Cablegate: Government Approves, Begins Implementation Of

DE RUEHKI #0775/01 2631410
O 191410Z SEP 08



E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: Government approves, begins implementation of
MONUC's non-negotiable Plan for Disengagement;
CNDP remains obdurate

REFTEL: Kinshasa 759

1. (SBU) Summary: MONUC, with support from the international
facilitation (U.S., EU), unveiled September 18 to the GDRC a North
Kivu disengagement plan which the government has accepted and begun
to implement. The plan calls for withdrawal from forward positions
occupied August 28-29. Implementation of the plan's initial phase
(reaffirmation of the cease-fire) began September 18 ("D Day"). The
plan is non-negotiable and thus will not be submitted to armed
groups for their approval, although the Government is willing to
discuss certain technical aspects of its implementation. At a
meeting with the facilitation team at Kimoka September 17, CNDP
refused any military discussions except in the wider context of
direct talks with the government on a new structure to replace the
Amani program. End summary.

MONUC's Disengagement Plan

2. (SBU) In a series of meetings with senior government officials,
including with President Kabila on the afternoon of September 17,
SRSG Doss and MONUC military-political staff, in close collaboration
with the EU (special envoy Van de Geer) and the U.S. (Embassy
Kinshasa DCM Brock) elaborated a draft plan for disengagement in
North Kivu (i.e., all areas of conflict involving the CNDP). The
plan had been requested by Kabila at a meeting in Goma with MONUC
and P-5 ambassadors on September 14 (reftel). Doss, again with the
EU and U.S., presented a refined plan to a government team led by
National Assembly President Vitale Kamerhe on September 18. The
government issued a statement the same day endorsing the MONUC plan
and announcing its implementation immediately by reaffirming the
ceasefire (the plan's first phase). Copies of the plan and its
timetable have been e-mailed to the Department (AF/C and Front
Office) to embassies Kigali and Kampala.

3. (SBU) Details such as exact width and location of the separation
zones are yet to be worked out (MONUC and FARDC are to begin
preparation of a "master map" on September 22). MONUC recommends a
five-kilometer zone around villages and three kilometers around key
axes, but there will be flexibility for lesser widths in other areas
depending on the terrain. (Note: A narrower zone, for example one
kilometer as recommended by Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Cunliffe,
would be much easier for North Kivu brigade's limited forces to
monitor, but effective separation will require wider zones at least
around towns and roads. End note.)

4. (SBU) The plan calls for withdrawal of forces sequentially from
east to south to west to north. At "D-Day" (September 18) plus 4
(i.e., September 22) redeployment is to begin in the eastern
(Rutshuru corridor) area, to include FARDC withdrawal from positions
occupied August 28-29 in the previously informal buffer zone
(Ntamugenga, Mutabo, and Kisherero). According to the plan's
timetable, redeployment (withdrawal) is then to occur in three-day
increments in the south (Ngungu area), the west (between Masisi and
Kirolirwe/Kitchanga), and the north (Mweso to Bambu to Tongo).

5. (SBU) The plan calls for FARDC battalions trained by 55
MONUC for action against FDLR (some of which were recently diverted
for action against CNDP) to return to previous positions, and these
are to resume anti-FDLR operations ("Operation Kimia") by D plus 16
(i.e., October 4).

6. (SBU) The plan, under the title "Comprehensive Plan for
Disengagement in North Kivu," includes actions beyond strict
disengagement (separation of forces). The summary which MONUC
presented to the government September 18 introduced a "Phase 2"
calling for construction of regroupment centers with eventual DDR
and brassage. The calendar, however, recognizes that no such
centers have been built.

7. (SBU) In the discussion September 18 between the GDRC, MONUC and
the international facilitation SRSG Doss stressed that the FDLR
track remained urgently important and that the Operation Kimia
battalions of the FARDC should return to their initial mission as
soon as possible. He contemplated that MONUC would produce daily
reports on ceasefire violations, pending establishment of an
independent monitoring mechanism. Brock said the U.S. would work
closely with MONUC and the GDRC to help design and staff the
monitoring mechanism. Doss said sanctions against ceasefire
violators could involve use of force, although MONUC would employ
persuasion whenever possible. (Force Commander General Gaye noted
that attack helicopters, which had not been used in recent action
against CNDP, were available for compelling compliance with zones of
separation.) Doss said he would push for DDR where feasible.

