Cablegate: Iaea/Safeguards: Year-End Round-Up of Discussions

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DE RUEHUNV #0568/01 3501422
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161422Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0425
INFO RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0965
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0931
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1307
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1038
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1180
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0365
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0815

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000568

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MNSA SANBORN, ADAMS
DOE FOR NA-24 WHITNEY, LOCKWOOD, MURPHY
NRC FOR NMSS MARSHALL, GRICE; OIP - SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP TRGY ENRG AORC IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA/SAFEGUARDS: YEAR-END ROUND-UP OF DISCUSSIONS
ON POTENTIAL SAFEGUARDS MEASURES FOR U.S./URENCO CENTRIFUGE
PLANT

REF: ZUBAREV-GOODMAN EMAIL 6/11/09

1. (SBU) Summary: On November 25, Msnoff and STATE/ISN
colleagues met with Neville Whiting, IAEA Section Head
responsible for implementing safeguards in the United States,
to discuss prospects for safeguards implementation at the
Louisiana Energy Services (LES - a U.S. subsidiary of Urenco)
gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) under construction in
New Mexico. The IAEA intends to visit the LES site in
January 2010. Plans for this pending visit follow a June
2009 meeting hosted by the IAEA, including both the U.S. and
Urenco, on the application of safeguards at the LES facility.
The IAEA is interested in using safeguards at LES as a test
bed for novel approaches to safeguards at enrichment
facilities that could be applied in the future.
DDG/Safeguards Heinonen has made clear, however, that while
he welcomes development of new tools, he wants the IAEA to
retain full latitude as to what tools are actually
used/installed in any given facility worldwide (i.e.,
availability of a new tool does not necessarily mean the IAEA
will choose to deploy it worldwide). This report includes a
summary of the various discussions to date on safeguards at
LES.

2. (SBU) Summary contd.: The November meeting and continuing
preparations in the Safeguards Department for 2010 extend the
process set out when representatives of the USG and Urenco
met with a large IAEA team June 15 to discuss possible
safeguards measures for the LES GCEP. IAEA officials said
then they were interested in applying safeguards only if the
United States funded the service and if the IAEA were
permitted to try out approaches that would be useful
elsewhere, e.g. in Iran. The IAEA presented the outlines of
a proposal to reduce inspection effort through use of remote
monitoring and short-notice random inspections. The United
States provided a paper on technical measures under
consideration to improve GCEP safeguards. Drawing on
elements of that paper, the IAEA presented the outlines of a
safeguards approach that would rely on expanded use of
operator data and randomized inspections to improve
effectiveness and reduce inspection burdens. Representatives
of the Dutch/German/UK consortium Urenco expressed cautious
interest but raised a number of reservations, particularly
about potential impacts on operations and competition in the
U.S. enrichment market. End Summary.

---------------------------------
Path Forward on Safeguards at LES
---------------------------------

3. (SBU) In a recent meeting with Neville Whiting of the IAEA
Safeguards Department's Operations B regional inspector
staff, U.S. representatives noted that the USG and LES have
agreed on a date for an IAEA site visit--January 21, 2010.
Whiting found the date agreeable, and expects to complete his
report on possible safeguards measures at the LES plant in
mid-December. The report will lay out innovative ideas for
the future of inspections at centrifuge facilities, using LES
as a test bed. His hope is to have the sides review the
report prior to the LES site visit. Speaking for the USG,
Steve Adams of ISN/MNSA suggested holding a closeout meeting
in Washington immediately following the site visit to discuss
the facility and the concepts in Whiting's paper. As a
follow-on in the February/March timeframe, the U.S. and IAEA
could have more formal bilateral discussions on the
application of safeguards at LES, in addition to discussing
other issues related to safeguards in the United States
(e.g., changes to the Eligible Facility List). Whiting
indicated that IAEA participants in the site visit would
likely include the same participants as in the initial June
meeting: Herman Nackaerts (Director, Safeguards Operations
B), Neville Whiting (Section Head, Safeguards Operations B1),
Jill Cooley (Director, Safeguards Concepts and Planning),
Bruce Moran (Section Head, Safeguards Concepts and
Approaches), Alain Lebrun (Acting Unit Head, Safeguards
Technical Support).

4. (SBU) Whiting emphasized that this is an opportunity to be
innovative and serve as a benchmark for a new transparency
regime. He noted that the only way for this effort to be
worthwhile would be if novel approaches were pursued at the
GCEP to serve as a model for safeguards at enrichment
facilities in other countries, particularly countries of
concern. Whiting added that while there are several possible
scenarios, his approach will be to highlight the 3 or 4
primary measures that are most essential for effective
safeguards at a centrifuge plant.

