Kathryn Nixdorff (Hamburg), Alan Pearson
(Center for Nonproliferation and Arms Control), Gert Harigel
(BWPP Board) and Amb. Sergey Batsanov (Pugwash). Prof.
Nixdorff made a statement that there should be benchmarks for
the BWC and that ( How do you increase participation in
something (the CBM) that is not mandatory and even if
participation in the CBM is not legally binding, it should be
politically binding.

--------------------------------------------- ------
International Biosecurity Forum (Interacademy Panel (IAP),
National Academies of Science (NAS))
--------------------------------------------- ------

36. (U) On August 20, the Interacademy Panel (IAP) held a
roundtable to discuss code of conducts, education and
awareness-building. The discussion was lead by Alastair Hay
(University of Leeds), Ben Rusak (U.S. NAS) and Sergio
Pastrana (IAP). Mr. Hay stressed the importance of improving
awareness among scientists concerning misuse of science and
securing a culture of responsibility. He endorses
development of a code of conduct in the life sciences and
urges governments to follow-up on their proposals. Mr. Rusek
stated that there should be no limits on research and
progress on major research does not have dual-use potential.
Individual awareness is critical and there should be a
bottom-up voluntary awareness with a top-down oversight. He
encourages developing an on-line biosecurity advice portal.
Mr. Pastrana emphasized building consensus in the scientific
community to promote proper conduct and prevent hindrance of
science. He suggested that the UN should lead coordinating
of activities, organizing meetings, improve networking, and
deepen connections between the scientific community and
policy makers. The audience commented that the IAP should
take the lead as they have the breadth of audience; IAP
answered that they do not have the mandate or resources to
accept this task.

--------------------------------------------- -
National Implementation Measures for Effective Biosecurity
and Biosafety (VERTIC)
--------------------------------------------- -

37. (U) On August 22, VERTIC, the London-based NGO, briefed
on its capabilities to provide services to countries that
request assistance in drafting and enacting biological
security-related legislation. Also on the podium were UK and
Netherlands reps who announced their financial support to
allow VERTIC not only to analyze legislation and review draft
bills, but also to send experts to capitals. U.S. del rep
expressed strong support for VERTIC's efforts and said the
U.S. also hopes to be able to provide financial assistance in
the near future. He also urged Dels to consider how
assistance could be made available for implementation and
enforcement of legislation.

End of text of part one of two.

Rocca sends.

STORELLA

© Scoop Media

 
 
 
 
 
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