P5 Beijing Conference: Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Joint Statement on the P5 Beijing Conference: Enhancing Strategic Confidence and Working Together to Implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Outcomes
Office of the Spokesperson
April 15, 2014
Following is the text of a joint statement issued by the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States at the conclusion of the P5 Beijing Conference: Enhancing Strategic Confidence and Working Together to Implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Outcomes, Beijing, April 14-15, 2014, the fifth such Conference since 2009.
1. The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or P5, met in Beijing on April 14-15, 2014, under the chairmanship of the People's Republic of China, to build on the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, 2012 Washington, and 2013 Russian-hosted Geneva P5 conferences. The P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 also had a useful discussion with representatives of civil society during the Conference.
2. The P5 reviewed significant developments at the 2013 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and in the context of the NPT since the 2013 Geneva P5 Conference. The P5 reaffirmed that the NPT remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and they remain committed to strengthening the NPT. They emphasized the importance of continuing to work together in implementing the Action Plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as provided for in Article VI of the NPT. The P5 intend to continue to seek progress on the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, which is the only practical path to achieving a world without nuclear weapons and in keeping with our NPT obligations.
3. The P5 intend to strengthen P5 engagement to advance progress on NPT obligations and 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan commitments. The P5 advanced their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, confidence-building, and verification, and welcomed the achievement under France’s leadership of P5 consensus on a reporting framework. They introduced to each other their national reports consistent with this reporting framework and Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT RevCon Final Document, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom. They encourage other NPT States Party to submit reports, consistent with Action 20 of the NPT RevCon Final Document.
4. The P5 reviewed the work carried out by the Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms under China's leadership, and in this regard, noted the success of the Second Experts' Meeting of the Working Group held on 26-27 September 2013, in Beijing, which established milestones for the completion of the first phase of the Glossary effort for the 2015 RevCon. The progress made in this effort provides a solid foundation for the Working Group to submit its outcome on the terms currently under discussion to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The P5 stressed again the importance of this work, which is increasing mutual understanding and will facilitate further P5 discussions beyond 2015 on nuclear issues.
5. The P5 had an exchange of views on their nuclear doctrines, strategic stability, and international security from their individual country perspectives to gain better understanding and build strategic trust. They also discussed the importance of verification in achieving progress towards further disarmament and ensuring the success of nonproliferation efforts. The P5 welcomed briefings by the Russian Federation and the United States on aspects of the New START Treaty’s implementation, as well as on implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly-Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons, signed in Washington, D.C. on 18 February 1993, and its related Protocol on HEU Transparency Arrangements. The P5 shared further information on their respective experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.
6. The P5 visited the Chinese National Data Centre for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as an endeavor to enhance transparency and mutual understanding. They recalled their commitment in the 2010 NPT RevCon Final Document to promote and take concrete steps towards early entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization. They called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force. The P5 intend to continue their cooperative work to strengthen the CTBT verification regime. The P5 confirmed their support for the ad referendum arrangement for collaborative work by their CTBT technical experts towards improved critical on-site inspection techniques and technology.
7. The P5 supported efforts to revitalize the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and continue to be concerned with the impasse at the CD. They discussed efforts to find a way forward in the CD and reiterated their support for a comprehensive program of work, which includes the immediate start of negotiations in the CD on a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or FMCT) for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The P5 participated fully in the first session of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT, established in UNGA/A/RES/67/53, and look forward to further engagement in this group.
8. In reaffirming the historic contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament and stressing the continued validity of this proven route, the P5 also emphasized their shared understanding of the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and their resolve to continue to give the highest priority to avoiding such contingencies, which is in the interests of all nations.
9. The P5 shared their views on topical proliferation issues and remain concerned about serious challenges to the nonproliferation regime. They pledged to continue their efforts in different formats and at various international fora to find peaceful diplomatic solutions to the outstanding issues faced by the nonproliferation regime. As they did previously, and looking ahead to the 2014 PrepCom, they called on the states concerned to fulfill without delay their international obligations under the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, undertakings with the IAEA and other appropriate international commitments.
10. The P5 shared their views on how to prevent abuse of NPT withdrawal (Article X). They resolved to make efforts to broaden consensus among NPT States Party on the withdrawal issue at the 2014 PrepCom, thus making a further contribution to the NPT Review Process.
11. The P5 reviewed their efforts to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties as soon as possible. They also reiterated their support for the early convening of a conference, to be attended by all the States of the Middle East, on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region.
12. The P5 discussed issues related to strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. They stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards including through the promotion of the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the development of approaches to IAEA safeguards implementation based on objective state factors. The P5 also discussed the role of the nuclear-weapon-states, in conformity with the provisions of the NPT, in assisting the IAEA in cases involving possible detection of nuclear weapon programs in non-nuclear weapon states.
13. The P5 noted that they are now more engaged than ever in regular interactions on disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation issues. The P5 pledged to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. In addition to meeting at all appropriate levels, the P5 intend to hold a sixth P5 conference. The P5 welcomed the offer by the United Kingdom to host this conference in London in 2015.