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Cablegate: (Sbu) Exploring a Montagnard-Focused Humanitarian

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000507

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, PRM

BANGKOK FOR REGIONAL REFCOORD HONNOLD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF VM CB ETMIN HUMANR
SUBJECT: (SBU) Exploring a Montagnard-focused Humanitarian
Resettlement Program

Ref: A) 2/3/05 Ryan-Marine E-mail; B) 3/1/05 Adams-Knapper E-
mail

1. (SBU) This is an action request. Post proposes exploring
prospects for a Montagnard-focused Humanitarian Resettlement
Program, the goal of which would be to help to mitigate the
outflow of Montagnards to Cambodia. Post has informally
raised the approach outlined below with PRM and EAP (Refs A
and B); we now seek front channel approval to begin the
steps outlined in paragraph 7.

Background
----------

2. (SBU) Among the factors driving Montagnards into Cambodia
are: the desire for economic opportunity; a response to
deliberate misinformation from outsiders (i.e., that the
UNHCR or the USG can help Montagnards to recover lost land);
and a fear of religious or political persecution. In
proposing an in-country humanitarian resettlement program to
help to mitigate the outflow of Mongtagnards to Cambodia, we
recognize that the only long-term palliative to the
Montagnard refugee problem will be social and economic
development in the Central Highlands.

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3. (SBU) In resolving this situation, the UNHCR needs to
have a prominent role, including the ability to monitor
those Montagnards found not to be refugees who are returned
to Vietnam from Cambodia, but a history of troubled GVN-
UNHCR relations may make this difficult. This is further
complicated by the fact that there is a small but active
group outside Vietnam seeking to destabilize the Central
Highlands in order to gain autonomy or independence for the
region.

4. (SBU) There are key issues about which we need more
information, including to what extent Montagnards who have a
genuine fear of religious or political persecution make up
the overall population of those who have fled to Cambodia
and details about their demographics, such as place of
origin, age or family status. Finally, and most
importantly, we do not know whether the GVN will be serious
about setting up an in-country processing program.

Issues to Consider
------------------

5. (SBU) Before approaching the GVN, we will need to have a
clear idea of our target population and a sound basis for
why we believe this group merits bilateral efforts to
establish an in-country processing program. We also need to
be mindful of Vietnamese sensitivities: the GVN will not
cooperate on a program specifically aimed at transporting
from Vietnam those "suffering religious and other
persecution."

6. (SBU) Publicly, we would want to present this effort as a
multilateral, humanitarian endeavor. Privately, our focus
should be on working together to move this issue to the
positive side of the bilateral ledger. The GVN has shown
some willingness to work with the USG on Montagnard "follow-
to-join" cases. There has been incremental progress in
passport issuances to long-pending Montagnard Visa-93 cases:
for example, eight families have received passports -- out
of 78 total cases -- as of February 25. That said, we
continue to look for greater cooperation in contacting and
processing these existing family reunification cases as an
indicator of the GVN's seriousness about cooperating on a
broader in-country program.

The Way Forward
---------------

7. (SBU) Our approach should have four steps:

-- Step 1) Determine our target population. Embassy Hanoi
and ConGen HCMC will draw up a list of questions for the
UNHCR to ask refugees under its care in Cambodia, the goal
of which is to try to establish the demographics of our
possible target population.

-- Step 2) Establish for ourselves the eligibility criteria
for the program. Once we get a better idea of our target
population, we must come up with a well-defined set of
specific criteria for access to a possible in-country
program. Out of an estimated 1.5 million Montagnards, there
must be credible grounds for identifying a group of 1,000 to
5,000 persons over a period of a few years that merits
access to the program. A somewhat broader interpretation of
existing Priority One guidelines based on some existing or
recent persecution probably offers the best approach. But
it remains to be seen whether the GVN would cooperate in
issuing passports to individuals so identified.

-- Step 3) Reach agreement with the GVN on what the issues
are. We will need to begin discussions with the GVN,
between the Ambassador and Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang
and then perhaps with Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, to
secure its agreement that:

-- Unauthorized travel by Montagnards into Cambodia needs to
be addressed;

-- Resolving this issue is in both countries' interests;

-- Cambodia and the UNHCR have important roles to play in
addressing this problem;

-- While a percentage of the Montagnards in Cambodia are
economic migrants or dupes of outside forces, a certain
number represent a larger population of Montagnards who
simply cannot or do not want to remain in Vietnam; and,

-- A necessary, but only partial, response to this problem
is allowing in-country processing of members of this group.

In coming to the above conclusions with the GVN, the United
States should be prepared to:

-- Be flexible in how we describe the target population and
the possible program; use of the term "refugee" would not be
acceptable to the GVN; a better nomenclature would be
"person at risk" or "individual of interest/concern."

-- Work with other interested countries and organizations to
"multilateralize" our efforts to help the Montagnards,
particularly through targeted development assistance
programs in the Central Highlands;

-- Emphasize early and often that U.S.-Vietnam humanitarian
efforts to resolve this issue can move the overall
relationship forward and shift this issue to the positive
side of the bilateral ledger;

-- Underline that USG- and non-USG public and private
organizations on the ground in the Central Highlands can
play a symbolic and highly beneficial role in the region's
economic development; ideally, Economic Support Funds would
be available for these projects (although our ESF funding
for Vietnam was zeroed out for FY 2006).

-- Accept the GVN's position that outside forces such as the
Montagnard Foundation and others are part of the problem;
commit to persuading Kok Ksor and others that their actions
are unhelpful; and, follow through on this commitment.

-- Step 4) Work on the details. PRM and ConGen HCMC/RRS
will bear responsibility for sorting out and negotiating the
details, which include cost, number of personnel,
arrangements for facilitating interviews and setting up a
venue for interviews. One key issue, subject to necessary
cooperation from the GVN, will be our ability to travel in
the Central Highlands region to verify claims.

MARINE

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