Cablegate: Security Environment Profile Questionnaire
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000634
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC PTER VM CTERR
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
RESPONSES - VIETNAM
REF: STATE 28688
Responses are keyed to REFTEL and include input from
AmConGen Ho Chi Minh City.
1. (SBU) POLITICAL VIOLENCE - DEMONSTRATIONS
1D. :Following the initiation of hostilities in the Gulf,
there were small street demonstrations across from mission
facilities in both Hanoi and HCMC of about 100. In addition
there were also some large rallies (5,000 - 10,000),
organized by the government, that took place approximately
two blocks from the Consulate. Anti-war rallies of up to
10,000 were also reported in the provinces.
1E. Yes, both in reaction to U.S. Congressional criticism
of Vietnam and by U.S. Military action
1F. HANOI: Demonstrations have been generally peaceful.
However, a few bricks, rocks, and bottles were thrown at the
Embassy on a couple of occasions without physical damage and
much success of inciting violence
1I. No, although there are periodic protests over land and
other issues, they are not anti-government.
1K. 100 people
1L. In 2003, we know of no violent demonstrations but in
earlier years some injuries have been reported
2. POLITICAL VIOLENCE - MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS
3. POLITICAL VIOLENCE - HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES
3B. Mission encourages participation in ILEA sponsored
courses. However, this program reaches a very limited
number of participants annually.
3D. SEE CLASSIFIED SEPTEL
3E. NO. The relationship is mostly unilateral, see
classified SEPTEL for additional information.
3G. MIXED. In response to specific threat information in
September 2002, Embassy requested armed uniformed presence
at its facilities. The request was initially rejected, and
as a security measure the EAC closed the Embassy and ConGen
for several days. Following the closure the GVN relented
and began providing coverage for the Chancellery, Rose
Garden Annex and the EMR. This coverage remains to date.
More recently, the GVN provided additional officers at the
Embassy and Annex, and equipped them with AK-47 rifles, riot
helmets and flack vests. The Embassy was not advised in
advance of the increase in security. The rational
eventually provided was that the increased security was for
high profile diplomatic missions during the SEA Games.
Shortly after the SEA Games ended, so did the additional
3H. POOR. While GVN security at major airports is
insufficient (below average-poor), the CAAV shows continuing
interest in cooperating with the USG on safety and the
aspects of security that remain under their purview.
Embassy has not conducted an in-depth assessment, but as
part of the implementation of the recently approved Air
Transport Agreement, the CAAV is receiving USG assistance
with safety and security reviews and training in preparation
for assessments from the ICAO.
3I. Average. Can be effective if they want to be, but
riddled with corruption, hampered by lack of equipment,
especially beyond the two major international airports in
Hanoi and HCMC
4. INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS
5. INDIDENOUS TERRORISM - OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS
5A. NO. The GVN claims that there are, but the USG does
not consider these groups to be terrorists. These are
usually groups of Ex-Pat Vietnamese, living in other
countries, who criticize or even oppose the SRV.
6. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM - TRANSNATIONAL TERRRORIST
6A. Not that Mission is aware of.
6D. Not that Mission is aware of.
6F. SEE CLASSIFIED SEPTEL
6G. The border is very porous and there is smuggling of
small arms and relatively small amounts of explosives. The
explosives are generally intended for commercial use.
However, the items would be available for purchase if a
terrorist cell needed them. Explosives have also been used
recently, predominately in the south, as a method of
carrying out vendettas.