Cablegate: Sri Lanka: Avian Flu Tripwires and Shelter-In-
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 002121
SIPDIS
STATE FOR OIE DANIEL SINGER AND REBECCA S DALEY
STATE FOR SA/INS
S/ES-O/CMS - OFFICE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
E.O 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMED AEMR AMGT ASEC CASC EAGR KFLO TBIO ECON CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: AVIAN FLU TRIPWIRES AND SHELTER-IN-
PLACE PLANS
REF: A) COLOMBO 1592, B) COLOMBO 1992, C) COLOMBO 1993,
D) STATE 219189
1. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE REPORTS OUR REVISED AVIAN
INFLUENZA (AI OR H5N1) TRIPWIRES AND SHELTER-IN-PLACE
PLANS REQUESTED IN REF D. THIS CABLE SUPERSEDES REF C.
2. SRI LANKA LACKS SEVERAL CRITICAL RESOURCES -
TAMIFLU, LABORATORY EQUIPMENT TO IDENTIFY AI, AND
MODERN, FULLY EQUIPPED HOSPITALS. IF AI COULD BE
DIAGNOSED RAPIDLY AND IN A DEFINED AREA OF SRI LANKA,
THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT (GSL) COULD OSTENSIBLY CONTAIN
AI. WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE ACTIVELY DEVELOPING
PLANS AND SEEKING RESOURCES. YET AI IS NOT A HIGH
PRIORITY WITHIN THE GSL. DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES AND
STAFFING OF MINISTRIES FOLLOWING A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
AS WELL AS A TENUOUS CEASEFIRE, TAKE HIGHER GSL PRIORITY
THAN AI PREPAREDNESS. POST ANTICIPATES IT IS ABLE TO
PROVIDE SHELTER IN PLACE FOR SEGREGATING PERSONNEL BY
UTILIZING THE CHANCERY AND HOMES AS DETAILED IN THE
TRIPWIRES. DRAWDOWN MAY BEGIN IN TRIPWIRE 3 - WITH
SUSTAINED HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION OCCURRING IN
COUNTRIES WITH REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLIGHTS TO SRI LANKA.
END SUMMARY.
3. US EMBASSY COLOMBO'S REVISED TRIPWIRES WERE PREPARED
BY POST'S AVIAN INFLUENZA WORKING GROUP (AIWG) AND HAVE
BEEN APPROVED BY THE CHIEF OF MISSION. WE INVITE AND
WELCOME FEEDBACK FROM RELEVANT OFFICES AND AGENCIES WITH
EXPERTISE IN EMERGENCY PLANNING AND/OR INFLUENZA.
4. POST'S ADMINISTRATIVE COUNSELOR, FOREIGN SERVICE
MEDICAL OFFICER, ECONOMIC OFFICER, CHIEF OF CONSULAR
SECTION AND AID HEALTH AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM OFFICER ARE MEMBERS OF THE AIWG. IN ADDITION
TO CONSULTING WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MULTILATERAL
REPRESENTATIVES (REFS A AND B) AND PREPARING THESE
TRIPWIRES, POST HAS DISTRIBUTED AN ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE
TO ALL PERSONNEL REGARDING AI SYMPTOMS AND PREVENTIVE
MEASURES. THE CONSULAR SECTION HAS ALSO INCLUDED A LINK
TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AVIAN FLU FACT SHEET WITHIN ITS
MEDICAL INFORMATION PAGE FOUND AT:
HTTP://SRILANKA.USEMBASSY.GOV/MEDICAL_INFORMA TION.HTML.
THE AIWG WILL CONTINUE PLANNING FOR A POSSIBLE PANDEMIC,
INCLUDING REFINEMENT OF PROGRAMS AVAILABLE TO EMBASSY
PERSONNEL IN THE EVENT OF A PANDEMIC.
5. THE FOLLOWING AMERICAN CITIZEN EMPLOYEES WILL BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR INPUTTING THE TRIPWIRE DATA: ALEXIS
SMITH, ELSA BRITT, AND CAROLINA RUDISEL.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
---------------
6. THE AIWG HAS MADE THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS FOR
PLANNING PURPOSES:
- THE CURRENT THREAT TO PERSONS IN SRI LANKA, AND USG
PERSONNEL IN PARTICULAR, IS LOW. NO BIRD HAS YET BEEN
DIAGNOSED WITH AI IN SRI LANKA. THE CONTINGENT RISK IS
THAT H5N1 BEGINS TO TRANSMIT ACTIVELY BETWEEN HUMANS.
