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Cablegate: Indonesia: 2003 Annual Terrorism Report

P 281047Z NOV 03
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2225

UNCLAS JAKARTA 013041


S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KJUS ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: A. STATE 301352
B. 02 JAKARTA 6779

A) Significant Action in Support of the Global Coalition
Against Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- --------------

1. Indonesia significantly increased its support for the
global coalition against terrorism during this period. The
October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali that killed 202 - including
88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 28 Britons, and seven
Americans galvanized the Indonesian Government into action,
and the August 5 bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta
that killed 12, including 11 Indonesians, further cemented
Jakarta's new resolve. Since then, the Government, led by
the Indonesian National Police, has taken effective steps to
counter the threat posed by the regional terror group that
calls itself Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and has ties to Al Qaeda.
The Indonesian police have reported the arrest of 109
suspected JI members as of late November, including suspects
in the Bali attacks, the Marriott attack and other criminal
acts linked to terrorism. Almost all of those arrests
occurred during 2003, and included numerous senior leaders,
most of the masterminds of the Bali bombing, several key
planners of the Marriott bombing and a number of JI cell
members, sub-regional (wakalah) and regional (mantiqi)
commanders, former instructors at JI training camps in the
southern Philippines and in Afghanistan, and financiers of
attacks.

2. Indonesia's weak rule of law, poorly regulated financial
system and serious internal coordination problems have
impeded progress uncovering and freezing terrorist assets.
Indonesia has not yet frozen any terrorist assets,
notwithstanding Jakarta's continued statements of willingness
to freeze terrorist assets, consistent with the requirements
of UNSCR 1267, 1373, 1390, and 1455. Indonesia did, however,
enhance its legal framework, passing amendments to its
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Law in September 2003. The
amendments not only brought Indonesia's legislation up to
international standards, but also strengthened the GOI's
legal authority to combat terrorist finance. A financial
intelligence unit is now up and running with considerable USG
assistance. Continued assistance will be required to improve
operational effectiveness.

3. The Indonesian military cooperated to a large extent with
flight clearance requests from the U.S. and other countries
related to the war against terrorism last year. The
Indonesian military also has cooperated in the protection
from terrorists of high value shipping in the Malacca
Straits. Other than limited military intelligence support,
the Indonesian armed forces have not played a major role in
the investigation of the Bali or JW Marriott bombings.

4. In March, parliament adopted into law two presidential
decrees on terrorism from 2002, now laws 15/2003 and 16/2003.
Law 15/2003 is a comprehensive anti-terrorism law, defining
various acts of terror, and providing police and prosecutors
with broader powers to combat terrorism such as extended
pre-trial detention periods and the use of electronic
evidence in court. Law 16/2003 makes law 15/2003 retroactive
to the date of the Bali bombings. As of December 1, the
Department of Justice and Human Rights was preparing a
revision of Law 15/2003 to present to parliament. The
revision would slightly broaden powers given to police and
prosecutors, and would reportedly give the Indonesian
military (TNI) a larger role in counter-terrorism efforts.
In November, the newly formed Constitutional Court agreed to
conduct a judicial review of Law 16/2003 which the Bali
bombers' defense attorneys had claimed was unconstitutional,
violating article 28(i) of the amended 1945 Constitution
which prohibits "laws with retroactive effect."

B) Response of the Judicial System to Acts of Terrorism
Including Prosecutions
--------------------------------------------- --------------

5. The Indonesian judicial system undertook the trials of
approximately 63 terror suspects during the year, including
17 members of the radical Laskar Jundullah organization for
involvement in the bombing of a McDonalds restaurant and a
car showroom in Makassar, South Sulawesi in December 2002,
and 46 members of JI for involvement in the Christmas Eve
2000 church bombings, the bombing of the Philippine
Ambassador's residence in Jakarta in August 2000, and the
Bali and Marriott hotel bombings. As of December 1,
Indonesian courts had convicted 50 terror suspects, and
acquitted two. Fifteen trials remained underway, and many
more JI suspects were said to be awaiting trial.

6. On September 2, the Central Jakarta District Court
convicted the leader, or "Emir" of JI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, on
treason and immigration charges. The panel of judges stated
in its decision that prosecutors had presented sufficient
evidence so as to convince them of JI's existence, its goal
of overthrowing the government of Indonesia, and Ba'asyir's
involvement with the group. However, despite
video-conference testimony from JI detainees in Singapore and
Malaysia as well as testimony from Bali bombers naming
Ba'asyir as head of the JI, judges were not convinced of his
leadership role, and sentenced him to only four years in
prison. Both Ba'asyir and the prosecution appealed the
decision, and the Jakarta High Court is expected to rule on
the appeal in December.

