Statement on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
STATEMENT by the delegation of the Russian Federation at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
First of all the Russian delegation would like to welcome you as the Chairman of our Preparatory Committee. We are convinced that under your leadership the work of the Committee will be successful and fruitful.
You may completely rely on our sustained and constructive cooperation in all the issues of holding the PrepCom and preparing for the 2005 Conference.
The twenty-first century has seen new trends and at the same time new challenges in the development of international relations.
We are convinced that countering these challenges is possible only through the consolidated efforts of the world community. As we see it, a new democratic world order should be built the way it would guarantee the harmonious combination of different approaches and interests of states although not always coinciding for the sake of preserving and strengthening comprehensive strategic stability in order to create a new multi-component system of security. The unilateral use of military force in circumvention of the UN Charter may result in undermining the international security system and encouraging individual countries to possess WMD.
Russia would like to see further strengthening and development of the international legal basis for strategic stability and international security. It is our understanding that political and diplomatic methods for resolving issues of non-proliferation and disarmament have been far from being exhausted and can be engaged with greater usefulness.
One of the most effective directions of our joint activity in order to achieve the said objective has been and still is the strengthening of the international regime of nuclear weapon non-proliferation and its foundation – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As a State party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and as one of its depositories, Russia believes that the NPT is a time-tested document, which has become one of the main pillars of the international security system. The NPT has confirmed its role as the most important international instrument safeguarding global stability and security.
The international community has practically come to a consensus regarding the scope of new threats and challenges. The problem of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction together with the problem of international terrorism is among the top items on the list. They are the issues that represent the greatest and quite real danger now.
The Russian Federation confirms its position of principle in support of the efforts undertaken by the international community, including the UN, Conference on Disarmament and IAEA to combat terrorism and proliferation. It is now important to unite efforts to create a global system of countering new challenges and threats, including those in nuclear sphere. The proposed new measures should not “compete” with traditional disarmament and non-proliferation aspects of security, quite to the contrary, they are called upon to make them more comprehensive and give them a new quality dimension.
In this connection we underscore the importance of making universal the Principals, approved at G8 Kananaskis Summit, preventing terrorists, or those that harbor them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction, we would like to see an enlargement of the number of countries committed to the said principles.
We believe that recommendations to further strengthen the NPT should become the principle result of our joint work to prepare the 2005 Conference.
We believe also that the main objective of the Committee is the preparation of the next review of the Treaty implementation in the whole aggregate of its provisions. The basis for that is available – namely, it is the Final Document approved in the year 2000. The list of measures it contains at the multilateral, regional and other levels is, in essence, the program of joint efforts to further increase the NPT effectiveness.
We are committed to decisions adopted at the 2000 Conference and take specific steps to implement them. We consider the Final Document of the Conference as a real future-oriented program for multilateral, regional and other measures that contains benchmarks for negotiations on a step-by-step consensus basis under strict observance of interests of security of all the NPT parties under conditions of stability and predictability. Therefore it should be implemented fully and not selectively.
Of principal importance remains the task to provide for universal nature of the NPT. Further on efforts are necessary to commit the states still not NPT parties to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
In this connection we would like to underscore that on November 4, 2002 Cuba joined the Treaty and deposited its instrument of ratification with Russia as an NPT depository. By joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty Cuba demonstrated its responsible approach to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and confirmed its reputation at the international arena as the state, which conducts consistent policy in matters of stability and security affecting its region.
It is with regret that we learned about the PDRK decision to withdraw from the NPT.
This step undermines the efforts of the international community to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and may well have negative consequences on the regional, as well as global scale, also it negatively affects the efforts of those states, which strive for the settlement of international problems including those in the field of non-proliferation, by political, diplomatic and international legal methods.
We believe that providing for nuclear-free status for the Korean Peninsula and implementation there of the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction, provided that peace, security and stability are preserved there, correspond to common hopes of the Korean people and mankind as a whole.
Russia continues to believe that return of the PDRK to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is necessary and possible.
At the same time we think it is necessary to provide the PDRK with guarantees of security and sovereignty, as well as we need to restart humanitarian and economic programs which had been in place on the Korean Peninsula.
We call again for a political and diplomatic settlement of the crisis through negotiations. Russia will support any format, which would lead to the achievement of this objective.
We would like to draw the attention of the audience to the initiative of President of Russia Vladimir V.Putin put forward at the Millenium Summit on the development of proliferation resistant nuclear technologies. The work is actively carried out in the IAEA to put it in place (the INPRO project). The first phase of this international project has been successfully implemented. We call upon all the states-parties to the NPT to take full part in the INPRO.