RISK WOULD BE MANAGEABLE IF HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION
OCCURRED ONLY IN CASES OF EXTENSIVE INTIMATE CONTACT.
TRANSMISSION BY CASUAL HUMAN-TO-HUMAN CONTACT WOULD
REQUIRE RAPID ACTION TO PROTECT OUR PERSONNEL.
- THERE IS A LOW PROBABILITY THAT SRI LANKA WOULD BE AT
THE CENTER OF ANY OUTBREAK OF HUMAN-TO-HUMAN AI
INFECTION. BUT IF CASUAL CONTACT WOULD RESULT IN AI
INFECTION, SRI LANKA IS ONLY A SHORT AIRLINE FLIGHT AWAY
FROM PROBABLE OUTBREAK CENTERS. DUE TO THESE FACTORS,
WE CHOSE TO DEFINE THREE SEPARATE TRIPWIRE LEVELS FOR
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALL FALL WITHIN IN THE EXAMPLE
TRIPWIRE 1 FOUND IN REF D.
- SRI LANKA'S CAPITAL CITY, COLOMBO, IS ALSO ITS
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION HUB. VIRTUALLY ALL
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL BEGINS OR ENDS WITHIN 20 MILES OF
COLOMBO'S CITY CENTER. ANTICIPATING THAT HUMAN-TO-HUMAN
AI WOULD MUTATE IN THE HIGH-RISK PARTS OF THE WORLD FOR
AI AND ARRIVE THROUGH THESE TRANSIT CHANNELS, WE
CONSIDER SUSTAINED HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION IN ANY
PART OF SRI LANKA AS EQUALLY THREATENING TO OUR
PERSONNEL. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
INFECTION WITHIN RURAL AREAS AND THE CAPITAL CITY AS
FOUND IN SAMPLE TRIPWIRES 2 AND 3 OF REF D.
- SRI LANKAN MEDICAL FACILITIES ARE ALREADY NEAR
CAPACITY EVEN WITHOUT AN EPIDEMIC OF ANY SORT. MEDICAL
FACILITIES WILL BE UNABLE TO HANDLE A LIMITED NUMBER OF
CASES. THERE ARE NO ENTIRELY SUITABLE ISOLATION WARDS
SHOULD H5N1 HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION BECOME HIGHLY
EFFICIENT.
- DEPENDING ON THE SPEED OF A HUMAN-TO-HUMAN OUTBREAK,
U.S. CITIZENS COULD BE QUICKLY CUT OFF FROM EVACUATION
ROUTES.
- POST WOULD BE UNABLE TO OBTAIN ESSENTIAL MEDICAL AND
BASIC SUPPLIES IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS AND SHOULD
STOCKPILE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS.
CURRENT PREPARATORY ACTIONS
---------------------------
7. IN ADDITION TO REGULAR MEETINGS OF THE AIWG AND
SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS BY THE EAC, POST IS TAKING OR
CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR A
POSSIBLE AI PANDEMIC:
- BEGIN REGULAR COMMUNICATION WITH OVERSEAS SCHOOL OF
COLOMBO AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS USED BY US
FAMILIES AT THE EMBASSY ON THEIR AI PREPARATIONS AND
PLANS.
- PREPARE FOR POTENTIAL NEED FOR PERSONNEL TO WORK AT
HOME AND COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR CONTACTS FROM SHELTER-IN-
PLACE LOCATIONS.
- THE COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICER AND MEDICAL OFFICER WILL
PREPARE A LIST OF BEST PRACTICES FOR EVACUATION -
WHETHER FOR AN AI-RELATED EMERGENCY OR OTHER FOR
PURPOSES.
- DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN A LIST OF PERSONAL EMAIL
ADDRESSES OF USG PERSONNEL IN CASE OF EMBASSY SHUTDOWN
AND/OR NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH PERSONNEL AT SHELTER-IN-
PLACE LOCATIONS.
