Senate Hearing on the G8 Global Partnership
Hearing on the G8 Global Partnership
John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC October 9, 2002
Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the Committee, I m pleased to appear before you to discuss the new G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and the Administration s plans to implement that initiative. Over the past decade, this Committee and its members have been strong advocates of nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation programs with Russia and other former Soviet states, while at the same time demanding that the programs fulfill their mandate.
Let me begin by putting that initiative within the larger context of the changed international security situation and the U.S.-Russian relationship. From the beginning of the Administration, President Bush has worked with President Putin to forge a New Strategic Framework for a cooperative relationship with Russia that deals with the security problems we face in the post-Cold War world.
The first element of the new framework involved issues of strategic defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty posed fundamental problems to our need to defend against a growing missile threat from rogue states intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them a threat that did not exist when the ABM Treaty was written. The Treaty prevented us from defending our country and our friends and allies from missile attacks, and hampered the development of partnership and cooperation with Russia. This phase of our work came to a conclusion with the announcement in December 2001 of our decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
That opened the way to an intensive effort on the second element of the New Strategic Framework, substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. Starting during the presidential election, Governor Bush had promised to reduce such weapons to the lowest level possible consistent with our national security. Through the 2001 nuclear posture review, and embodied in the Treaty of Moscow signed in May, we have decided to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads over the next 10 years to between 1,700 and 2,200. We are pleased that the Committee has completed its hearings on the Moscow Treaty, and look forward to action on the Treaty before the Senate adjourns.
Success in the strategic offensive and defensive fields now allows us to focus our attention with Russia on the third critical element of the New Strategic Framework, nonproliferation. One critical aspect of our nonproliferation work with Russia is the assistance program launched in 1991 by the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Last year the Administration reviewed U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction programs and concluded that, with a few adjustments, they were effective and should be continued. The Global Partnership that is the subject of today s hearing represents a broadening of this program to encompass other G8 members.
Before turning to the Global Partnership, however, I d like to note the second element of our nonproliferation effort with Russia: ensuring that WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and their delivery systems, related materials and technology do not flow from Russia to other countries. We remain very concerned that the nuclear and missile programs of Iran and others, including Syria, continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and expertise. President Bush has raised this issue with President Putin at their meetings in Moscow and Kananaskis and in their correspondence. Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Abraham have addressed this problem at length with their Russian counterparts, and we continue to press this issue.
Iran is seeking all elements of a nuclear fuel cycle, from mining uranium to enrichment to production of reactor fuel. There is no economic justification for this effort, given Russia s commitment to supply all the fuel for the Bushehr reactor, not to mention Iran s abundant supplies of energy in the form of oil and gas. The inescapable conclusion is that Iran is building a nuclear fuel cycle to support a nuclear weapons program. Equally worrisome is Iran s long-range missile program. They have developed and tested a 1300 kilometer range missile, the Shahab 3, based on North Korean technology, and are pursing longer range missiles that could threaten Europe, Russia, and eventually the United States.
Concerns about Russia s performance on its arms control and non-proliferation commitments have already adversely affected important bilateral efforts, and unless resolved could pose a threat to new initiatives including the Global Partnership.
Having established the overall context of the New Strategic Framework, let me turn to the Global Partnership. In the aftermath of September 11, the United States not only elaborated the New Strategic Framework with Russia, but also intensified dialogue with other allies regarding the need to expand and accelerate efforts to address nonproliferation and threat reduction goals, especially in Russia and other former Soviet states. As a result of these discussions, President early this year proposed to the Group of Eight the "10 plus 10 over 10" initiative commitments of $10 billion from the United States would be matched by $10 billion from the other G8 for nonproliferation cooperation for Russia and other former Soviet states over the next ten years.
After several months of intense work by G8 officials, G8 Leaders (the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom) launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction at the Kananaskis Summit in June. We owe a particular debt of gratitude to Canada, host of the Kananaskis Summit, for its tireless efforts to make the Global Partnership a reality. Under this initiative, the Leaders pledged to raise up to $20 billion over ten years to support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues. The President has committed to provide half of this amount. The U.S. continues to believe that the nonproliferation concerns are paramount, and we will be pressing members to ensure that the most critical proliferation threats are addressed.
Among the priority concerns, the G8 specifically named destruction of chemical weapons, disposition of fissile materials, employment of former weapon scientists, and dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. The full scope of programs under the Partnership is much broader; in fact, U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction programs implemented by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, Commerce, and Treasury (through the Customs Service) are all encompassed under the Partnership. My colleagues in the panel presentation will address these programs in more detail.
This initiative, a major achievement for the G8 and this Administration, represents a significant expansion of international commitment to provide financial resources address proliferation issues. The United States has pressed allies to provide such support since the U.S. launched the Nunn-Lugar programs in 1992. But while from FY1992 through FY2002 the U.S. Government has provided over $7 billion for security assistance to Russia and other former Soviet states, G7 members have contributed less than $1 billion. Under the Global Partnership, the G7 members commitments should represent a fairer share of the responsibilities. From early indications from other G8 members, we are about halfway toward meeting the $10 billion target. At current exchange rates, Canada will contribute $650 million US; the UK, $750 million; Germany, $1.5 billion; the European Commission, $1 billion; and Japan, initially, $200 million. Other pledges have not been publicly announced; and not all members have taken decisions on pledges.
