Cablegate: Embassy Support for Ambassador Speckhard

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007116

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR MICHELLE COHEN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA APER IZ JO
SUBJECT: EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR AMBASSADOR SPECKHARD

REF: BAGHDAD 03608

1. Embassy Amman welcomes the visit of Ambassador Daniel V.
Speckhard to Amman, Jordan from September 7-8, 2005, and will
work with Embassy Baghdad to arrange meetings, as requested
reftel.

2. Point of contact for this visit will be Greg Lawless,
office 962-6-590-6557/6558; mobile 962-79-522-0909; fax
962-6-592-7653; email LawlessGF@state.gov or
LawlessGMS@state.sgov.gov.

3. Valid visas are required for entry into Jordan. Visas
may be obtained at the Queen Alia Airport. However, Embassy
suggests visitors obtain their visas prior to arrival, as
there can be long lines for visa issuance at the airport.
Money can be exchanged at the Queen Alia Airport.

4. Post understands that reservations have already been made
at the Le Royal Hotel in Amman. Due to security concerns in
Jordan (para 6) visitors and TDY personnel are assigned
hotels on a rotational basis. Therefore, Embassy Amman will
make the final decision on hotel accommodations for all
visitors.

5. Each visitor, regardless of length of stay, must have
fiscal data to pay for direct costs of the visit. Each
agency, organization, or visiting delegation will be charged
for the actual costs attributed to the visit. Direct charge
costs include, but are not limited to: American and LES
overtime (for such services as airport expediting, cashier
accommodation exchange, control room staffing,
representational event support), travel and per diem costs
incurred by post personnel in support of visitors' field
travel, rental of vehicles and other equipment, long distance
telephone calls, office supplies, gasoline and other vehicle
maintenance costs, departure tax, and other airport fees.

6. Threat assessment:

Since late 1999, there has been a series of serious,
confirmed terrorist threats and disrupted terrorist plots
targeting U.S. interests in Jordan. Transnational terrorist
groups, as well as less sophisticated local elements, have
demonstrated the capability to pose threats here.
Anti-western sentiment, though less pronounced since the end
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, has been sparked on occasion by
regional events, particularly those related to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, to a lesser extent, Iraq.

In May 2004, two men were arrested for plotting to
assassinate diplomats in Amman, including an American Embassy
employee. In April 2004, Jordanian authorities disrupted a
plan to attack the American Embassy and Jordanian government
buildings with explosive-laden vehicles.

In September 2003, 13 were arrested for plotting attacks
against U.S. and Jordanian targets, including the American
Embassy in Amman. In May 2003, three persons connected to the
Zarqawi network were arrested for planning attacks against
foreigners and tourist sites. The October 28, 2002
assassination of a U.S. diplomat in Amman outside his
residence was ultimately linked to the Zarqawi network.
Jordanian authorities arrested the assassins in December
2002. The most recently published U.S. government security
alerts state that extremist groups continue to plan terrorist
attacks against U.S. interests worldwide.

Crime is generally not a serious problem for travelers in
Jordan, although petty theft is common in the downtown Amman
Hashimiyah Square area and near the Roman amphitheater. In
the narrow streets of the old city and at some of the more
popular tourist sites, crowded conditions invite pickpockets
and other petty criminals. We urge travelers to be more
guarded in these areas so that they do not present easy
opportunities to criminals. Purse snatchings in central and
western Amman are reportedly on the increase. In several
cases, thieves in moving vehicles snatched pedestrians,
purses and drove off. In some instances, victims were
injured when they were unable to free themselves from their
purses. When carrying a purse, it would be wise to conceal it
if possible, to avoid walking near the road within reach of
passing vehicles, and to walk towards the flow of traffic.

7. Travel guidelines:

American citizens traveling in Jordan should exercise
caution, be alert and stay informed of regional and local
events that could quickly impact the security environment in
the country. Travelers should avoid large crowds and
demonstrations and take measures to avoid areas where they
are most likely to occur (city centers, universities, refugee
camps), particularly during periods of increased tension. It
is also recommended to maintain a low profile and not
establish predictable patterns of movement, even if only
visiting for a short period. Recent worldwide USG security
announcements continue to alert American travelers that
terrorists do not distinguish between official and civilian
targets. Therefore, facilities where Americans or foreigners
are likely to congregate such as hotels, nightspots,
restaurants, and places of worship should be considered as
potential targets. Travelers should stay alert when
attendance at such locations is necessary. Taxis are the
only form of public transportation that is recommended.
As Jordan is a predominantly Muslim country, cultural
sensitivities should be observed. Female travelers should
dress conservatively and not travel alone, particularly in
areas where western visitors are uncommon. Western visitors
and residents have reported incidents of sexual harassment,
assault and unwelcome advances of a sexual nature. Such
incidents, while troubling, are not common.

8. For further information, see the State Department's
Consular Information Sheet for Jordan at
http://travel.state.gov/jordan.html and link from that site
to the most recent Public Announcement on Travel in the
Middle East and South Asia and the most recent Worldwide
Caution.
HALE

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