Cablegate: Colombia: 1990 Annual Terrorism Report

R 202334Z NOV 90
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0576
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
CIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
DIA WASHDC
DEA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 18530

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE FOR S/CT BREELAND

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PTER CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: 1990 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: (A) STATE 355397; (B) BOGOTA 5568; (C) BOGOTA 14054;

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BACKGROUND
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1. COLOMBIA'S DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IS CONFRONTED BY
THREE LEFTIST GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS
VIOLENT, WELL-FINANCED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATIONS. BOTH THE INSURGENTS AND THE TRAFFICKERS
USE TERRORISM, ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AGAINST DOMESTIC
TARGETS. GUERRILLA VIOLENCE CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED
INTERNATIONAL TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES
HAVE AT TIMES CROSSED COLOMBIA'S BORDER INTO VENEZUELA
AND ECUADOR.

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PROSECUTIONS
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2. THERE WERE NO PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM IN COLOMBIA IN 1990.

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SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTS
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3. NUMEROUS ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM OCCURED IN 1990,
SOME THE RESULT OF GUERRILLA INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGNS
AGAINST RURAL POPULATIONS. GUERRILLAS REGULARLY TORTURE
AND MURDER PEASANTS AND OTHERS SUSPECTED OF ASSISTING
GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
TERRORIST ATTACKS, HOWEVER, WERE COMMITTED BY THE LOOSE
CONGLOMERATE OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS KNOWN AS THE
MEDELLIN CARTEL. IN AUGUST 1989 THE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED
A CRACKDOWN AGAINST THE MEDELLIN CARTEL FOLLOWING A
STRING OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO THE
CARTEL. THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS RESPONDED WITH A
VIOLENT CAMPAIGN OF BOMBINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS OF
POLITICAL FIGURES AND POLICEMEN THAT CONTINUED INTO
1990. THE BOMBINGS WERE INTENDED TO INDUCE THE PUBLIC
INTO PRESSURING THE GOVERNMENT INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS
TO THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. THE ASSASSINATIONS WERE
MEANT TO INTIMIDATE POLITICAL FIGURES OPPOSED TO THE
TRAFFICKER'S INTERESTS AND DISRUPT COLOMBIA'S DEMOCRATIC
ELECTIONS.

4. IN MARCH AND APRIL SUSPECTED NARCO-TERRORISTS
ASSASSINATED THE TWO LEADING LEFTIST PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES. IN MAY NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS BEGAN A
COP-KILLING CAMPAIGN IN MEDELLIN, CONTRIBUTING TO A
RECORD HIGH 521 POLICEMEN KILLED IN ALL OF COLOMBIA AS
OF OCTOBER 16. RANDOM STREETCORNER MASSACRES IN
MEDELLIN SOON FOLLOWED THE ATTACKS ON POLICEMEN,
CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH-LEVEL OF TERRORISM IN
MEDELLIN. SPECIFIC TERRORIST ACTS MAY HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED BY THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS IN RETALIATION
FOR GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLICE KILLING
OF ONE OF ESCOBAR'S TOP AIDES IN JUNE WAS FOLLOWED HOURS
LATER BY THE EXPLOSION OF A CAR BOMB WHICH KILLED THREE
PEOPLE.

5. FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT
AUGUST 7, THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS CHANGED THEIR
TACTICS. DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, THE GROUP OF
TRAFFICKERS KNOWN AS "THE EXTRADITABLES" KIDNAPPED NINE
PROMINENT COLOMBIANS, MOSTLY JOURNALISTS. IT IS WIDELY
BELIEVED THAT THE KIDNAPPERS' AIM IS TO INFLUENCE THE
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, SCHEDULED TO MEET IN FEBRUARY TO
REFORM THE CONSTITUTION. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE
TRAFFICKERS WANT THE ASSEMBLY TO PROHIBIT
CONSTITUTIONALLY THE EXTRADITION OF COLOMBIAN CITIZENS.

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EXTRADITION REQUESTS
--------------------

6. THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA MADE NO REQUESTS FOR
EXTRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN 1990.

