Cablegate: Letter to Mr. Ahmet Gun From Nnsa Deputy
DE RUEHC #4915 3022100
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 282050Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0000
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0000
UNCLAS STATE 114915
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP ENRG EXBS TU
SUBJECT: LETTER TO MR. AHMET GUN FROM NNSA DEPUTY
REF: ANKARA 1845
1. This is an action request. Please see para
2. Summary: United States Department of Energy,s (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, William Tobey visited Ankara and Istanbul
on 20 October 2008, to discuss important nuclear
nonproliferation issues with representatives from the Turkish
Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA), Turkish National Police (TNP), and Turkish Customs.
Results of these meetings were summarized in reference A.
3. ACTION: As a follow up to discussions regarding
cooperation between DOE/NNSA, Republic of Turkey,s MFA,
Customs, and TNP, and TAEK on various cooperative
international nuclear nonproliferation programs, including
the Second Line of Defense Program and the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, Post is requested to deliver the letter
provided below to Mr. Ahmet Gun, Deputy Director General,
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This letter
summarizes the discussions and highlights DOE/NNSA proposals
for specific engagement on these high priority programs.
BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER
Mr. Ahmet GUN
Deputy Director General
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dear Mr. GUN,
Thank you for meeting with me on October 20 to discuss
opportunities for further cooperation between the Government
of the Republic of Turkey and the U.S. Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) on
important nuclear nonproliferation initiatives.
I applaud the concrete steps your government has taken to
address issues such as the illicit trafficking of nuclear and
other radiological material, specifically your efforts to
strengthen export control processes and to add radiation
detection capabilities at Turkey,s points of entry. These
are all very important initiatives that are key to addressing
a growing regional proliferation threat. Moreover, now that
we have brought into force the so-called &123 agreement8 on
nuclear cooperation, I am hopeful that we can broaden and
deepen our joint nonproliferation efforts. Given that turkey
is one of our most important allies, we would like to
collaborate with you to further meet this threat in five
-Under our Second Line of Defense Program (SLD) Program, I
would like to offer collaboration and support to strengthen
Turkish capabilities to detect and deter illicit traffic of
nuclear and radiological material. As we discussed, this
could involve Turkish manufactured equipment. Initial steps
A visit to our equipment test site by Turkish experts.
Testing of Turkish equipment at this test site.
A pilot project to deploy current SLD equipment in Turkey.
-Our Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program is
currently working on reactor conversion and U.S. fuel return
with the Republic of Turkey. I understand that this vital
work is on track. GTRI would like to broaden its work to
cover cooperation on radiological source security, including
elimination of disused sources or the installation of
physical protection upgrades to sources that are in-use in
order to prevent their diversion, and discussion of the
assessment of key facilities to identify any possible
vulnerabilities and their countermeasures, including physical
protection, alarm communication and assessment, procedural
enhancements and training.
-Our office of Emergency Response is prepared to work with
TAEK to share information on U.S. planning in the context of
a nuclear emergency.
-To expand on our current border and export control training
cooperation, we can offer additional training to include more
robust commodity identification training, licensing
cooperation that would focus on analysis of strategic
commodity transfers, and enterprise outreach cooperation that
would assist in developing seminars for Turkish manufactures
of export-controlled strategic goods.
-The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program
(INSEP) is prepared to cooperate with Turkey to develop its
nuclear infrastructure in ways that promote nonproliferation
and NPT Article IV goals. Possible interactions would
include nuclear regulation development, nuclear material and
facility safeguards, reactor operations, and radiation
I believe a mutually beneficial partnership that contributes
to global nonproliferation can be formed through the
activities I am offering, and my staff is prepared to meet
and engage in detailed discussions to support these
proposals. I look forward to your response.
4. DOE/NNSA appreciates Post,s assistance in this regard.
Follow up questions can be directed to Mr. Michael Fink,