Cablegate: Air France Addresses Letter to Ambassador On July

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006109

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR EB/TRA/OTP, S/CT AND EUR/WE
DHS FOR TSA, ICE/CBP, AND ICE/FOREIGN OPS
FBIHQ FOR OIO SC MICHAEL WELCH
CTD/TSOU FOR SSA MICHAEL CAPUTO
TSC FOR DONNA BUCELLA

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAIR PTER FR
SUBJECT: AIR FRANCE ADDRESSES LETTER TO AMBASSADOR ON JULY
FLIGHT DIVERSION

REFS: A) Paris 4921

NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION

1. (SBU) Summary: In an August 29 letter to Ambassador, Air
France CEO Jean-Cyril Spinetta raised a number of concerns
about the July 8 diversion of AF flight 50 to Chicago due to
the presence of a passenger on the "no-fly" list (reftel).
He argues that Air France followed TSA procedures in this
case, yet has born substantial costs to its treasury and
reputation. A summary of the letter follows in paragraphs 2
and 3, with the text included in paragraph 4. Post intends
to respond to the letter based on the points suggested in
paragraph 5. End Summary

2. (SBU) Spinetta points out that passenger Abed Khalifeh
had a valid US passport, was not on the no-fly list used by
AF to screen passengers for this flight, and could not have
been matched to selectee list because the entry birthdate
did not match. He also notes that Khalifeh was able to
return to the U.S. the following day without a problem.
Moreover, his reservation had been made over a month before;
in spite of the cost to AF, Spinetta believes that U.S.
authorities had access to PNR data for over a month yet
apparently made no use of information that should have
pointed to a problem. All of this indicates the probability
of "a mistake by TSA." AF cannot accept repetition of such
mistakes, which have occurred several times in the past two
years without AF being at fault. He is "particularly
surprised" at the disproportionate number of such incidents
that have affected AF. They are costly (in this case 368,734
Euros) and are hurting its reputation.

3. (SBU) In addition, Spinetta requests information about
how the USG proposes to compensate AF for the "prejudice" it
has suffered. He also complains about a TSA press release
indicating that AF had boarded a "positive hit," and says AF
would like the right to correct the record. He closes by
evoking AF's desire to pursue "positive and efficient"
cooperation with TSA and CBP; and suggests that a
"constructive dialogue" leading to better understanding is
necessary. He proposes that contacts both in Washington and
Paris be intensified in order to achieve "precise and
efficient operational processes" that can avoid such
incidents in the future.

4. (SBU) Unofficial translation of Air France Chairman
Spinetta's letter:

Mr. Ambassador:

As you have just taken up your functions, I regret bringing
up, in my first letter to you, a very disturbing matter for
Air France. I nevertheless take the liberty to do so in the
hope that you will understand.

On July 8, 2005, AF flight 050 bound for Chicago was refused
entry into U.S. airspace in mid-flight. Air France
management ordered the flight Captain to return to CDG
airport because one of the passengers on board was on the
"no fly list," which is regularly furnished to us by U.S.
authorities.

This case leads me to provide you with additional
information on the way the incident unfolded and on the
costs borne by Air France on this occasion.

The passenger in question, Mr. Abed Khalifeh, born on
January 1, 1960, was in possession of a passport valid under
existing U.S. regulations. He had made the reservations for
himself and his family over a month before the flight.

According to existing procedures, the list of passengers of
AF flight 050 had been checked against the "no fly list",
and no anomaly was or could have been detected since the
family name, first name and date of birth of our passenger
were completely different from those of the people on the
list.

Furthermore, and contrary to allegations by the TSA,
published in the American press as early as July 8, we
proceeded in the same manner with the "selectee list," and
were unable to identify him as a "selectee" for the same
reasons outlined previously (different date of birth, i.e.
1980 instead of 1960).

It is worth noting that Mr. Abed Khalifeh and his family
finally flew to Chicago the following day, on our July 9 AF
flight 050, without any problem this time.

I will add that Mr. Abed Khalifeh had made reservations on
June 3, 2005 on flight AF 050 of July 8, and that no
modification in his travel record had taken place between
reservation and check-in procedures.

I would further like to point out that as of March 5, 2003,
both the CBP and the TSA have access to all the records of
Air France passengers traveling from and to the United
States.
While the U.S. authorities performed over 2 million
transactions on passenger name record (PNR) data concerning
Air France passengers during the month of June at a cost to
Air France of some 26,000 Euros, and while these same
authorities had more than a month to trace the passenger
under suspicion, Air France was neither alerted nor informed
about him. This obviously raises serious questions about
the interest of making our PNR data available, when it is
evidently of no particular use, as illustrated in this
particular case.