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IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION AND EXTRADITION
------------------------------------------

7. REF B, PLUS PREVIOUS EMBASSY REPORTING, DESCRIBES
THE PROFOUND PROBLEMS OF THE COLOMBIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
WHICH IS OUTDATED, INEFFECTIVE, AND VULNERABLE TO
CORRUPTION AND INTIMIDATION. GOVERNMENT POLICY IS TO
ARREST AND PROSECUTE THOSE WHO COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS,
BUT IN REALITY THOSE WHO COMMIT THESE CRIMES ARE RARELY
CAUGHT. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION IS IMPLEMENTING A
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IT HOPES WILL STRENGTHEN THE
GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO ARREST AND PROSECUTE TERRORISTS.

8. THE GOC CURRENTLY HAS NO LEGAL MECHANISM FOR
EXTRADITING A COLOMBIAN TO THE U.S. FOR CRIMES OTHER
THAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. IN AUGUST 1989 COLOMBIA
RESUMED EXTRADITIONS BY EXECUTIVE DECREE, FOLLOWING
SEVERAL YEARS DURING WHICH EXTRADITIONS WERE PROHIBITED
BY A 1987 SUPREME COURT RULING. THE 1989 DECREE ONLY
PROVIDES FOR THE EXTRADITION OF THOSE ACCUSED OF
NARCOTICS-RELATED CRIMES. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
CRIMES ARE NOT INCLUDED. IN SEPTEMBER THE GOVERNMENT
PROMULGATED A DECREE (REF C) GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM
EXTRADITION TO THOSE WHO CONFESS NARCOTICS OR
TERRORIST-RELATED CRIMES. ONLY ONE TRAFFICKER HAS TAKEN
ADVANTAGE OF THIS DECREE, HOWEVER, AND COLOMBIA
CONTINUES TO EXTRADITE DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO THE U.S.

9. IN JUNE 1990 THE GOC ISSUED ARREST WARRANTS FOR FIVE
BRITISH MERCENARIES ACCUSED OF TRAINING PARA-MILITARY
GROUPS FOR COLOMBIA'S NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. COLOMBIA
HAS A VALID EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM,
BUT APPARENTLY HAS MADE NO REQUEST FOR THEIR EXTRADITION.

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RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION
--------------------------------

10. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REGULARLY CONDEMN
TERRORIST ACTS, BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL. THE
GOC WAS THE PRIMARY INSTIGATOR OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO
AN ANTIGUA-BROKERED ISRAELI ARMS SALE TO COLOMBIAN
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. IN JULY THE JUSTICE MINISTRY
CONDUCTED A MAJOR SHAKEUP OF COLOMBIA'S PUBLIC ORDER
COURTS, RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING TERRORISM CASES, IN AN
EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE COURTS' PERFORMANCE.

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MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS
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11. IN NOVEMBER THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED A MAJOR ATTACK
ON THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT BASE OF COLOMBIA'S LARGEST
GUERRILLA GROUP, DEALING A BLOW TO THAT GROUP'S ABILITY
TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ACTS. COLOMBIA AGGRESSIVELY
CAMPAIGNS IN THE UN AND THE OAS FOR ADOPTION OF
RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE ILLICIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRADE. COLOMBIA HAS ALSO CALLED FOR TIGHTER
RESTRICTIONS IN LEGITIMATE ARMS TRANSFERS.

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SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
-----------------------------------

12. COLOMBIA PROVIDES NO SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM OR TERRORIST GROUPS, NOR HAS THE GOVERNMENT
MADE ANY STATEMENTS IN FAVOR OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING
COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE. IN 1980 COLOMBIA BROKE
RELATIONS WITH CUBA BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S SUPPORT FOR
COLOMBIAN GUERRILLAS.

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SIGNIFICANT CHANGES SINCE 1989
------------------------------

13. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN COLOMBIA'S
ATTITUDE TOWARDS TERRORISM. THE GOC CONTINUES TO
CONDEMN TERRORISM AND PROSECUTE TERRORISTS TO THE BEST
OF ITS VERY LIMITED ABILITY.

HOBBS

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