Cablegate: Kinshasa - Security Environment Profile
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001730
DEPT FOR DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/AF
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: KINSHASA - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE
REF: A) STATE 185263 B) KINSHASA 00354
1. (SBU) Our responses to the questionnaire have not
changed dramatically since our last submission in reftel (B).
However, there is more narrative explanation due to the
events of June 3-6.
2. (SBU) POLITICAL VIOLENCE
b. There were city-wide demonstrations from June 3-6 that
targeted the United Nations which to a certain degree
spilled over to the U.S. and other Embassies in
Kinshasa. The objective of the demonstrators was
to voice their dissatisfaction with the fact that
MONUC (the U.N) did nothing in response to military
action taken by a renegade general in the city of
Bukavu in eastern Congo.
c. Yes. The June 3-6 demonstrations did occur in the
vicinity of the Embassy. However, the EAC agreed that
this was a result of the fact that the Embassy is
located within 2 blocks of MONUC Headquarters.
d. N/A. There have not been any demonstrations
specifically targeting the U.S. Embassy.
e. The June demonstrations were triggered by domestic
f. Although the majority of demonstrations in Kinshasa
are peaceful, the June demonstrations were quite
g. There was slight damage to the Embassy - three broken
windows from rocks/debris being thrown by the
i. Yes. There are frequent peaceful demonstrations by
civil servants and teachers usually due to the lack
of payment of salaries.
k. Although there were several thousands of demonstrators
during the events of June 3-6, the average size of
most demonstrations is 100-200.
l. Most of the demonstrations are usually peaceful.
m. As mentioned above, the Embassy did suffer minor
damage during the June demonstrations.
3. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS
a. Yes. An intrastate conflict.
b. It is limited to the eastern part of the country.
d. Some of the factions involved in the conflict have
signaled a slight anti-American stance, but nothing
4. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES
b. Yes. Limited training in document fraud, personal
protection and chemical and biological training
has been given to a limited number of Congolese
security personnel. The effectiveness of the
training is difficult to determine. However, we
believe that the training was somewhat effective
and better than none at all.
d. The Congolese Intelligence Services are as
professional as they can be with their limited
resources and training.
5. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS
b. Two. ALIR and FDLR.
g. Limited to a specific region - eastern Congo.
6. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS
b. The UPC and several other uncontrolled armed
7. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
a. No. There are individuals in Kinshasa and
elsewhere in the Congo who may be sympathetic
to certain terrorist groups (such as Hamas
and Hezbollah), but we believe that there
are no known operational cells in the
country. There are reports of a group
called the Al Qaida Fan Club but the members
are more than likely sympathizers and not
the majority of the people
b. The EAC assesses these as possibly financial
support and/or propaganda cells.
d. There are Islamic NGO's operating in Congo.
The EAC has no reason to believe they
represent a threat to U.S. interests.
g. Easily accessible.
8. (U) POC is RSO Jeff Lischke at 243-81-88-44608 (cell) or
934 ext. 2207 (IVG).