Practically there is no alternative to our joint work in matters of non-proliferation and disarmament. We are firmly convinced that, for example, it is impossible to resolve problems of disarmament and strengthening of non-proliferation regimes by military means.
A priority for Russia is the issues of nuclear arms reduction. Our country not only declares its commitment – as an ultimate goal – to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, but we also take steps in the field of nuclear disarmament.
By its practical actions our country confirms its commitment to strict fulfillment of its obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Today already in regarding the actions of Russia an essential progress has been reached in the implementation of key objectives of the Treaty including priority tasks agreed upon at the 2000 Conference.
The period for reduction of strategic offensive weapons foreseen under the START I Treaty ended in December 2001. Under the Treaty the parties committed themselves to reduce the number of their strategic delivery systems seven years after its entry into force down to 1600 units, and the reentry vehicles accounted with them down to the level of 6000 units for each of the parties. Russia fully and ahead of the time-schedule fulfilled her obligations under the above mentioned reduction provisions and on the deadline date - December 5, 2001 - has actually lowered the number of her deployed strategic delivery systems (ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers) down to 1136 units, and the number of the reentry vehicles accounted with them – down to 5518 units.
In October 2001 the last nuclear warhead brought into Russia from the territory of Ukraine was eliminated.
At the beginning of June this year the INF Treaty under which a whole class of non-strategic offensive weapons has been eliminated will celebrate its 15 years.
We have ratified the START II Treaty. It’s not Russia’s guilt that it has not come into force.
A new major step forward in the nuclear disarmament was the conclusion at the Moscow Summit in May 2002 of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty between Russia and the United States. This document legally sets an agreement on mutual reduction of a summary number of strategic nuclear warheads down to between 1700 and 2000 units to each of the parties by December 31, 2012, that means that it foresees the reduction approximately to a third in comparison to the level established under START I Treaty. At the same time the START I Treaty will stay in force till December 5, 2009 and by the agreement between the parties can be prolonged further. So, at least up to the end of the year 2009 the strategic offensive potentials of Russia and the USA will be under two-fold mutually reinforcing limitations by the two treaties. Provisions for its further enrichment, strengthening and evolution have been included into the new treaty and specially created Bilateral Commission on its implementation will focus on them. At the moment the work to complete the process of ratification of the new Treaty is underway.
The SOR Treaty - like any other agreement it has been the result of mutual compromises – was made possible in many respects thanks to new strategic relations between Russia and the United States facing new threats, set in the Joint Declaration signed at the same Summit, as well as thanks to the confirmation by the parties of close connection between strategic offensive and defensive armaments.
When concluding the new treaty in the sphere of the strategic offensive arms Russia and the United States took into account – and reflected it in its text – the commitments under Article VII of the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. In assessing the significance of this agreement President Vladimir V.Putin underscored the fact that “in letter and spirit this is the confirmation of a choice by our countries made in favor of reduction of nuclear arsenals and for joint work to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction”.
Russia proceeds from the understanding that it is impossible to consider the issues of tactical nuclear weapons separate from other kinds of armaments. This is why the well-known unilateral Russian initiatives in the sphere of disarmament in 1991-1992 are comprehensive in nature and besides the TNW touch upon other important issues, which have an essential influence on strategic stability.
An essential argument in favor of the comprehensive consideration of issues related to different kinds of weapons is that, for example, dividing nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical is a very arbitrary process and that fact is vividly testified by an analysis of combat characteristics of the TNW, as well as by the transformation of the role of such weapons depending upon location of their deployment. On our part we believe that removal of the tactical nuclear weapons, for example, from Europe and elimination there of respective infrastructure would become an important practical step ultimately overcoming the vestiges of the cold-war period. Such a decision in our opinion could serve the purposes of strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Quite naturally the elaboration of specific proposals to reduce and limit nuclear weapons should be accompanied by the adoption of specific measures also to limit other types of weapons including non-nuclear, as well as including the prohibition or limitation of activities with such weapons within reach of each other’s territories.
Russia remains attached to an exclusive importance of an unconditional implementation of negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapon states provided in 1995. This provision is set down in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.
The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was an important measure of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is our hope that CTBT which, as many are aware, has long ago been ratified by Russia will be joined by all the nations whose ratification is of principal importance for the entry into force of the Treaty.
We appreciate the process of creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world that gained a pace. The establishment of the zones free from nuclear weapons is by itself an important measure of disarmament. In forming the zone the states seek to strengthen regional and international security, increase the level of mutual trust and agreement. At the same time they do something not less important: acting in the spirit of NPT Article VII they make an essential contribution into the development and consolidation of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime. Such an organic combination of mutually complimentary factors determines the significance of all the NWFZs taken together and each of them individually.