7. Indonesian courts have convicted 39 suspects for
involvement in planning and carrying out the October 12, 2002
Bali bombings or for aiding and abetting those responsible
for the attacks. The Denpasar District Court handed down 29
of those convictions, and sentenced key Bali bombers Amrozi
bin Nurhasyim, Abdul Ghoni (a.k.a. Mukhlas) and Abdul Aziz
(a.k.a. Imam Samudra) to death. Other suspects standing
trial in Denpasar and Lamongan received sentences ranging
from three years to life in prison. Four trials remained
underway in Denpasar at year's end, with four more underway
in Palu, Central Sulawesi and two still underway in Lamongan,
East Java. At least 15 of those convicted filed appeals. As
of December 1, the Bali High Court had quashed 12 of the
appeals, including those by Amrozi and Imam Samudra, both of
whom subsequently filed appeals with the Supreme Court. The
numerous convictions and tough sentences handed down by the
Bali courts are a reflection of the Government's seriousness
in combating terrorism, and its commitment to bringing to
justice those implicated in terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

8. The Makassar District Court held the trials of 17 suspects
in connection to the December 5, 2002 bombing of a McDonalds
restaurant and a car showroom in the South Sulawesi
provincial capital. Many of the suspects were believed to be
members of the radical Laskar Jundullah organization, and
admitted to having trained at camps in the Southern
Philippines. Some were friends or acquaintances of Bali
bombers. As of December 1, the court had reportedly
convicted ten suspects and acquitted one. Several trials
remained underway, and two suspects were awaiting trial.

9. The first trial in connection to the August 5 bombing of
the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta began on November 12 in
Bengkulu, Sumatra. The suspect, Sardona Siliwangi, stood
accused of storing explosives used in the attack, which
killed 12 people and injured 150 others. At least ten
additional Marriott bombing suspects are expected to stand
trial beginning in December or early 2004, including Bali and
Marriott bombing suspects Mohamed Rais and Idris (a.k.a.
Jhoni Hendrawan).

10. Other JI figures stood trial during the year, including
Abdul Jabar bin Ahmad Kandai, who a Jakarta court convicted
of planning and carrying out the August 2000 bombing of the
Philippine Ambassador's residence in Jakarta as well as
participating in the Christmas Eve bombing of a number of
Jakarta churches that same year. The Central Jakarta
District Court sentenced Jabar to 20 years in prison after he
admitted his involvement in the attacks.

11. Indonesian police conducted a credible first phase of
investigation into the August 31, 2002 ambush of an
international mining company's contract employees near
Tembagapura and Timika in Papua province, which killed two
Americans and one Indonesian and wounded ten others. The
investigation uncovered indications of possible involvement
by Indonesian military members. Due to limits on its legal
jurisdiction, the police handed the investigation over to
military authorities. Since January, the Indonesian police
and military have been cooperating with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to solve the case.


C) Extraditions or Requested Extraditions of Suspected
Terrorists
--------------------------------------------- ------------

12. Jakarta did not extradite or request the extradition of
suspected terrorists for prosecution during the year, but did
request the United States provide access to and eventually
render JI operations chief and Indonesian citizen Riduan
Isamuddin (a.k.a. Hambali).


D) Significant Impediments to Prosecution/Extradition of
Suspected Terrorists
--------------------------------------------- -----------

13. There are no significant legal barriers to prosecuting
domestic terror acts under the existing criminal code, and
Parliament's adoption into law of two anti-terrorism decrees
in March further strengthened the legal framework in place
for bringing terrorists to justice.

14. However, the Government has been unwilling to ban JI,
saying the organization never formally applied for
recognition and thus cannot be prohibited. The absence of
such a prohibition has impeded police and prosecutors in
arresting and trying suspected terrorists. Police have had
to release a number of known JI members for lack of evidence
tying them to specific criminal or terrorist acts. As JI's
intellectual leaders begin to stand trial, the apparent
non-status of JI in Indonesia will likely further hamper
prosecutors' efforts to put the organization's leaders behind
bars.

15. Although Indonesian courts have convicted 50 people on
charges of terrorism, a dearth of prosecutors familiar with
the structure and inner workings of JI has hampered efforts
to successfully prosecute suspected terrorists. Senior
officials at the Attorney General's Office are aware of the
challenges they face, and are coordinating with police to
educate prosecutors handling terrorism trials and ensure
solid cases are made against terror suspects.

16. The Constitution does not prohibit the extradition of
suspected terrorists. Indonesia has extradition treaties
with only five countries (Australia, Malaysia, Philippines,
South Korea and Thailand) and an agreement for "surrender of
fugitive offenders" with the Special Administrative Region
(SAR) of Hong Kong. Indonesia does not have an extradition
treaty with the United States.


