Cablegate: Daily Summary of Japanese Press 07/21/06
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 004084
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DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/21/06
INDEX:
(1) Emperor Showa's words from Tomita memos (Part 1): Unpleasant
feeling toward war described in careful language
(2) Editorial: Enshrinement of Class-A war criminals along with the
war dead -- Emperor Showa's remarks carry special weight
(3) Editorial: Emperor Showa's feelings should be respected
(4) Perilous provocation -- North Korea missiles: Abe played leading
role, backed by hot line between Prime Minister's Official Residence
and US
(5) METI eager to spread "Hinomaru oil" projects and will send
delegation to Libya soon
ARTICLES:
(1) Emperor Showa's words from Tomita memos (Part 1): Unpleasant
feeling toward war described in careful language
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 39) (Abridged slightly)
July 21, 2006
Former Imperial Household Agency Grand Steward Tomohiko Tomita's
diaries and notebooks portraying Emperor Showa's strong displeasure
with Yasukuni Shrine's decision to enshrine Class-A war criminals
along with the war dead contained many words of the emperor, who was
not at liberty to express his candid views on such subjects as the
war and paying homage at the shrine. By sharing with Tomita his
memories of the late Prime Minister Reijiro Wakatsuki, the emperor
alluded to his difficult position that he was not allowed to speak
from his heart.
The memorandum dated May 9, 1988, quoted the emperor as saying:
"I often recall memories of Prime Minister Wakatsuki. He used to
say, 'The Diet and the lawmakers today (may mean 'back then')
reflect the US Congress' drawbacks and the Japanese parliament's
negative aspects.' He always avoided criticizing and blaming other
people as much as possible. I often asked him about his hardships in
early years of the Showa Period, but his lips were usually tight. He
mostly talked about his experience of offering government bonds in
London in his early days during the Russo-Japanese War."
Prime Minister Wakatsuki refers to Reijiro Wakatsuki, who served
twice as prime minister before World War II. The first Wakatsuki
administration experienced the banking crisis in 1927, and the
second administration the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Although when
Emperor Showa had questioned Wakatsuki is not clear, the emperor
seems to have tried to learn the prime minister's difficult
experiences.
The emperor also said to Tomita:
"Now, I can understand how Wakatsuki felt. People often ask me how I
feel about the war and ask me questions about responsibility for the
war, but I cannot answer them so easily because some are still
around. That's why I talk about my trip to Europe, where I had a lot
of fun."
Emperor Showa last visited Yasukuni Shrine in November 1975. Class-A
TOKYO 00004084 002 OF 007
war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978, and the emperor
stopped visiting there without offering any official reason.
The April 28, 1988, memorandum describing the emperor's displeasure
with the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals was preceded by his
feelings about the war in response to a question in a press
conference held ahead of his birthday (April 29). The annual
birthday press conference was a rare opportunity for the emperor to
announce his views. The memo clearly tells that the emperor used
extremely measured language.
In the birthday interview, the emperor said: "Above all, the last
major war is the worst memory." He later explained it this way:
"I wanted to express my unpleasant feeling in response to a question
asking about my sentiments regarding the war. I used the word
'dislike' in indirect reference to (cabinet ministers') comments on
Yasukuni and China, as well."
On the August 15 end-of-the-war anniversary in 1985, then Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited the shrine in his official
capacity. Such countries as China and South Korea reacted furiously
to the visit. Cabinet ministers' statements on the responsibility
for the war and Yasukuni Shrine caused much controversy in 1988. The
emperor apparently tried to answer the question without directly
commenting on the ministers' statements.
Tomita's diary had this entry under July 23, 1986: "These days, I
have been called quite often to report to the emperor regarding
Yasukuni, the textbook issue, and other matters." The emperor is
believed to have spoken his mind to Tomita, whom he trusted.
(2) Editorial: Enshrinement of Class-A war criminals along with the
war dead -- Emperor Showa's remarks carry special weight
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
July 21, 2006
Fourteen Class-A war criminals, including wartime prime minister
Hideki Tojo, were enshrined in 1978 at Yasukuni Shrine. Though
Emperor Showa had visited the shrine eight times after the war, he
stopped coming after that.