- PREPARE LIST OF AI-SPECIFIC ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND
PREPARE FOR POTENTIAL NEED TO LODGE SUCH PERSONNEL AT
CHANCERY. (NOTE: DUE TO THE NATURE OF A HEALTH-RELATED
EMERGENCY AND POSSIBLE SHELTERING OF ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL
AT THE CHANCERY, THIS LIST WILL DIFFER FROM THE REGULAR
LIST OF ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL. END NOTE.)
- DEVELOP SMS CAPABILITY FOR EMBASSY TO EFFICIENTLY
COMMUNICATE WITH EMBASSY COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN
CITIZENS.
- TRAVEL ORDER PACKETS ARE ALREADY PREPARED SHOULD
EVACUATION BE REQUIRED.
TRIPWIRES AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
---------------------------------
THE CHIEF OF MISSION HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING
TRIPWIRES AND POSSIBLE ASSOCIATED ACTIONS:
8. TRIPWIRE ONE: SIGNIFICANT OCCURRENCES OF AI
TRANSMITTED FROM BIRDS OR OTHER ANIMALS TO OTHER BIRDS
OR ANIMALS EMERGE IN SRI LANKA; NO EVIDENCE OF SUSTAINED
TRANSMISSION TO HUMANS. (Note: "Significant
occurrences" include transmission to a population of non-
migratory birds or animals within a geographically
limited area or transmission in more than one area of
the country. "Sustained transmission to humans" is the
transmission of disease beyond the situation where a
single infected person transmits to another single
person with whom he/she is in extremely close physical
contact, e.g., sick child to mother. End Note.)
POSSIBLE ACTIONS:
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed.
- Restrict official and unofficial travel to affected
areas, bird markets and similar facilities.
- Reiterate current Center for Disease Control (CDC)
recommendations to staff and post's food service
regarding AI prevention: reinforce caution against
consuming improperly cooked eggs or poultry meat as well
as advise on proper handling of raw poultry products;
advise people to avoid butcher or wet markets where
poultry is prepared; consider issuing further
recommendations regarding preparation or consumption of
poultry.
- In coordination with the Department, release a warning
announcement to Mission personnel and a warden message
to private US citizens and post the announcement on the
website.
- Hold a town hall meeting with the American community
to discuss AI and other topics of interest.
- Continue regular communication with Overseas School of
Colombo and other international schools used by US
families at the embassy on their AI preparations and
plans.
9. TRIPWIRE TWO: ANY CASE OF BIRD-TO-HUMAN OR ANIMAL-
TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION OF AI IN SRI LANKA
POSSIBLE ACTIONS:
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed.
- Restrict travel to affected areas.
- Release a warning announcement to Mission personnel,
and in coordination with the Department, release a
warden message to private US citizens; post the
announcement on the website. Information will include
details of the episode, instructions on watching for
signs and symptoms of avian influenza, triage criteria
and the use of personal protective equipment.
- Ensure that any public announcements or warnings
issued relating to neighboring countries regarding AI
are disseminated with American citizens in host country.
("Neighboring countries" include both countries
geographically near as well as those with direct flights
to or from Sri Lanka.)
- Begin stockpiling water and canned goods to prepare
for possible need to quarantine individuals returning
from areas where human-to-human transmission may occur
(i.e., prepare for Tripwire 3).
- Instruct Embassy community regarding the medical
response and Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Plan.
- Continue regular communication with Overseas School of
Colombo and other international schools used by US
families at the embassy on their AI preparations and
plans.
10. TRIPWIRE THREE: SUSTAINED HUMAN-TO-HUMAN
TRANSMISSION OCCURS AS EVIDENCED BY A CLUSTER OF CASES
IN COUNTRIES WITH REGULARLY SCHEDULED DIRECT FLIGHTS TO
SRI LANKA (E.G., CHINA, INDIA, MALDIVES, THAILAND)
POSSIBLE ACTIONS:
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed.
- EAC considers requesting authorized departure of U.S.
family members and non-essential personnel, potentially
recommending authorized departure of only individuals at
high risk for AI.
- Consider recalling all employees who are currently in
remote areas
- Personnel who have frequent contact with the public
will use protective gear including masks, according to
MED guidance.