KINSHASA 00000775 002 OF 003

8. (SBU) Kamerhe said the government was "very satisfied" with the
plan. In its general principles, the plan was non-negotiable, he
said, just as the Amani program in its general principles was
non-negotiable, although there could be flexibility with CNDP on
technical aspects or other details. Responding to the CNDP demand
that the government show good will, Kamerhe said that in fact the
government was doing much, including committing to withdraw from
Ntamugenga, Mutabo, and Kisherere, which he said MONUC must occupy
upon FARDC's withdrawal. On amnesty, Kamerhe said that the National
Assembly had approved a draft law but the Senate would not do so as
long as the CNDP continued its attacks. Hostilities must end also
for progress to be made on returning IDP's or refugees to their
homes. DRC had committed five million dollars to IDP return, as
well as 6.5 million dollars to building "regroupment centers.
Kamerhe noted that the big question remained how to get the CNDP on

CNDP Obdurate

9. (SBU) Earlier on September 17 the international facilitation
team, led by EU Special Envoy van de Geer and enlarged by a MONUC
military officer, traveled to Kimoka (neutral zone north of Sake) to
convey to CNDP the outlines of MONUC's draft plan for disengagement.
(Note: The team had some concern about its safety, as the FARDC
had brought heavy armaments into the area September 16 and had been
firing from near Sake into the hills near Kirotshe, but this
activity had ceased. End note.) The CNDP team, led by Kambasu
Ngeve, was over two hours late, and van de Geer had to depart before
CNDP arrived. Van de Geer later joined SRSG and DCM Brock for a
meeting with President Kabila. Van de Geer told Kabila that the
international facilitation appeared to have hit an impasse with CNDP
and that the government needed to make its own efforts in contacting
CNDP. Brock told the president that Nkunda was refusing to speak to
Tim Shortley, special advisor to Assistant Secretary Frazer for
Conflict Resolution, and had even accused Shortley of "no longer
working for the U.S. Government but working instead for the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo." Kabila and his
entourage (including National Assembly president, ministers of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defense, and senior FARDC officers)
reacted with hearty laughter.

10. (SBU) Kambasu told the facilitation team that MONUC's draft
plan, in its general principles, did not appear to differ much from
CNDP's overall vision. CNDP had previously called for a
four-kilometer zone of separation, while this plan appeared to call
for three to five. However, he and other members of the CNDP
insisted that this plan could only be considered "in the context of
a new structure." CNDP had signed the Acte d'Engagement and not the
Amani program, and it rejected the Amani program and called for a
new framework ("cadre"). CNDP could not agree to even military
discussions without direct dialogue with the government to define a
new political structure. CNDP in the past few days had been
repeatedly attacked by FARDC and its proxy forces in the
Ngungu/Kirtoshe area, and now FARDC and its proxies were attacking
at Rubaya, Kahundu, and Katoyi (three points along CNDP's western

11. (SBU) CNDP continued that it had received no response to the
demands it presented in the meeting with van de Geer and the
facilitation team on September 13 (new framework, freeing new and
old prisoners, unacceptable declarations by Minister of Defense and
others, return of FARDC to previous positions, MONUC protecting
areas from which CNDP withdraws, and FDLR battalions reinforcing
FARDC). Kambasu complained that he felt "offended" that the
facilitation was so insistent on meeting a Tutsi such as Nkunda, and
he said that CNDP might reach a point of not recognizing the
government. The facilitation team attempted, without success, to
persuade this CNDP team that a completely new structure was out of
the question but that there was much flexibility within it (as
evidenced by CNDP's agreement August 26 to limited working groups on
disengagement) and that the government had made a very positive
gesture in the offer of direct military talks at Kimoka.

12. (SBU) After this meeting, CNDP member Bisimwa called Deputy
Eastern Coordinator Ladjouzi to confirm that CNDP rejected any talks
that did not take place within a "new cadre." He asserted that
MONUC was no longer acceptable as mediator and that Kimoka was no
longer acceptable as a neutral location for bilateral talks (due to
FARDC's recent move of heavy machinery into Sake). On September 18,
CNDP member Muiti called poloff to say that CNDP urgently wanted to
engage in talks with the government "within another cadre," with the
U.S. as preferred mediator, in Nairobi or Addis Ababa. He said that

KINSHASA 00000775 003 OF 003

FARDC was "heavily bombarding" CNDP in its western sector and CNDP
urgently wanted these attacks to be stopped. He said CNDP had
captured an FDLR fighter which it could present. (In its military
briefing on the afternoon of September 18, North Kivu brigade
confirmed that there had been "some firing" northeast of Masisi
during the day, which had produced a movement of "many IDPs" toward

13. (SBU) Meanwhile, on instructions from Kabila, Amani Coordinator
Malu Malu tapped Bizima Karaha and Emmanuel Kamanzi (prominent loyal
Congolese Tutsis with connections to CNDP) to make contact with CNDP
and set up a direct government-CNDP meeting to discuss the
disengagement plan. As of COB September 18, there was no indication
that Karaha and Kamanzi had succeeded in setting up such a meeting.

14. (SBU) At MONUC's daily military briefing at 16:00 September 18,
the facilitation was informed that MONUC force commander Gaye would
return to Goma over the weekend and would seek to hold separate
consultations on the disengagement plan with CNDP, PARECO and other
armed groups, as well as continuing consultations with FARDC.
Assembly President Kamerhe and the other key ministers, as well as
SRSG Doss, are expected to return to Goma on September 22 to
announce the formal launch of the plan (though actual "D day" in
relation to the plan's calendar was today, September 18), then
proceed to Bukavu on Septebmer 23 for a meeting of the Amani
Steering Committee focused on South Kivu demilitarization and
disengagement. International Facilitation representatives at those
meetings will include the EU (Jean-Michel Dupont) and the U.S. (DCM


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