Cablegate: Tfle01: Un Prsg: "Don't Rush" On International

VZCZCXRO0775
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2470/01 2061620
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251620Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4785
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0659
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002470

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PINS PTER MOPS KPKO EAID LE
SUBJECT: TFLE01: UN PRSG: "DON'T RUSH" ON INTERNATIONAL
STABILIZATION FORCE

BEIRUT 00002470 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
-------

1. (C/NF) In a 7/25 conversation, Geir Pedersen, Personal
Representative of the UN Secretary-General (PRSG), emphasized
the importance of showing Lebanon's Shia community that a
domestic political approach to Hizballah's disarmament
remained possible. He recommended that an international
stabilization force -- a successor to UNIFIL in southern
Lebanon -- be "sold" as a means of guaranteeing respect for
the Blue Line, from Lebanon's perspective as well as
Israel's. He cautioned against moving so fast on an
international stabilization force as to derail potential
political means of disarming Hizballah. End summary.

EMPHASIZE TAIF, AVOID RADICALIZING THE SHIAS
--------------------------------------------

2. (C/NF) In a July 25 discussion with the Ambassador and
emboff on the necessary elements for a sustainable end to
ongoing Hizballah-Israeli hostilities, Pedersen agreed that
an emphasis on the 1989 Taif Agreement would be helpful
regarding Hizballah's obligation to disarm. Keeping the
focus on Taif -- the agreement that laid the framework for
post-civil-war governance in Lebanon, and which also called
for the disarmament of all militias -- would convey the point
that a domestic political process should be the primary means
of disarming Hizballah, Pedersen said.

3. (C/NF) Pedersen suggested that the Shia community would
feel less threatened by an emphasis on disarming Hizballah by
political means. What the Lebanese government needed to do,
in his view, was to avoid any steps that radicalized the Shia
community further. The idea to be conveyed to the Shias was
that, regardless of whatever had happened in the past, a
political solution was possible. There was potentially a
role here for Michel Aoun, Pedersen said.

"SELLING" A NEW INTERNATIONAL FORCE
-----------------------------------

4. (C/NF) Pedersen agreed that, with regard to the
establishment of an international stabilization force in
southern Lebanon, determining the force's mandate and rules
of engagement was the primary challenge. While the mandate
had to include disarmament of Hizballah, it would be
important to "sell" the force not as a shield for Israeli
interests, but as a guarantor of respect for the Blue Line in
both directions, Lebanese and Israeli.

5. (C/NF) The Lebanese public should see the international
stabilization force as a barrier to Israeli overflights
across Lebanon as well as Hizballah rocket attacks on Israel,
Pedersen said. He agreed that an emphasis by the force on
civil affairs functions in southern Lebanon would be helpful
in gaining support.

"UNIFIL IS HISTORY"
-------------------

6. (C/NF) According to Pedersen, the UN Secretary-General is
"convinced" that the current UN peacekeeping presence in
southern Lebanon, UNFIL, has to change. "UNIFIL is history,"
Pedersen said, describing the Secretary-General's view. The
history of the Multi-National Force (MNF) of the early 1980s,
which was forced to disband and withdraw following a series
of terrorist attacks carried out by Hizballah was a cause of
concern, however.

7. (C/NF) Given the fate of the MNF two decades ago,
Pedersen asked, what countries would be willing to enter in
UNIFIL's place with a more expansive mandate that included
disarmament of Hizballah? Were a cease-fire part of the
"package" that established the international stabilization
force, would Hizballah still attack it? It was "hard to
tell," Pedersen said.

SINIORA NEEDS TO ASK FIRST
--------------------------

8. (C/NF) Pedersen agreed that it would be a good idea for

BEIRUT 00002470 002.2 OF 002

Prime Minister Siniora to call for the deployment of an
international stabilization force. Siniora should coordinate
with Speaker of Parliament Berri -- the most prominent
non-Hizballah Shia politician in the country -- in doing so,
however. For Siniora to get into too many specifics in his
request -- such as the use of a NATO rapid-deployment force
to fill in the gap until a UN peacekeeping force could be
stood up, for example -- might only "complicate things," he
said.

9. (C/NF) A UN mandate was key to any replacement of UNIFIL,
said Pedersen, who appeared skeptical of any non-UN approach,
such as using a NATO force in the interim. Needed was a
"strong" UN Security Council resolution, one that included
some "clever wording" on the mandate of such a force. (As
the Ambassador and emboff departed, however, Pedersen's
senior political advisor, Salman Shaikh, whispered that a UN
force in fact might not be the right way to go -- such an
approach threatened to "over-bureaucratize" the mission, he
warned.)

THE TIME FACTOR
---------------

10. (C/NF) Leaving aside the question of what to do in the
interim, Petersen said it would not be a problem for the UN
to generate a replacement for UNIFIL in approximately 90
days. He doubted that Israel would be happy with anything
sooner, nor would a number of Lebanese political figures that
had pinned their hopes on the Israeli military campaign
decisively weakening Hizballah. Neither side was in a hurry,
Petersen suggested, because the Israeli ground offensive
against Hizballah appeared to be progressing very slowly.

11. (C/NF) Twelve days after Israeli operations began
following the abduction of two Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
soldiers, Pedersen explained, the IDF has captured only one
village, Maroun al-Ras. (He understood reports of the IDF's
capture of nearby Bint Jbeil to be unconfirmed.) There were
a total of 19 villages along the Blue Line, many if not all
of which the IDF presumably needed to capture in order to
drive Hizballah out. (He noted that not all of those
villages have Shia populations.)

12. (C/NF) While the quickness with which an international
stabilization force could be deployed was important, Pedersen
said, that quickness should not be at the expense of the
political process in Lebanon. Intent on standing such a
force up, the international community should avoid doing
anything that made a political process towards Hizballah
disarmament more difficult. "Don't rush," Pedersen said.

COMMENT
-------

13. (C/NF) Regarding Pedersen's comment about Michel Aoun,
it is true that Aoun has positioned himself as a Christian
figure with cross-confessional appeal, one who could bring
Hizballah into a genuinely Lebanese fold by offering
assurances of respect for Shia community interests. That,
after all, is how Aoun and his more ardent supporters
justified his February 2006 memorandum of understanding with
Hizballah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. The current
crisis has given the lie to Aoun's strategy, however. For
now, treating Aoun as the key to a solution would simply
inflate Aoun, not deflate Hizballah.
FELTMAN

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