It was discovered that then Imperial Household Agency Grand Steward
Tomohiko Miyata wrote down the words of Emperor Showa that were
spoken from the heart. His memorandum noted that the Emperor
expressed his displeasure about the enshrinement of the Class-A war
criminals together with the war dead. He was quoted as saying.
"That's why I have not paid a visit since then. That's how I feel in
my heart."
It is now clear that Emperor Showa stopped visiting the shrine
because of the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals along with the
souls of the war dead.
The father of the chief priest of Yasukuni Shrine who decided to
honor the Class-A war criminals was then Imperial Household Minister
Yoshitami Matsudaira. The memo included the emperor's remarks on
him: "I thought Matsudaira had a strong aspiration for peace. He was
the child that did not understand the parent's mind."
Emperor Showa probably thought that had he visited the shrine that
honors Class-A war criminals, it would negate the postwar history of
TOKYO 00004084 003 OF 007
Japan that was reborn as a pacifist nation.
We think that the emperor, being seen as the "symbol of the unity of
the people" under the new Constitution rather than just the emperor
himself, made a wise decision to stop paying homage at the shrine.
We want to give special weight to the fact that he independently
made that judgment even before China and other countries made an
issue over the enshrinement of Class-A criminals together with the
war dead.
Emperor Showa was the supreme commander of the Japanese Army and
Navy before the war. He sent many soldiers to battlefields in his
own name. The feelings of soldiers killed during the war toward the
emperor may vary greatly. The emperor wanted to visit the shrine and
console the souls of the war dead, which probably came from a
natural feeling.
He probably thought that it was another matter to enshrine together
with the war dead those senior military officers and politicians who
had planned and launched the war. The emperor was quoted as saying,
"Class-A war criminals were enshrined together with the war dead,
even including Matsuoka and Shiratori." The memo evokes the
impression that he was angry with former Foreign Minister Yosuke
Matsuoka and former Ambassador to Italy Toshio Shiratori, who had
promoted the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy.
It had long been known through testimonies by his aides that Emperor
Showa had expressed his displeasure with the enshrinement of Class-A
criminals along with the souls of the war dead.
And yet, the claim that the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals at
Yasukuni was really not the reason why he had stopped visiting the
shrine has been floated a number of times by those who favor
honoring war criminals at the shrine. Their position is that when
Prime Minister Takeo Miki visited Yasukuni in 1975 in his private
capacity, it created the issue of whether the emperor's visit to the
shrine should be considered as a visit in his public or private
capacity, and that Emperor Showa's cessation of his shrine visits
should be viewed in this context, as a Sankei Shimbun editorial put
it last August.
Such a claim was unreasonable from the beginning. The remarks of
Showa Emperor unveiled through then Grand Steward Tomita will bring
such an argument to an end.
The present Emperor has never visited Yasukuni Shrine. Even if he
wants to offer condolences to the war dead, it is not possible to do
so at Yasukuni Shrine as it exists now.
There is the need for a place where anybody can offer condolences to
the victims of the war. It is a question to which we Japanese must
find an answer, before being told to do so by China or South Korea.
Emperor Showa's remarks point that out.
(3) Editorial: Emperor Showa's feelings should be respected
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
July 21, 2006
It has been revealed that Emperor Showa (Hirohito) expressed his
strong displeasure at the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals at
Yasukuni Shrine. According to a memorandum written by then Imperial
Household Agency Grand Steward Tomohiko Tomita (now deceased), the
TOKYO 00004084 004 OF 007
emperor told Tomita: "That is why I haven't visited the shrine since
then. That is my feeling." The late emperor made his final visit to
Yasukuni in 1975. The highly reliable historical documents have
revealed for the first time how the emperor felt about the
enshrinement of Class-A war criminals.
There has been a heated debate over Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. In addition, this issue has
damaged Japan's relations with China and South Korea, resulting in
bilateral summits being suspended. Following this new revelation,
Japanese people should discuss the Yasukuni issue in a cool-headed
manner and try to resolve it without being affected by the opinion
of other countries.