- Restrict travel to affected countries.
- Do not grant country clearances to non-emergency TDY
personnel from or transiting affected countries.
- Conduct home visits to sick individuals who receive
care under the Embassy health unit.
- Quarantine USG and Foreign Service National (FSN)
personnel who are returning to Sri Lanka from affected
countries for two weeks or for the predetermined time of
virus incubation.
- Order mandatory sick leave with enforced quarantine at
home for any employee who shows any flu-like symptoms or
has a family member with flu-like symptoms.
- In coordination with the Department, issue a public
announcement to private American citizens.
- In coordination with the Department, prepare press
guidance.
- Continue communication with Overseas School of Colombo
and other international schools used by US families at
the embassy on their AI policies.
- Establish daily briefings on AI status/cases with
Ministry of Health or WHO.
- Close American Center Library to public access.
11. TRIPWIRE FOUR: SUSTAINED HUMAN-TO-HUMAN
TRANSMISSION IN SRI LANKA
POSSIBLE ACTIONS:
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed
(perhaps by phone or email).
- In consultation with CA, provide emergency consular
services only.
- Cancel incoming official travel, except for personnel
involved in investigative/containment efforts, or as
otherwise deemed necessary by COM.
- EAC considers requesting authorized departure. EAC
discusses ordered departure (on the assumption that the
airlines will take passengers from countries where human-
to-human transmission has occurred).
- Consider options for minimizing workplace exposure
(e.g., teleconferencing).
- Instruct all non-emergency American and LES staff at
post to remain home on administrative leave. Children
shall remain home from school.
- Order mandatory sick leave with enforced quarantine at
home of any employee who shows any flu-like symptom or
has a family member with flu-like symptoms.
- Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependent
who has been in contact with a person confirmed to have
an AI infection and implement at home monitoring
procedure.
- Conduct home visits to sick individuals who receive
care under the Embassy health unit.
- Permit visitors embassy access for emergency purposes
only.
- Consider using designated space to isolate emergency
personnel (those not on leave) to prevent risk of
transmitting to families or to others who are on leave.
- Divide Marine Security Guard detachment into two
separate and independent entities to decrease the risk
of the spread of the disease and ensure proper coverage
of classified materials.
- Consider delivery services of groceries and other
essential items to residences.
- Personnel who have frequent contact with the public
will use protective gear including masks as directed by
MED.
- Cancel local community gatherings until confirming
there are no immediate further occurrences of cases in
Sri Lanka.
- Advise closure of Overseas School of Colombo and other
international schools used by US families at the
embassy.
- Those personnel who are required to be in direct
contact with potentially infected persons will be
considered as candidates for antiviral prophylaxis.
- Release a warning announcement to Mission personnel,
and in coordination with the Department, provide a
warden message to private US citizens; post the
information on the website. Information will include
details of the episode(s) and advice on means of
prevention, as well as treatment options. Urge American
citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to Sri Lanka.
- Depending on level of public inquiries, Embassy may
staff and equip a situation room.
- Consular officers establish a database tracking
American citizens who have been quarantined,
hospitalized, or ill at home.
- In coordination with Department, prepare press
guidance.
12. TRIPWIRE FIVE: ONE OR MORE EMBASSY OR IN-COUNTRY
PERSONNEL SUSTAIN HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION
POSSIBLE ACTIONS:
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed
(perhaps by phone or email).
- Order mandatory sick leave with enforced quarantine at
home for affected personnel.
- Initiate treatment of affected individuals with
antivirals; medevac if possible.
- Those personnel who are required to be in direct
contact with potentially infected persons will be
considered as candidates for antiviral prophylaxis.
- Release a warning announcement to Mission personnel,
and in coordination with the Department, provide a
warden message to private US citizens; post the
information on the website. Information will include
details of the episode(s) and advice on means of
prevention.
- In coordination with Department, prepare press
guidance.
- Continue all actions listed in Tripwire 4.
13. POST-TRIPWIRE DETERMINATIONS
The AIWG will continue monitoring the situation and
recommend to the EAC when particular threats are no
longer substantial. Advice from in-country contacts as
well as medical and agricultural contacts worldwide will
be used in forming such recommendations.
ENTWISTLE