Cablegate: Nea Water Advisor Charles Lawson Discusses

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271335Z Apr 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002389

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID ETRD IZ PREL SENV SY TU
SUBJECT: NEA WATER ADVISOR CHARLES LAWSON DISCUSSES
TIGRIS-EUPHRATES COOPERATION WITH TURKISH OFFICIALS

REF: A. SECSTATE 55035

B. ANKARA 1230

Sensitive but Unclassified.

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: NEA Senior Advisor for Science and
Technology Issues Charles Lawson visited Turkey April 18-21
to explore GOT interest in cooperation on the
Tigris-Euphrates basin. Lawson visited water infrastructure
programs in the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), which
encompasses the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers, and met with Turkey's water policy officials in the
Foreign Ministry, State Hydraulics Works (DSI) and GAP
Administration. In the GAP region, officials and local
farmers admitted that the current irrigation infrastructure
is wasteful and leads to soil salinization, but DSI said it
will eliminate those problems in upcoming irrigation projects
by employing better technology. The officials emphasized the
Tigris-Euphrates basin (which includes Turkey, Syria and
Iraq) could be a basis for building peace and stability in
the region, but pointed out that deep-seated suspicions
remain among the riparian countries. They agreed that the
time was right to explore initial steps of cooperation to
build confidence among the parties and were interested in
ways the US could help that process. End Summary.

GAP -- Southeast Anatolia Project

2. (U) NEA Senior Advisor for Science and Technology Issues
Charles Lawson visited Turkey April 18-21. He traveled to
the GAP region with Ankara Econ Counselor and Science
Specialist to learn more about the GAP, Turkey's ambitious
plan to harness the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers for hydroelectric power, irrigation and economic
development in the impoverished southeast region of Turkey.
Begun in 1976, the GAP has spent $17 billion of a projected
$32 billion to build 9 dams along the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers that produce 7,476 MW and provide irrigation for an
estimated 210,000 hectares in the arid southeast. The GAP
Master Plan calls for 22 dams in all to provide irrigation
for 1.7 million hectares, an area about 75% the size of New
Jersey.

3. (U) Officials at DSI's regional office in the southeast
identified several problems with the way farmers use the
irrigation water provided by the GAP project. Most farmers
are uneducated and rent their fields and are not aware of or
do not care about the effect on the land of overusing water.
Before the GAP irrigation projects came to this water-scarce
region, any marginal increase in water applied to the fields
meant much higher yields. With the cheap water provided by
the GAP project, farmers tend to over-irrigate their fields,
leading to wasted water and salinization of the soil. And
the cheap water allowed the farmers to grow cotton, which
requires large volumes of water and damages the soil. The
irrigation system that was first introduced by the GAP is
very low-tech, using open channels and gravity irrigation.
As a result, a large percentage of the water in the early
irrigation projects is lost to evaporation and drainage is
very poor. GAP and DSI officials recognize this mistake and
for upcoming irrigation projects plan to use pressurized pipe
systems that are 50% more costly but should significantly
reduce salinity build-up in the soil.

4. (SBU) The largest GAP irrigation project is just north of
the Syrian border in the Harran plain, which gets its water
from the Ataturk dam via two 23 foot high tunnels that run
for 26 kilometers. Local farmers pay DSI nothing for the
water and its transportation to Harran. The only charge is
levied by the 22 water user associations that collect water
fees to maintain the local irrigation infrastructure. The
president of one association explained that the associations
do not charge by the volume of water farmers use but by the
number of hectares they are farming. (Comment: This water
price scheme represents an enormous state subsidy to the
Harran farmers and encourages individual farmers to use
excessive water.) The president said his association
recognizes the flaw in the pricing system and plans to begin
charging by the volume of water used. He said his farmers
have recently received training and are making better
decisions. For example, he claimed that in his area, until
2003, 95% of the land was used to grow cotton; in just two
years that percentage has declined to 30%.

The Politics of Water

5. (SBU) MFA DDG Mithat Rende, who coordinates Turkey's
transnational water policy, told Lawson that Turkey is
looking for ways to encourage cooperation among the
Tigris-Euphrates riparian countries. However, he emphasized
that the process must start slowly since "there is no trust
among the countries." He raised again Turkey's frustration
that Iraq had ignored an MFA request for water data. (Note:
Turkey requested data in 2001 and repeated the request in
2004. End Note.) Lawson informed Rende that recently
Embassy Baghdad personnel had discussed this with Iraqi Water
Minister al-Rashid, who had been unaware of the request but
promised to respond immediately. Rende said that once a
reply was received, the MFA would then be prepared to
consider Rashid's request for a bilateral technical meeting
(ref a). Lawson added that the U.S. could play a helpful
role in building cooperation if Turkey and Iraq are
interested. Rende said Turkey would appreciate U.S. help as
a facilitator of cooperation, and he was eager to receive any
U.S. proposals for technical activities that could serve to
build confidence among the parties.

6. (SBU) Faruk Demir, a former national security advisor to
PM Erdogan, explained that water policy has long been a chief
foreign policy concern for Turkey. In the past, Turkey has
viewed water (especially Turkey's control of the
Tigris-Euphrates headwaters) as a weapon to deter hostile
policies in Iraq and Syria, and it has explored ways to use
Turkey's water resources commercially. According to Demir,
Turkey's water policy has not been successful in the past
because of Turkey's insecurity -- the fear that any change to
the status quo would open Turkey up to losing its current
advantage. He was especially critical of the Erdogan
government, which does not consider water a national security
priority and has no clearly articulated policy. And the MFA
is concerned mainly with preserving the status quo -- "the
MFA never says no, but rarely implements its yes's."
Therefore, any change in Turkey's conservative policy will
have to come from the Prime Minister, he concluded.

7. (SBU) In a lunch, Former DSI president Dogan Altinbilek
and academics Aysegul Kibarioglu and Huseyn Bagci from Middle
East Technical University told us that conditions for
cooperation on the Tigris-Euphrates are better than they have
been in decades. During the Saddam regime, Iraq claimed that
100% of its territory was suitable for irrigation and
therefore Iraq had a right to a much larger share of the
Tigris-Euphrates water. When Altinbilek was president of
DSI, then Turkish President Demirel was a hard-liner on water
issues and considered the MFA too soft. At one point,
Demirel asked Altinbilek if DSI could divert the Euphrates
river to supply water to central Turkey and thereby
demonstrate Turkey's ability to cut off water to Syria and
Iraq. Altinbilek agreed that confidence-building steps were
necessary before real cooperation and joint management of the
basin could be accomplished. Once that happens, the three
countries can realize tremendous benefits and efficiencies
from jointly managing their shared water resources, he added.

Comment

8. (SBU) Turkish officials understand the importance of
cooperation among the riparian countries of the
Tigris-Euphrates basin. However, the lack of mutual trust
and the cautious approach of Turkish officials means that
cooperation will have to start slowly. A prompt and detailed
response by the Iraqi side to the Turkish request for Iraqi
water data would be a first small step in a long process of
easing suspicion and frustration. Both Iraq and Turkey have
expressed their interest in cooperation, and Turkey has
indicated recently a desire to be more supportive of U.S.
objectives in Iraq. It therefore appears to be a good time
to test whether Turkey is serious about cooperation and
propose one or two USG-funded confidence-building projects
(see ref b).
EDELMAN

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