E) Responses Other than Prosecution, and Efforts to
Investigate Terror Incidents or Assist With International
Terror Investigations
--------------------------------------------- --------------

17. Senior officials, starting with the President,
strengthened their public statements on terrorism during
2003. Before the Bali bombings in 2002, only a small cadre
of government officials spoke publicly about the need to
confront terrorism in Indonesia, while most senior officials
remained reluctant. As a democratic country with almost 200
million Muslims, most senior politicians shied away from even
acknowledging the existence of domestic Islamic terrorists
for fear of angering a large constituency. The suicide car
bombing in Bali that killed 202, mostly foreigners, in two
nightclubs on the night of October 12, 2002, was a watershed.
The bloody attack forced the Indonesians to confront this
long-denied problem. Two months later, terrorists bombed a
McDonald's restaurant and a Toyota showroom in Makassar, the
largest city on the island of Sulawesi. JI's bombing of the
JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 again shocked
Indonesians, both because of the mostly Indonesian
casualties, and because the attack occurred in the capital
city.

18. The public comments of senior officials have, for the
most part, reflected the government's shift to a tougher
attitude on terrorism. In late September, for example,
Indonesian President Megawati said that despite public
protests, her government would continue to take preemptive
measures against terrorism in Indonesia and keep hard-line
groups under surveillance. The Indonesian National Police
have been by far the most active in trying to convince the
public of the need to resist the JI and countering public
statements from various religious leaders denying the
existence of the JI terror group and who attribute bombings
in Indonesia to outsiders. In late September, police
organized meetings with religious leaders both in Jakarta and
outside the capital in which detained JI suspects described
how JI carried out its bombing plans. In October, police put
newly arrested terror suspects on national television where
they admitted their involvement with JI, bomb plots, and
asked forgiveness.

19. The Indonesians have also participated in a number of
international investigations, mostly with neighboring
countries. JI is a terror group that operates on a regional
scale, and thus opportunities for cross-border investigations
are numerous. For example, the Philippines government on
October 2 arrested a key Indonesian figure in JI, Taufiq
Rifke, and within days gave Indonesian police access to him.
Rifke, was scheduled as of late-November to be sent back to
Indonesia to stand trial. In addition, after the Bali
bombings, the Indonesian police allowed the Australian
Federal Police, the FBI and other police agencies to
participate in that investigation. The U.S. Government,
since spring 2003, has helped train and equip a CT unit
within the Indonesian police force.


F) Major CT Efforts Taken in 2003
---------------------------------

20. Indonesia has been hit by a series of terror bombings
carried out by JI stretching back to the bombing of the
Philippines Ambassador's residence in Jakarta on August 1,
2000. But it was only after the October 2002 Bali bombing
that Jakarta admitted it had a problem and moved to confront
JI. In the wake of the Bali bombing, the Government
permitted an unprecedented joint investigation with Australia
(many of whose nationals died in the attack), assisted by the
United States and other countries. These efforts, led by the
police, have netted more than 100 JI suspects, including
senior leaders, operatives, trainers, financiers and
accomplices. Their subsequent testimony in open court helped
identify the perpetrators of previously unsolved bombings
dating back several years.

21. At the 9th ASEAN summit in Bali October 7-9, Indonesia
joined other member states in endorsing creation of an ASEAN
Security Community (ASC). The Community will strengthen
national and regional capacity to counter terrorism and other
transnational crimes. The Government of Indonesia, as ASEAN
Chairman, will draft a "road map" to implement the ASC. This
will be presented to other ASEAN member states at its next
summit, to be held in Vientiane, Laos in 2004. The
Indonesian government had previously signed MOUs on CT
cooperation with Thailand and the Philippines as well as
leading the effort to adopt an ASEAN Police Chiefs agreement
to cooperate and share information.


G) Support for Terrorism
------------------------

22. While the administration of President Megawati has
generally performed well in the fight against terrorism,
certain members of her senior cabinet from other political
parties have, at times, undermined the government's resolve
on this issue. The Vice President Hamzah Haz called
President Bush the "King of Terrorists" and met with JI
leader Abu Bakar Ba'ashir, prior to Ba'asyir's arrest.


H) Public Statements in Support of a Terror-Supporting
Country on a Terrorism Issue
--------------------------------------------- --------------

23. There has been no reported GOI support or public
statements in support of countries that sponsor terrorism on
a terrorism-related issue.


I) Change in Attitude
---------------------

24. Jakarta dramatically changed its approach toward
terrorism at the end of 2002, and that new approach was
reinforced during 2003. Only after the October 2002 Bali
bombings did Jakarta admit the existence of and threat posed
by JI. Subsequent bombings, including in Makassar, and
several in Jakarta, including against the JW Marriott hotel
in August 2003, demonstrated time and again to Indonesians
their vulnerability to terrorism and its negative effects on
the economy, the national image, and stability. This open
acknowledgement of terrorism as a national problem, the
Government's aggressive steps to arrest terrorists linked to
a small Muslim fringe group, and past history of the
Government's suppression of Muslim organizations, prompted
some concern and suspicion over government actions among
Indonesia's mainstream Islamic community. By and large,
however, 2003 witnessed increasing public awareness of the
dangers of terrorism and a strengthening public resolve to
combat terrorist groups.


Boyce

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