General efforts by Air France to meet U.S. regulatory
requirements, and permanent efforts by our staff to improve
our responsiveness in cooperation with U.S. authorities,
should have prevented such an incident, which would appear
to originate in an error by the TSA.

Air France cannot possibly accept that such errors be
repeated, since for almost two years many of our flights to
the U.S. have been similarly disrupted, without any known
error on our part. I would further like to note that it is
particularly surprising that Air France flights represent
such an important part -- almost half -- of all commercial
flights to the U.S., either cancelled, re-routed or banned.

Finally, the impact of this case, in terms of financial
costs and bad publicity, cannot be ignored.

As you may know, turning a commercial aircraft around
produces additional costs, related to the replacement of the
crew in accordance with the French Civil Aviation Code,
aircraft assistance, fees, compensation to passengers,
financial losses, flight delays affecting subsequent
flights. The decision to turn around this flight has cost
us 368,734 Euros. We would greatly appreciate knowing what
U.S. authorities intend to do to compensate Air France for
the financial prejudice incurred.

Furthermore, the cost of such an operation on Air France's
image is considerable. Although it is normally accepted
that no comment related to this type of event should ever be
relayed to the media, the TSA published a press release
asserting that "a passenger of the federal no fly list had
been authorized to board the Air France flight to Chicago,
that this time it was a positive hit," which greatly altered
the image of the company.

Even though part of the press in the U.S. reported the TSA's
mistake, Air France believes it should enjoy a right to
correct the record, in order to polish its tarnished image
in the U.S.

You are familiar with the difficulties encountered by all
carriers over the past few years to meet growing operating
costs, resulting from the oil price hike, as well as safety
and security-related expenses. While we remain convinced of
the need to continue together our fight against the scourge
of the 21st century we know as terrorism with the utmost
energy, we cannot allow the commercial activities of Air
France to be periodically disturbed by decisions that do not
appear to be fully justified. The frequent and repetitive
nature of these incidents is extremely detrimental to us in
most of our markets.

At Air France, we have always endeavored to make our
cooperation with the CBP and the TSA as positive and
efficient as possible. It has however become more and more
evident that a constructive dialogue aimed at a greater
mutual understanding needs to be established.

My colleagues have met many times with U.S. officials in
Washington as well as in Paris. These meetings were
designed to convey as clearly as possible the daily problems
we encountered. I would like to propose a rapid increase in
the number of these working sessions to achieve the
establishment of precise and efficient operational
procedures, which will in turn prevent any further such
incident from occurring.

Supervised by competent French authorities for almost four
years now, Air France has made efforts to follow all the
successive requests of the U.S. Administration relating to
security, as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We
respected the spirit and the letter, in a climate of trust
backed-up by substantial investment. I do not want to see
these efforts compromised by inadequate and costly
decisions.

Complimentary closing.

5. (SBU) Proposed points for use in reply:

--We understand the concerns expressed in your letter. Air
France is a valued business partner of the United States and
an important participant in the fight against terrorism.

--We have never sought to place blame on Air France for this
incident. It is inevitable that at times last-minute
information leads to airlines not possessing the latest
version of the list, which is updated several times daily.
The passenger in question was added to the No-Fly list late
on July 6 based on information developed in the days
immediately preceding the flight. After subsequent
evaluation of all the information pertaining to him, he was
downgraded to a selectee the following day and permitted to
fly home.

--We recognize the particular burden that has fallen on Air
France due to repeated flight diversions, and want to do
everything we can to avoid them in the future. In a few
cases these were the product of unfortunate circumstances
that placed suspicion on travelers that later proved to be
unnecessary. In other cases however we would point out that
lack of notification by Air France led to flights being
diverted. For that reason, we are concerned that Air
France's inability to implement the Selectee Emergency
Amendment (EA) without French Government approval may
increase the risk of future diversions. We would like to
work with you to ensure that full application of TSA
security procedures, including particularly Selectee and
Master Crew Lists, helps minimize the risk of flight
diversions in the future.

--We share your desire for closer cooperation in order to
improve security procedures and diminish the risk of future
flight diversions. TSA has provided additional support to
assist Air France with this, and we encourage you to contact
Embassy representatives whenever you have questions about
required procedures or need to resolve ambiguities about
whether passengers names are on our watch lists. This will
permit us to better understand Air France's operating
procedures and particular concerns, and we are hopeful that
it will help us to develop solutions that meet the needs of
all concerned.

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