The international community has accumulated a great experience in matters of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It testifies to the fact that when the process of institutionalizing the zones follows the channels of principles and parameters, which have become a common practice, when it does not contradict the international law, then the NWFZs receive recognition and respective assurances. On the contrary, non-observance of these conditions makes the process of recognition of a zone more difficult, as we have seen it happened to the NWFZ in South-East Asia. We express our hope that the dialogue between the SEA countries and nuclear powers will, in final analysis, allow them to resolve the outstanding difficulties.
The work on the draft treaty on nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is about to be completed. At the same time efforts to create such a zone in the Middle East stalled and that fact cannot but cause concern, especially taking into consideration a complicated situation in the region. Russia remains of the view that it is important to implement the resolutions on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference.
We are also convinced that the process of the post-war settlement at the Middle East and in Iraq in particular should be brought back into international legal framework based on existing mechanisms accountable to the UN Security Council. That would also facilitate the solution of the tasks related to the strengthening of the WMD non-proliferation regime in the region.
We express concern at the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. At the same time we confirm our position regarding the earliest possible start within the CD framework of negotiations on non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We would also like to point out that prevention of arms race in space is also of importance in the context of the NPT.
We believe it is necessary to elaborate and adopt effective measures with the objective to enhance the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime without detriment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all the states.
We believe also that under present conditions broad international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear power is a potent and effective means of strengthening of nuclear weapons non-proliferation regimes at the global as well as regional levels.
In our view the basic directions of activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC) would help to resolve these two interconnected tasks. We actively support the drive of activities carried out by these multilateral mechanisms to be more open in the work with non-member countries. We believe that there are some reserves to be exploited in this work. We advocate constructive interaction and intensive dialogue with all the countries, including non-parties to the NPT, first of all with the objective of establishing and improving national systems of export control.
Russia firmly adheres to the policy of implementation of comprehensive IAEA safeguards as a mandatory condition for nuclear exports to countries not possessing nuclear weapons. Together with other countries, which supply nuclear materials and equipment on a regular basis, we take part in the work to provide more detailed specification and renewal of the lists of goods for nuclear exports and strictly adhere to its provisions.
Prior to the previous period we continued to improve our national system of export control. We have made more specific practically all the control lists. Changes have been introduced into legal acts, which regulate the procedure of foreign economic activities regarding the goods under control. First of all, the scope of foreign economic operations, which are subject to licensing, was made broader. Besides, export operations in goods subject to control their transfer to foreign entities in the territory of Russia is also subject to issuing licenses.
Moreover, now the export control covers also the transfer of technologies in the so-called “intangible” form – through electronic means of communication, in the process of teaching, presentations at scientific conferences, symposia and other events with foreign participation. It is explained by the necessity to close the above said channels for the leakage of “sensitive” information abroad. At the same time the procedure to obtain permits has been significantly simplified and time-periods for consideration of applications of exporters have been reduced.
The work to establish internal programs of export control at the enterprises and in organizations is in progress. The mechanisms for identification survey of products are being improved. Criminal and administrative responsibility for violation of established procedure for the execution of foreign economic operations with the goods that are subject to the export control has been made stricter.
Russia actively supports the IAEA activity. The priority directions of this activity are strengthening safeguards, prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, creation of effective verification mechanisms for member states of nuclear-weapon-free zones, etc.
We highly appreciate the efforts of the Agency to develop and introduce the concept of integral safeguards. We take note also of the greater number of states which signed with the IAEA Additional Protocols to the Safeguards Agreements that significantly increases the confidence of the international community in the absence of switching of nuclear materials and equipment to non-declared activities.
We support the IAEA program to combat possible acts of nuclear terrorism and new trilateral Russia–US–IAEA initiative regarding safe treatment of radioactive sources.
In approaching the process of the NPT review with due responsibility, the Russian delegation will make its contribution into constructive dialogue of participants in the PrepCom second session in order to enhance the efficiency and validity of this most important international treaty. In considering procedural issues of the agenda of the Committee we believe it is reasonable to use to the maximum possible degree the experience accrued during six previous Conferences, and of course, taking due account of specific nature of the 2005 Conference.
Mr.Chairman, distinguished delegates,
In conclusion on behalf of the Russian side I once again would like to state that Russia adheres to the efforts to achieve ultimate goal in matters of nuclear disarmament. We are prepared to cooperate with all the interested states.
We wish a successful work to all the participants at the session.
Thank you for your