Persons connected with the Imperial Household Agency were quoted as
saying that the emperor stopped visiting the shrine because he was
unhappy with the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals. But those
supportive of the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine
strongly rejected that idea. Some assert that since Prime Minister
Takeo Miki paid homage at Yasukuni in the capacity of a private
citizen, the emperor found it difficult to visit. The Tomita memo
destroys the basis for this argument.
The emperor's expression of strong displeasure reflected his
profound remorse regarding the past war, as well as his desire to
maintain global peace and to keep faith with other countries,
including the United States, Britain, and China. The late emperor's
feelings must be respected.
Emperor Showa stopped visiting Yasukuni Shrine following the
inclusion of Class-A war criminals in the list of war dead honored
there in 1978, but his deep sorrow and regret remained unchanged.
Despite his advanced age, the emperor attended the Aug. 15 memorial
service for all the war dead every year and expressed his sorrow and
desire for peace.
It is reasonable to offer our deep condolences and appreciation to
the war dead. In this respect, paying homage at Yasukuni Shrine
should not be denied. But it is also true that it is difficult to
obtain understanding both inside and outside the nation regarding
the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals. Japan must keep in mind
that public opinion in the US and Europe, in addition to that in
China and South Korea, is also critical of the enshrinement of war
criminals at Yasukuni.
Prime Minister Koizumi says that Yasukuni is a matter of the heart,
but the issue is not so simple. We keenly hope that Prime Minister
Koizumi and other persons concerned will behave in an appropriate
manner while taking seriously the historical background behind the
late emperor's feelings.
(4) Perilous provocation -- North Korea missiles: Abe played leading
role, backed by hot line between Prime Minister's Official Residence
and US
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
July 20, 2006
Hiroshi Maruya, Washington
"Don't do anything that will put Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in
a predicament." US President Bush gave only this instruction to his
staff before they engaged in diplomatic horse-trading at the United
TOKYO 00004084 005 OF 007
Nations over North Korea's missile tests.
Following this instruction, Presidential Assistant for National
Security Affairs Hadley played his part in the White House. Hadley
traveled with the president from Washington to Germany to Russia.
Getting Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe's cell phone number from
a concerned official, Hadley kept in contact with Abe. This contact
between Hadley and Abe was the "hot line" between the Prime
Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) and the White House.
On the morning of July 14, the US Eastern Time, a video conference
was held among three officials: Hadley, who was then abroad,
Secretary of State Rice, and Ambassador to the UN Bolton, who was
SIPDIS
then in New York. Referring to a resolution submitted to the UN
Security Council (UNSC), Rice told Bolton: "I will leave when to put
the resolution to a vote to your judgment." Then Hadley confirmed
that Japan and the US would work together. Immediately before this
conference, Abe met with US Ambassador to Japan Schieffer and the
two discussed how to handle the UN Charter's Chapter 7, a reference
to which means to impose sanctions. Hadley again contacted Abe to
convey to him the US administration's final position that was
determined on the basis of what Abe and Schieffer had discussed.
Ambassador Bolton is known for his tough stance, and before becoming
ambassador to the UN, he served as under secretary of State for arms
control. In contrast, the State Department repeatedly pointed out
the importance of international cooperation; as a result, the
language "sanctions" disappeared (from the resolution). Around
then, some in the Japanese government voiced this concern: "The
delicate relationship between Secretary Rice and Ambassador Bolton
may affect the fate of the resolution." The role played by Hadley
was to unify the Bush administration's view and negotiate with
Japan.
While letting Japan lead negotiations in the UN, the Bush
administration kept close attention on China's moves. On July 10,
when the adoption of the resolution was put off, Hadley told Abe:
"China is saying, 'If more time were given to us, we could persuade
North Korea.' Let give a chance for China to do so." The idea was
viewed as a tactic to make China more responsible for North Korea.