In addition, we are pleased that under the French G8 presidency in 2003, the Global Partnership will continue to be a priority. In August remarks about the upcoming French presidency, President Chirac has announced that "all the necessary impetus will be given to this programme s implementation."
But participation in the Global Partnership will not be limited to the G8. The Global Partnership statement invited other countries "that are prepared to adopt its common principles and guidelines to enter into discussions on participating in and contributing to this initiative." Other countries are already making valuable contributions; Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands are examples. The Senior Officials will be addressing outreach strategies in more detail at their next meeting, but have agreed to take advantage of bilateral and multilateral opportunities to inform other countries and encourage their participation. One such opportunity will be the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Cooperation (NDCI) Conference on nonproliferation cooperation with Russia and Eurasian states in Brussels on December 16-17, 2003. The European Union, Canada, and the U.S. are sponsoring this multilateral conference of experts from current and potential donor and recipient countries to discuss implementation and coordination of new programs as well as new projects to meet outstanding needs.
From my personal involvement in negotiating this initiative I can attest that getting to agreement at Kananaskis was not an easy task. Many G8 members have experienced serious difficulties in implementing their nonproliferation cooperation commitments with Russia. Some have been unable to conclude government-to-government implementing agreements because of inability to reach agreement with Russia on adequate provisions for liability protections, exemption from taxation, access to work sites, and other conditions. Program delays due to poor coordination within the Russian Government and among federal, regional, and local entities have been another concern. Millions of dollars previously committed by G8 members remain unexpended at present due to these problems, and G8 members will have difficulty committing new funds if these difficulties persist. In response to these difficulties, we negotiated Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects, which outline basic elements to be incorporated into legal frameworks for implementation. For the new Global Partnership to be successful, the Russian Federation will need to take concrete actions to resolve outstanding problems.
On September 26-27 in Ottawa, I attended the G8 Senior Officials first meeting following the Summit to discuss concrete implementation of the Kananaskis commitments. A major part of the meeting was devoted to the implementation problems, and we pressed the Russians hard on this issue. The Senior Officials agreed that we should continue to meet to provide the coordinating mechanism called for by the Leaders. This welcome development will help ensure high-level attention on any areas of difficulty. We have already planned another meeting before the end of the calendar year to engage further on implementation guidelines, projects for cooperation, and outreach to countries beyond the G8.
It came as welcome news that G8 governments are engaged in implementing the Global Partnership; establishing interagency coordination mechanism, identifying potential projects, and beginning to budget resources. With respect to contributions, not all members have made commitments. From initial indications Some have shared current thinking on anticipated pledges; others have not yet been able to do so. For the Evian Summit, we intend to press to have total commitments reach the $20 billion goal.
The G8 as a group and individual members will be working on projects to be pursued. The Russian Federation has identified chemical weapons destruction and general-purpose nuclear submarine dismantlement as program priorities. Some members intend to contribute to cooperation in these areas; some have reiterated their commitments to support plutonium disposition. In addition, members will continue to address a range of other projects under the Partnership, including employment of former weapon scientists.
In general, G8 members, including the United States, intend to fund and implement cooperation projects of their choice on a bilateral basis under government-to-government agreements with the Russian Federation. We do not intend to establish a Global Partnership multilateral implementation mechanism or common fund. However, the G8 Senior Officials, as the coordinating mechanism, will address priorities, identify program gaps, and to prevent duplication and overlap.
Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, all current U.S. nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union are encompassed within the scope of the G8 Global Partnership and reflect U.S. plans to address the goals that are reflected in the Partnership. The Administration s FY03 request for these programs is about $1 billion. The President has indicated that the U.S. will maintain this level of effort for a ten-year period. Of course, the President s annual budget request will include our specific requests by program based on need for that specific year, within the overall context of the Administration s budget priorities.
The U.S. programs have a significant role in shaping cooperation under the Global Partnership. We had already provided information on U.S. programs and noted projects where substantial resources are needed from others. We believe that this information has been useful to other G8 members as they consider how to direct resources. The Administration will of course continue to assess where and how our resources can be most usefully directed.
With respect to financing, the inclusion of authorities to reduce Russian Soviet-era debt in exchange for nonproliferation program spending by the Russian government in the recently passed Foreign Relations Authorization Act provides welcome flexibility to the Administration. I very much appreciate the Committee s role in enacting these provisions. The Administration is actively considering debt for nonproliferation program options, and we look forward to consulting with you on the outcome of these deliberations.
In closing, I d like to express my appreciation for the support of this Committee for these critical national security concerns. We welcome the passage of the authorization of debt exchanges with Russia for nonproliferation projects. We are looking forward to completion of FY03 appropriations at the President s requested levels. There are two other provisions still under consideration in the Congress which are very important to the Administration s ability to meet our nonproliferation goals. First, we are seeking in the Defense Authorization bill Congressional approval of authority for the President to waive the annual certification requirement for Cooperative Threat Reduction and Freedom Support Act Title V funding when it is in the U.S. national security interest to do so. Second, we are seeking authority to waive the conditions for cooperation with Russia on construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch ye. We hope that both these provisions can be passed before the Congress leaves for the fall elections.