Cablegate: Lebanon: For Berri Resolution Comes Down to One
VZCZCXRO8386
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2600/01 2231724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111724Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5008
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0947
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0062
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002600
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FOR BERRI RESOLUTION COMES DOWN TO ONE
THING
1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: On August 11 NEA A/S Welch, Ambassador,
and PolOff met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri,
accompanied by his foreign policy advisor Ali Hamdan, at
Berri's Ain Al Tinneh office. A/S Welch told Berri that we
hoped that the UNSC resolution addressing the current
conflict would be voted on today and that there were
obstacles that needed to be addressed. First, A/S Welch
advised Berri that the resolution will call for an expanded
UNIFIL force under Chapter 7. Second, A/S Welch asked Berri
to focus on the politics of Shebaa Farms rather than the
language in the resolution. He assured Berri that Shebaa
would continue to be an important issue after the resolution
is passed. Finally, Berri expressed great concern that
during the time between the cessation of hostilities and the
deployment of UNIFIL, Hizballah would fire on Israeli troops
in Lebanon. With an expansive view of defensive operations,
Israel would retaliate with a devastating air or sea campaign
on civilian villages. This would hinder his primary goal of
bringing displaced Shia back to the south. Berri recommended
using language similar to that of the ""April Understanding""
of 1996 as a foundation to address possible hostilities in
the current context, while UNIFIL acts as a monitor. A/S
Welch offered to take this idea to Prime Minister Siniora and
GOI. END SUMMARY.
2. (C/NF) Berri began by acknowledging a letter to him from
the USG regarding the status of Moussa Sadr. He stated that
Moussa Sadr disappeared in Tripoli, Libya, and after 27 years
his case was closed. The case has been reopened and a
Lebanese judge was sent to Italy because some witnesses are
Libyan. He requested that any information that could be
acquired by the USG from Libya about Moussa Sadr be passed to
GOL. He said that such an effort would be helpful for all
Shia.
3. (C/NF) On the current crisis, A/S Welch assured Berri that
Secretary Rice was traveling to the United Nations to engage
on the proposed draft UNSC resolution. Secretary Rice is
working hard to stop the fighting and hoped for a vote on the
resolution today. He told Berri that there were obstacles
that needed to be addressed.
Chapter 6 vs. Chapter 7
-----------------------
4. (C/NF) A/S Welch reminded Berri that during their August 9
meeting, Berri insisted that the new UNIFIL force be placed
under Chapter 6, while by contrast the Security Council will
look at Chapter 7 for the new UNIFIL force. Berri inquired
about having the UNIFIL force under Chapter 6 with the ""right
to self defense."" The Ambassador reminded Berri that Chapter
7 offers Lebanon protection as well.
5. (C/NF) Berri admitted that the events of 1983 set a bad
example for multinational forces in Lebanon under Chapter 7.
Berri told A/S Welch that perhaps he is afraid of Chapter 7,
and the U.S. friendship with Israel makes him even more
afraid. He recognized that Israel wants the right to protect
itself and said that ""this will be included."" He reminded
A/S Welch that Resolution 426 establishes precedent for
Chapter 6 with a clause for self-defense.
6. (C/NF) A/S Welch suggested that Berri consider the victory
he has gained. Past discussions focused on a ""multinational
force"" while today they are discussing an expanded UNIFIL
force in response to Berri's concerns. ""You can claim credit
for this,"" exclaimed A/S Welch.
7. (C/NF) A/S Welch advised Berri that the resolution will
call for a multinational force under Chapter 7, and the
decision on that proposal is left to the GOL. Berri then
joked that maybe the force can fall under Chapter 6 ""and a
half.""
Shebaa Farms
------------
8. (C/NF) Berri informed A/S Welch that Shebaa Farms will
always be the pretext for Hizballah to remain armed. He
warned that the language in the current draft of the
resolution on Shebaa farms is not sufficient.