While setting the deadline for the adoption of the resolution at
just before the start of a US-China summit meeting, Japan and the US
adamantly stuck to Chapter 7. This was intended in order to see
China's reaction.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), there had been
no hot line in the past between the Kantei and the White House. The
hot line was put in motion by Hadley's first congratulatory phone
call to Abe to express congratulations on his assumption of the post
of chief cabinet secretary. Last year, when Abe visited the US as
deputy secretary general (of the Liberal Democratic Party), he met
with Hadley. This spring, the two worked in close coordination in
arranging a meeting between the Japanese abductee Megumi Yokota's
mother and the president.
Once the North Korean issue came under the direct control of the
White House, the Kantei, instead of MOFA, can sit at the negotiating
table with the US. Hadley thus can make contacts with Abe via the
cell phone wherever he may be on the globe. This in part reflects
the White House view that Abe is a powerful candidate to succeed
Prime Minister Koizumi, but the stronger reason is that Hadley and
Abe are both in charge of foreign policy coordination.
TOKYO 00004084 006 OF 007
"It was of great significance for the resolution to be unanimously
adopted by the UNSC. This is proof that Japan and the US have
maintained the solidity of the alliance. We have been able to come
to this point thanks to Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe's leadership."
Yesterday evening, Ambassador Schieffer telephoned Abe and thanked
him in that way. Abe told Schieffer: "I am thankful for the close
cooperation of Presidential Assistant Hadley and other officials
involved."
The true value of this sort of the Japan-US hot line will be tested
in terms of how it will respond to the changing international
situation, including North Korea, after Koizumi steps down.
(5) METI eager to spread "Hinomaru oil" projects and will send
delegation to Libya soon
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full)
July 18, 2006
Focusing on a number of unexplored oil fields in Libya, Japan has
high expectations of that nation as a promising oil supplier in the
future. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), with the
aim of strengthening bilateral relations with Libya, has decided to
dispatch a delegation of senior officials to that country shortly.
Libya introduced an international open bidding system for oil
concession rights last year. The third bid has been planned for this
fall. Japanese oil development companies and trading houses are
eager to participate in the bid. METI is willing to construct a
system to offer indirect support for private firms' efforts to
increase the ratio of "Hinomaru oil" (independently developed oil
supply) through the planned visit of its senior officials.
Meeting with METI Minister Toshihiro Nikai on July 13, visiting
Libyan National Oil Corp. Chairman Shukri Ganem said he expected
Japanese firms to participate in the bid by Japanese firms. In
response, Nikai decided to dispatch a delegation headed by a senior
vice minister or the Natural Resources and Energy Agency director
general, saying: "It is necessary for the government to show its
eagerness."
METI came up with the nation's new energy strategy this May, which
calls for raising the ratio of Japan's independent oil development
from the current 15% to 40 as part of efforts to revise up its
energy security. Although Japanese firms acquired concession rights
for the Azadegan oil field in Iran in 2004, uncertainty is now
looming large over the feasibility of the development due to the
negative effect of Iran's alleged nuclear development. Given this,
the government needs to be hurriedly seek oil-exploitation rights
for other oil fields.
The energy agency is going to make arrangements for the public and
private sectors to take a joint approach to oil-producing countries.
An official of the Oil and Natural Gas Development said: "Keeping
favorable relations with oil producers will result in assisting
private firms."
Libya is situated on the western side of Egypt and has about 39
billion barrels of underground deposits of oil in 2004, recording
the 9th place. Western countries had slapped economic sanctions on
that nation for its alleged development of weapons of mass
destruction, but the US normalized diplomatic ties with Libya this
May in response to its disbandment of its development program.
TOKYO 00004084 007 OF 007
From Japan, Teikoku Oil Co., Nippon Oil Corporation and other firms
took part in the second bid held in October of last year. As a
result, five companies - these two companies, Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co., Inpex Corporation, and Mitsubishi Corporation -
acquired concession rights for six oil fields out of 26. Each
company is willing to also become successful bidders in the next
bidding.
The Libyan government expects Japanese firms to join projects to
construct plants to manufacture oil petrochemical products and offer
technology, as well, in addition to oil field development. Nikai
commented: "We would like to offer cooperation in a wide range of
areas, not limited to energy."
SCHIEFFER