Cablegate: Brazil: Response to Additional Protocol As Condition of Supply
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002151
GENEVA FOR CD DEL, UNVIE FOR IAEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ETTC PREL PARM BR NPT IAEA
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS CONDITION OF SUPPLY
REF: A. STATE 180283 B. BRASILIA 1045 C. BRASILIA 1221 D. BRASILIA 1069 E. BRASILIA 909 F. BRASILIA 1005
Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne, reason 1.4 (d)
1. (SBU) Poloff delivered ref A talking points to Ministry of Foreign Relations Sensitive Technologies and Disarmament Division (MRE/DDS) Deputy Director Manuel Montenegro, who is well versed on Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) matters. Montenegro had participated in the recent NSG plenary meeting in Sweden and his comments likely reflect the thinking of his superiors within Itamaraty. Poloff also exchanged brief pleasantries with Ambassador Sergio Duarte, President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and his assistant Jandyr Ferreira dos Santos.
2. (C) Responding to the Brazil specific points in ref A, Montenegro sought to clarify the GOB position on conclusion of the Additional Protocol (AP). Montenegro stressed that the GOB does not have any "conceptual" problem with the AP and "would get there eventually," implying a Brazilian disposition to sign the protocol at some point in the future. However, Montenegro said he was certain that Brazil could not complete its internal policy consideration of the issue in time to adhere to the AP prior to the 2005 NPT Revcon. In that regard, he noted that Brazil's congress had issued a "caveat" to the MRE that the congress wants to see "concerted effort towards nuclear disarmament" among weapons states if it is to consider approval of the Additional Protocol. (Note: Under Brazilian law, the Additional Protocol would almost certainly have to be approved by Brazil's congress, as it is a substantive addendum to an international treaty. End note.)
3. (C) Responding further to ref A points, Montenegro said Brazil continues to oppose implementation of the AP as a Condition of Supply (COS) for trigger list transfers in the NSG. Montenegro was surprised that the USG was continuing to press for the UK/Austrian proposal to establish AP implementation as a COS since, following the NSG Plenary and after GOB delegation discussions with the UK and Austrian delegations, it was Montenegro's understanding that the UK/Austrian text was "dead." Montenegro further said that the GOB is against the use of the NSG as a kind of "cheerleader for the AP."
4. (C) Comment: Montenegro is a candid MRE specialist in non-proliferation issues, and we suspect he is offering a realistic assessment of the deliberate pace the GOB will take toward the AP, even as senior Brazilian officials continue to indicate a disposition to eventually sign on. His assessment reinforces views expressed earlier this year by FM Amorim and Defense Minister Viegas to visiting Energy Secretary Abraham and former NP A/S Wolf (refs E and F). The public statements in April by Science and Technology Minister Campos that Brazil would sign the AP in time for the 2005 NPT Review Conference now seem isolated and too optimistic. We believe the GOB's reservations probably continue to include: (1) reluctance to appear to bow to external pressures, from the USG, IAEA or in the context of the NSG; (2) concern with perceptions that the AP pressure on Brazil in some fashion lumps Brazil in the suspect company of North Korea and Iran, when the GOB feels Brazil ought to be seen as a model citizen in non-proliferation; (3) concern that the GOB needs an "air-tight" case on the merits of the AP before taking the matter to Brazil's congress, which only reluctantly ratified the NPT and may renew its criticisms of a perceived lack of disarmament progress among the weapons states. We will continue to try to gain more clarity on the thinking within the GOB on these issues.