9. (C/NF) A/S Welch asked Berri to focus on the politics of
Shebaa Farms rather than the language. He assured Berri that
the USG understands the significance of Shebaa Farms. Both
A/S Welch and the Ambassador told Berri in the past that
Shebaa Farms was only on the Lebanese agenda, but today
Shebaa farms is on the international agenda -- he should
declare that alone to be an achievement. Shebaa will
continue to be an important issue after the resolution is
passed. He assured Berri that Shebaa Farms is good news for
Lebanon ""in spite of what is written."" Welch explained at
length how problematic the Shebaa language is for the
Israelis and how much Berri was getting from the U.S. in
going as far as we have with the language.
10. (C/NF) Berri accused the U.S. of not wanting to engage on
the Shebaa Farm issue because it does not want to give
Hizballah a victory. A/S Welch agreed. Berri declared that
it is his right to state for the record that problems will
continue with Israel until Shebaa Farms is resolved.
Berri Interested in
One Thing
-------------------
11. (C/NF) Berri asked A/S Welch if the ceasefire remains in
two phases. A/S Welch reiterated to Berri that the new draft
calls for a ceasefire upon Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon.
The withdrawal will take place immediately following the
deployment of LAF and the new UNIFIL.
12. (C/NF) Berri emphasized that the ceasefire is the most
important thing for displaced Shia to return to the south.
He told A/S Welch that in the entire resolution he is
""interested in one thing, that people go home."" He
questioned his ability to convince people to go home if there
is fighting in the south. He commented that Israeli forces
in the south after the cessation of hostilities would be
fired on by Hizballah.
13. (C/NF) Berri was most concerned that in the event that
Hizballah fired on Israeli troops in Lebanon, Israel would
retaliate with a devastating air or sea campaign on civilian
villages. This would start the war again and everything that
was worked for in the resolution ""would be lost."" He
insisted that he wanted a ""practical"" solution to this issue.
14. (C/NF) Berri reluctantly accepted the reality that if
Israeli troops are fired on they have the right to defend
themselves on the ground at the point of attack. However he
added that defending themselves does not mean air bombings on
civilian areas. He asked the USG to provide a guarantee that
air and sea campaigns would not be used by Israel ""in
defense."" He also asked that the UN act as a mediator in any
post cessation of hostilities fighting. A/S Welch assured
Berri that the current resolution calls on the UNIFIL-plus to
act as the monitor of the cessation of fire.
15. (C/NF) A/S Welch received Berri's agreement that both
Israel and Hizballah should not fire rockets and that there
should be no re-supply of Hizballah from Syria. He also
agreed that attacks on the ground are a risk that the USG and
GOL could not control. Berri added that he could help
promote stability in the south by bring the displaced back
home. When the displaced go back, Hizballah will have less
motivation to fight and ""this is an element of stability.""
Berri also warned that, if the displaced do not return home
within a month, ""I cannot guarantee the security of Lebanon.""
16. (C/NF) Berri suggested using a framework similar to the
""April Agreement"" of 1996 to address possible hostilities
during the time between the cessation of hostilities and the
deployment of UNIFIL and LAF. A/S Welch stated that civilian
areas should not be used as launching sites by Hizballah.
Furthermore, if not used as launching sites, the civilian
areas should not be struck by Israel as stated in the April
Understanding.
17. (C/NF) A/S Welch offered that when the U.S. votes on the
resolution, it could say that civilian areas should not be
used as launching areas and should not be attacked. Berri
cautioned that the wording should be precise and clear.
Winking (and implying he was thinking of his ""Hizballah
partners""), he fears that the time between the cessation of
hostilities and the deployment of an enhanced UNIFIL could be
used by people who ""do not want peace"" to ignite the conflict
again. Berri stressed the importance of assurances from the
U.S. and UN that Hizballah fire on Israeli soldiers inside
Lebanon will not start the conflict again because he doesn't
""trust Hizballah.""
18. (C/NF) Berri again mentioned that it is his priority to
take the Shia back to the south. He assured A/S Welch that
he would do what he could to maintain calm during the
cessation of hostilities. Berri wondered if the Russian
proposal for a 48-hour humanitarian cease-fire would be
useful to give A/S Welch time to discuss this idea with Prime
Minister Siniora and GOI. A/S Welch instead offered to take
his ideas promptly to Siniora and the GOI.
19. (U) A/S Welch did not have the opportunity to clear
this cable.
FELTMAN