----------------
Early Background
----------------

5. (SBU) At an April 20-21, 2009 U.S.-IAEA meeting on
safeguards implementation in the United States there was a
preliminary discussion of the possibility that the IAEA might
select a gas centrifuge enrichment plant in the United States
for application of safeguards under the U.S.-IAEA safeguards
agreement (also known as the Voluntary Offer Agreement or
VOA). In particular, the National Enrichment Facility (NEF),
under construction in Eunice, New Mexico by Louisiana Energy
Services (LES - a U.S. subsidiary of Urenco), was scheduled
to begin operation by the end of 2009. The IAEA suggested
holding a meeting in June to discuss the matter further, and
suggested that Urenco be invited.

6. (SBU) On May 21, Michael Whitaker and Brent McGinnis (Oak
Ridge National Laboratory) and MsnOff met with IAEA officials
Chris Charlier (Safeguards Operations B - the Section Head
responsible for safeguards in the United States), Bruce Moran
(Safeguards Concepts and Planning), and Alain Lebrun
(Safeguards Technical Support) for informal discussions of
possible U.S. and IAEA objectives for GCEP safeguards. The
IAEA indicated that its principal objectives were (1) to
improve efficiency in verifying non-diversion of declared
material, (2) to improve effectiveness at detecting
undeclared LEU production, and (3) to improve timeliness in
detecting undeclared HEU production. Participants discussed
technical measures involving automated use of operator
weighing systems, non-destructive assay methods for measuring
enrichment and flow in header (feed and withdrawal) pipes,
tagging and tracking cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6),
and other technical measures. The IAEA expressed particular
interest in use of weighing systems. There was general
agreement that it was important to get Urenco buy-in for
whatever approach was proposed, and to invite them to a more
formal discussion in June.

7. (SBU) On June 12, MsnOff met with Charlier to preview the
IAEA's proposed safeguards approach. As outlined by
Charlier, the IAEA planned to propose the use of data from
the operator's weighing system and of mass spectrometry data
on enrichment levels of feed, product and tails. Combined
with mailbox declarations (secure and unalterable daily
reports of operating data to an IAEA computer on-site) and
random inspections to verify samples of the reported data,
this would allow more effective safeguards with lower
inspection effort by reducing the time spent on mechanical
tasks such as verifying cylinder weights and enrichment
assays. In a separate discussion, DDG/Safeguards Heinonen
confirmed to Deputy Nuclear Counselor his support for this
effort, with the understanding that his primary interest was
not to apply safeguards in the United States but to develop
methods that could be used in other countries, particularly
to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

----------------------------------------
U.S. and IAEA Presentations in June 2009
----------------------------------------

8. (SBU) An IAEA Secretariat team hosted USG and Urenco
representatives to an in-depth discussion June 15. Herman
Nackaerts, Director of Safeguards Operations B (SGOB - the

Division responsible for safeguards in, among others, all
nuclear weapons states) opened the meeting by noting the
conditions under which the IAEA was willing to apply
safeguards to a U.S. enrichment facility. First, the United
States would have to pay the cost of safeguards operations.
Second, the IAEA would have to learn something that it could
apply to other facilities. Third, the IAEA would apply a
comprehensive safeguards approach covering the entire
facility.

9. (SBU) Mark Laughter (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
summarized the U.S. concept paper ("Summary of Advanced GCEP
Safeguards Efforts in the United States"), which had been
provided to the IAEA and Urenco in advance (ref e-mail).
Based on the UAEA objectives cited above (para 3), the paper
listed twelve types of safeguards measures under development
at the DOE National Laboratories, seven of which involve
unattended monitoring measures. The majority of these
measures would be available in the relatively near term (five
years or less).

10. (SBU) Jill Cooley, Director of Safeguards Concepts and
Planning, then presented the outlines of the IAEA's proposed
safeguards approach:

-- Use of operator process load cell data at feed and
withdrawal stations to measure mass flow through the process
area.

-- Use of online enrichment monitors at the unit headers
rather than cascade headers (a unit consists of several
cascades).

-- Use of data from accountability scales (these provide more
precise mass measurements).

-- Integration of accountancy scales with surveillance to
identify cylinders automatically at key points.

-- Use of operator data from online mass spectrometers.

-- Maintaining continuity of knowledge by having the operator
apply IAEA seals to cylinders.

-- Use of mailbox declarations for reporting data.

-- Remote monitoring through periodic transmission to the
IAEA of some accountancy-related data.

