Cablegate: U/S Burns Meets with Senior Goc Officials And
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 007361
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD PHUM CO VE BR SP
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH SENIOR GOC OFFICIALS AND
FORMER MINDEF
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 B & D.
1. (U) July 26, 2005, 8:00-10:30 pm, Ambassador's Residence,
Bogota.
2. (U) Participants:
U.S.
----
R. Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political Affairs
Ambassador William B. Wood
DCM Milton K. Drucker
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Political Counselor
Cynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant
Brian Walch, POL, notetaker
Colombia
---------
Jorge Humberto Botero, Commerce Minister
Juan Lozano, Presidential Counselor
Jaime Bermudez, Presidential Communications Director
Jorge Alberto Uribe, former Minister of Defense.
3. (C) Summary: U/S Burns and Ambassador met over dinner on
July 26 with Commerce Minister Jorge Humberto Botero,
Presidential Counselor Juan Lozano, Presidential
Communications Director Jaime Bermudez, and former Defense
Minister Jorge Alberto Uribe. U/S Burns stressed the
importance of progress on human rights and timely and
transparent implementation of the demobilization law. He
also noted the Secretary's keen interest in setting a
positive agenda with democratic nations in Latin America.
The GOC officials and ex-Minister Uribe expressed concern
over Venezuelan President Chavez, including the GOV's recent
arms purchases and potential illegal channeling of money to
Colombian political campaigns. Botero expressed concern over
the delay and the "lack of content" in USTR's most recent
reply to Colombian concerns on agriculture in the FTA
context. With the apparent exception of Botero, all were
guardedly optimistic about the prospects for a favorable
Constitutional Court ruling on Presidential reelection. End
Summary.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOBILIZATION LAW
-----------------------------------
4. (C) Ambassador hosted a dinner for U/S Burns on July 26
with Commerce Minister Jorge Humberto Botero, Presidential
Counselor Juan Lozano, Presidential Communications Director
Jaime Bermudez, and former Defense Minister Jorge Alberto
Uribe. U/S Burns noted the close relationship of Colombia
and the U.S. He added that the certification of Colombia's
human rights record had been held up pending his report to
the Secretary after this trip. U/S Burns explained
Washington's--USG, Congress, and NGOs--keen interest in
progress on key human rights issues, and in particular the
cases of San Jose de Apartado, Mapiripan, and Arauca. He
stated that for many members of Congress, progress on those
cases was key as Congress was considering support for a
successor to Plan Colombia. Regarding the demobilization law
(aka Justice and Peace), U/S Burns noted that the GOC had
gotten off to a slow start in explaining it to relevant
Washington actors. He stressed that timely, transparent, and
rigorous implementation was key. Uribe passionately
explained the need for a balance between peace and
justice/truth, citing his own personal example of the
paramilitaries' and guerrillas' kidnapping 17 members of his
extended family, including his son. Uribe stated his
personal desire for revenge against those who had been
involved in the kidnapping of his son, but continued that
revenge was not in the best interest of the nation. U/S
Burns suggested Colombia be more pro-active in explaining
publicly the complex and compelling public security and
humanitarian situation it has faced for five decades, in an
effort to bring more actors around to its cause.
5. (C) In discussing the demobilization law, the Colombians
explained their view that the law was the best politically
possible compromise between justice and peace. The
demobilization of paramilitaries was urgent, but peace would
not be achieved without incentives to paramilitaries to
demobilize their troops. The Colombians explained the new
law would not pardon paramilitaries and should apply to the
FARC and ELN. Ex-Minister Uribe complained the law was being
judged by people who lived far from Colombia. They did not
have an accurate understanding of the nature and background
of Colombia's conflict. U/S Burns urged prompt, vigorous
application of the law. He also insisted that paramilitary
leaders must be prosecuted and jailed for their crimes.
CHAVEZ A PROBLEM
----------------
6. (C) U/S Burns told the group that Secretary Rice had
returned from her March visit to Latin America and meeting
with President Uribe energized to improve U.S. relations with
Latin America. She had welcomed President Uribe's
observations on the region, in particular the need to deal
constructively with responsible center-left legitimate
democracies in the region. U/S Burns solicited the group's
views on Venezuelan President Chavez. Uribe expressed
concern over Russian and Spanish arms sales--in particular
rifles--to Venezuela. He asked rhetorically why Venezuela
needed the arms and predicted that one day they would
threaten Colombia. U/S Burns recounted his recent
discussions with Spanish officials on the subject, lamenting
that the Spanish appeared to lack a strategic rationale for
having made the sales. U/S Burns noted the only argument
seemed to be that the manufacture of the weapons generated
employment and this was an insufficient justification.
Botero felt that Brazilian President Lula was uncomfortable
with Chavez's attempts to overplay their close relations.
Botero cited the Andean Community of Nations Summit as an
example of Chavez's bizarre behavior: Chavez justified his
socialist views by claiming that Christ was a socialist, but
Judas was a capitalist. Bermudez believed Chavez was
beginning to channel money to leftist political campaigns in
Colombia in advance of 2006 Congressional and Presidential
elections. All concurred that Chavez's control of
institutions was total, and that his mental stability is in
doubt.
MORE THAN JUST PUBLIC SECURITY
------------------------------
7. (C) Bermudez outlined "five principles" guiding the GOC's
approach, and suggested they could be an example for other
nations in the hemisphere: improved public security, more
transparent institutions, enhanced individual liberties,
stronger social cohesion, and a more level playing field for
political participation (using the term "guarantees," or
"garantias" in Spanish). Lozano qualified Uribe
Administration economic policies as pro-growth, with an eye
toward bringing economic opportunity to the lower classes,
which would reduce incentives to traffic narcotics and/or
enter illegal armed groups (IAGs). In this context, he
stressed the large increase in adolescents and young adults
trained in technical vocations -- some 2.9 million in 2004
alone. Botero highlighted expansion of micro-credit
programs.
CONCERN OVER FTA NEGOTIATIONS
-----------------------------
8. (C) Botero complained about USTR's written response to
Colombian agricultural concerns in the context of FTA
negotiations. He lamented that after taking five weeks to
respond, the USTR paper did not address all of Colombia's
questions, and arrived only a week before the Crawford
meeting between Presidents Bush and Uribe.
REELECTION STILL A QUESTION MARK
--------------------------------
9. (C) In discussing the pending Constitutional Court ruling
on Presidential reelection, Bermudez and Lozano were the most
confident, expecting the Court to allow reelection to stand.
Uribe and Botero were more guarded, however, suggesting that
a hybrid decision was possible, namely allowing reelection
but only in a non-consecutive term fashion. Uribe suggested
the issue was like the flip of a coin, indicating anything
was possible with the polemic and activist Court.
10. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this cable.
DRUCKER