Cablegate: Argentina: Kirchner Insider On Goa Policy in The

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RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1674

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001610

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
NSC FOR DAN FISK
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016

TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR

SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER INSIDER ON GOA POLICY IN THE

REGION

REF: 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141

Classified By: CDA, a.i., Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 5, the DCM paid a farewell call on

Secretary General of the Presidency (President Nestor

SIPDIS

Kirchner's chief of staff) Oscar Parrilli that included a

frank discussion on GOA policy in the region. Attempting to

clarify Kirchner's recent comments about the U.S. in Madrid,

Parrilli said that Argentina valued U.S. support during the

crisis and that Kirchner wanted a ""mature"" relationship with

the United States. Parrilli's comments reflected the view

that the GOA accepts the idea of the U.S. leadership in the

region, as long as it also benefits Argentina. The DCM

raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that Kirchner's close

relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and

Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his penchant

for slandering President Bush and the USG made it difficult

for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral relations

with the GOA. Parrilli responded by saying the GOA's

relationship with the GOV was based primarily on economics

and Mercosur. The DCM next turned the discussion to Bolivia,

expressing the U.S. concern that Bolivian President Evo

Morales needs to respect Bolivia's constitutional democracy

and cooperate with the U.S. and regional neighbors to control

narcotrafficking. Parrilli said that the GOA shares the U.S.

goal of ensuring President Evo Morales operates within a

democratic framework and said that the two nations should be

very clear with Morales on counternarcotics. On the whole

question of hemispheric free trade, the DCM noted the U.S.

view that the Summit of the Americas was a success in the

sense that a majority of the region -- 29 countries -- said

that they wanted to continue discussions about creating an

FTAA. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) On July 5, the DCM paid a farewell call on Secretary

General of the Presidency Oscar Parrilli that included a

frank discussion on GOA policy in the region. Oscar

Parrilli, President Nestor Kirchner's chief of staff, is a

key Kirchner insider (See Reftel). Parrilli has been a good

contact of the Embassy and is known for his calm disposition,

although he clearly shares the world view of the rest of

Kirchner's inner circle. Parrilli began the discussion by

remarking on the good personal relations the Casa Rosada has

enjoyed over the past three years with the Ambassador and

DCM. The DCM highlighted the strong background of incoming

Ambassador Wayne and corrected the misperception expressed by

some members of the GOA that Ambassador Wayne had praised

former President Carlos Menem during his recent confirmation

hearings.

3. (C) Attempting to clarify Kirchner's recent comments

about the U.S. in Madrid, Parrilli said that Argentina valued

U.S. support during the crisis and that Kirchner wanted a

""mature"" relationship with the United States. ""President

Kirchner has acknowledged this publicly in the past. Despite

our differences, the U.S. has come to Argentina's aid when

Argentina really needed it."" Parrilli said that Argentina,

in turn, can help ensure ""tranquillity"" in the region. He

said that at times in the past, the U.S. has not played the

leadership role necessary in the region. Parrilli said that

Kirchner was referring to this ""historic debt"" of the U.S. in

the region, not necessarily about current U.S. policy. ""What

Kirchner wants is a 'mature' relationship with the U.S.""

Parrilli further commented that ""what crashed in 2001 was not

the de la Rua government, but an economic model. The model

of having your economy owned by foreign interests. Countries

need to be able to defend their rights, their economy.""

(COMMENT: Parrilli's comments reflect the GOA view that they

acknowledge and accept the idea of the U.S. as the natural

leader of the region, but they want that leadership to act in

Argentina's and the region's interests. In particular, he

mentioned that the GOA would like to see more U.S. economic

assistance to the region. END COMMENT.)

4. (C) The DCM raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that

Kirchner's close relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo

BUENOS AIR 00001610 002 OF 003

Chavez and Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his

penchant for slandering President Bush and the USG made it

difficult for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral

relations with the GOA. The DCM said, ""One day Kirchner is

meeting with Chavez, and Chavez may be on good behavior

because Kirchner has asked Chavez to avoid incidents, but the

next day Chavez is calling President Bush a drunkard, a

genocidal maniac and worse than Hitler."" The DCM said that

by so closely associating himself with a leader like Chavez,

Kirchner risks being viewed by Washington as sharing Chavez's

views.

5. (C) Parrilli responded by saying that the GOA's

relationship with the GOV was based primarily on economics

and Mercosur. Parrilli also said that the GOA does not agree

""with the message or the style of Chavez's attacks on

President Bush or the U.S."" Parrilli added, ""Our

relationship with Venezuela is not an axis. Argentina and

Brazil are the two main drivers of regional integration in

South America. We need to include the other big countries in

the region -- Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile -- in this

process.""

6. (C) The DCM next turned the discussion to Bolivia,

expressing the U.S. concern that Bolivian President Evo

Morales needs to respect Bolivia's constitutional democracy

and cooperate with the U.S. and regional neighbors to control

narcotrafficking. Parrilli said that the GOA shares the U.S.

goal of ensuring President Evo Morales operates within a

democratic framework. Parrilli said that Morales is

defending and respecting the rights of the mainly indigenous

voters that elected him, who have been excluded from the

Bolivian political system until now. Parrilli added that ""we

have to hope that Morales is successful."" The DCM noted the

concern that the recent increase in Bolivian coca production

will lead to an increase in cocaine trafficking. Parrilli

agreed that the two nations should be very clear with Morales

on counternarcotics.

7. (C) On the whole question of hemispheric free trade, the

DCM noted the U.S. view that the Summit of the Americas was a

success in the sense that a majority of the region -- 29

countries -- said that they wanted to continue discussions

about creating an FTAA. The DCM said that the Mercosur

objections to the FTAA over agricultural issues at least

leaves room for discussion, while Venezuela was the only

country in the region to object to the FTAA on ideological

grounds. Parrilli responded by saying, ""In the past what you

were offering us in terms of free trade deals was not what

Argentina needed."" The DCM pointed to the benefits of free

trade and noted that NAFTA is no longer an issue for the left

or the right in both Canada and Mexico. ""NAFTA has been a

win-win for all countries involved.""

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COMMENT

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8. (C) Oscar Parrilli shares the leftist world view of most

of Kirchner's inner circle, but like other Casa Rosada

insiders, always appears friendly and cooperative in private

to Embassy officials. Parrilli clearly received the official

talking points on how to respond to questions about

Kirchner's recent statements on the U.S. in Madrid and on GOA

relations with Venezuela, as we have heard Parrilli's

comments on these two issues repeated on several recent

occasions by high-level GOA officials. This continues a long

pattern in the Kirchner administration where GOA officials

tell us what they think we want to hear in private, while

Kirchner's actions and public statements project a different

image to the rest of the world.

9. (C) Although Kirchner's inner circle may not diverge fromthe official line, engaging them is beneficial. Messages

given to them are immediately conveyed to President Kirchner,

and Kirchner uses them to deliver his message to the USG.

With President Kirchner often inaccessible and relying on an

BUENOS AIR 00001610 003 OF 003

ever-shrinking group of close advisors, engaging Kirchner's

inner circle is often the best way to maintain a dialogue

with the GOA. We believe it would be far worse for U.S.

interests to discontinue dialogue with some of the only

people that can still influence Kirchner. END COMMENT.

LLORENS

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