The safeguards approach would involve one annual PIV; all the
other inspections would be done on a randomized basis. The
IAEA could also call a short-notice inspection if data
reported through remote monitoring indicated unusual
operating conditions. SGTS Acting Unit Head Alain Lebrun
said that applying formal authentication measures to all data
streams would be prohibitively expensive, and he anticipated
that only the accountancy scales would need to be
authenticated. He warned that unattended systems only save
money when done right.

---------------
Urenco Concerns
---------------

11. (SBU) Peter Friend, Urenco Director of safeguards and
security from Capenhurst, UK, expressed a number of concerns
with what he called a "long shopping list." First, he noted
that there were four companies providing enrichment services
internationally and only one of them (Urenco) was subject to
IAEA safeguards. He referred to the two other planned U.S.
enrichment facilities - the USEC American Centrifuge Plant at
Portsmouth, Ohio and the Areva centrifuge plant (using Urenco
technology) planned for Eagle Rock, Idaho, and said it seemed
a little unfair that only the Urenco plant was being
considered for safeguards. Second, Friend noted that the
construction schedule at the LES plant was tight, with first

cascade operations scheduled for November 2009. Urenco did
not want anything to interfere with commissioning this plant,
and noted that new safeguards measures were easier to
contemplate at an operating plant, such as Almelo in the
Netherlands.

12. (SBU) Responding to specific measures proposed, Friend
warned that enrichment measures sensitive enough to detect
diversion of a significant quantity per year might be able to
reveal classified centrifuge performance data. He thought
unattended use of accountability scales was probably doable.
Online enrichment monitors are expensive and not very
accurate and Urenco might be able to allow direct gas
measurement instead, but he wasn't sure Urenco would be
willing to share mass spectrometry data. Friend was unsure
of the value of containment and surveillance measures and
noted that this might require some improvement in cylinder
identification. Regarding mailbox declarations, he wanted
the declared data to remain on-site and not be transmitted to
Vienna. There was some discussion of possible compromise
approaches allowing summary data to be transmitted to Vienna.
With those caveats, Urenco was generally supportive of IAEA
safeguards and would cooperate with the authorities. Friend
did not put any markers down to the effect that what was
being proposed was unacceptable, noted that Urenco had a
longstanding relationship with the IAEA, and expressed the
view that all centrifuge enrichment facilities around the
world should be under international safeguards. Later,
Friend raised two additional concerns: First, what would
happen if operator data system failed? Second, he did not
want the IAEA to learn of operational problems before the
operator.

13. (SBU) Nackaerts summed up by saying he was encouraged.
He identified three types of issue that needed further
discussion: technical issues, concerns about intrusiveness,
and information sensitivity. He suggested that one advantage
of trying new measures at LES was that it offered greater
prospects for reducing inspection effort. At Urenco's
European plants, where Euratom safeguards are also applied,
new measures might reduce inspection effort by 40% from the
current level of roughly 120 person-days of inspection (PDI)
per year. At LES, the inspection effort could be reduced to
30 PDI per year, a 75% reduction. He said the IAEA would
prepare a written proposal, taking into account the
discussion, and aim to share it with the United States and
with Urenco by the end of July. Friend suggested that the
IAEA use the design of an existing Urenco facility at Almelo
in the Netherlands as the basis for such a proposal. The
proposal would be in the form of a baseline and additional
options, and would include a cost estimate. This would
enable the United States and the IAEA to make their
respective decisions (on funding and selection) on whether to
apply safeguards at the LES plant. Nackaerts also made a
request for design information to aid in developing a
safeguards approach and cost estimates. Friend suggested
using design information from recent additions to the Almelo
plant for that purpose.

14. (SBU) June 2009 Meeting Participants:

IAEA
----
Herman Nackaerts, Director, Safeguards Operations B
Neville Whiting, Section Head, Safeguards Operations B1
Jill Cooley, Director, Safeguards Concepts and Planning
Bruce Moran, Section Head, Safeguards Concepts and Approaches
Alain Lebrun, Acting Unit Head, Safeguards Technical Support

United States
-------------
Dunbar Lockwood, Department of Energy
Steve Adams, Department of State
Jon Sanborn, Department of State
Karolina Walkin, Department of State
Jane Marshall, Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mark Goodman, UNVIE
John Murphy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Brian Boyer, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Mark Laughter, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Urenco
------
Peter Friend, Capenhurst
Jack Rollins, LES
Theodoor Botter, LES

15. (U) Subsequent USG-IAEA consultations in November
involved Steve Adams (ISN/MNSA), Mathew Sharp (ISN/MNSA) and
Elena Thomas (UNVIE) for the USG, and Neville Whiting (SGOB1)
from the Agency.
DAVIES

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