Cablegate: Advisor Tells Peretz: It's Syria, Syria, Syria!

P 031526Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5380
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 003040

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KWBG IS SY LE
SUBJECT: ADVISOR TELLS PERETZ: IT'S SYRIA, SYRIA, SYRIA!

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Pini Medan, an unofficial advisor to Defense
Minister Peretz, told POL/C August 2 that he is advising
Peretz at every opportunity that "recruiting Syria" is
critical to achieving success against Hizballah and saving
Israel's position vis a vis Lebanon. Syrian involvement is
equally critical for the United States, he said, as it
counters what Medan terms the USG's greatest challenge: Iran.
Medan, a former career Mossad officer and former foreign
policy advisor to then-PM Ehud Barak, said that in his
unofficial role as one of several advisors to Peretz, he has
pressed the following points about the Lebanon conflict and
the Israeli public:

-- The gap between a cease-fire and deployment of an
international force will be at least six to eight weeks in
the most ideal conditions and more likely three to four
months.

-- Israel must stay in Lebanon until an international force
deploys. The LAF is not enough.

-- Israeli troops can remain in Lebanon during that gap -- if
the incoming troops have a solid mandate -- but only for the
time it takes an international force to stand up.

-- Israeli "public tension" over the conflict is high and the
public worries that Hizballah will continue to terrorize the
troops during that time. The public remembers well, he said,
that Israel went into Lebanon "for a month and stayed 24
years."

-- The existence of a solid international mandate for an
intervention force, offers of troops from supportive
countries, and negotiations on prisoner exchanges would
reduce that public tension.

-- Prisoner exchange negotiations must deal only with Israeli
and Lebanese prisoners, not Palestinians. Israel must cut
any appearance of a tie between Hamas and Hizballah.

-- Israel cannot tolerate Syria's re-supply and re-arming of
Hizballah and must retaliate against any such efforts. The
question is what will be the result. Israel cannot tolerate
convoys of missiles coming into Lebanon. On the other hand,
Israel needs to address what a ceasefire would look like if a
low level of shooting were to continue.

-- It's not enough to seal the land borders. The ports also
need to be sealed to prevent arms transfers. Israel is not
worried about fishing boats, which can be monitored and
checked by the Israeli navy and other elements, but it must
worry about container ships coming in with thousands of
containers that cannot be checked. Israel will need a third
party to ensure that such shipments cannot get through, and a
arrangement under which Lebanon can accept this "overruling"
of its sovereignty. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) In an August 2 conversation, unofficial MinDef Peretz
advisor Pini Medan told Pol/C that among all the issues
Peretz is facing, Medan stresses to the minister the need to
cut the link between Syria and Iran, or, more importantly,
"how to recruit Syria to our side." The problem, he said, is
that Israeli leaders are getting signals from the United
States "that Asad is a bad guy" and that Israel will anger
the United States if it seeks to deal with Asad. "Some of us
think Syria is a key player"; Israel needs to recognize this
to pull it away from Iran. He stressed that he does not
believe in the democratization of Syria that some USG
officials call for -- the result would be the Muslim
Brotherhood. "Forget regime change, I don't believe in it."

3. (C) Peretz, he said, is listening to the voices saying
that Israel must do something with Syria. Peretz is not
afraid personally of the fact that, in any dealings with
Syria Israel will, at some point, have to discuss the Golan
Heights. "He's not rejecting it," Medan said, but Israel is
"very concerned about confronting the U.S. and about the
personal feelings" (toward Syria) of the President, the Vice
President and the Secretary of Defense. The United States he
argued needs to put aside its feelings about Syria and focus
on Iran. The Israel-Palestine conflict is not the most
important thing for the United States right now, nor is
Lebanon, he said. Many Americans would say the biggest
issues are Iraq and Iran, he added, but if you neutralize
Syria, that enhances the U.S. vis-a-vis both Iraq and Iran.
The United States need to focus on Syria not for Israel's
sake, he said, but for its own.

4. (C) On Palestinian issues, Medan said that he looks to
the international force that will be deployed in Lebanon, and
its mandate, as the models, with some adjustments, for what
he said is a necessary force in Gaza. "The region has many
leaders who want peace but can't deliver -- Siniora, Abu
Mazen, Haniyeh -- they can't do the job without supervision,"
he added. Because of that, he said, he sees a two-state
solution: one Palestinian state in Gaza and another in the
West Bank, with two non-qualified leaders both of whom are
"run by Masha'al and Ahmadinejad." The prospect, he said,
"brings us back to Syria,... as a platform, proxy and
host,... and as a tool" of Iran.

5. (C) The United States and Russia are key players in
addressing Syria, he said. Even though "we don't like them,"
Russian troops need to be standing alongside the French in
any Lebanon intervention force. And while "we have a
problem with their relations with Iran," they can talk to
Asad. Likewise, "Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are
terrified of radical Islam," so bring them into the
intervention force, along with Egypt and Jordan, both of
which know the Middle East rules of the game. The objective,
he asserted, is to make a Qaddafi of Asad, and cut him from
Iran. Unless Syria is brought into the Lebanon issue, any
ceasefire "will be very shaky,... "we'll shoot back. We'll
hope that a multilateral force will come in," and, once in,
keep control of the situation.

6. (C) Medan recalled that Israel's new demand for an
international force is a turnaround from the views of former
PM Ariel Sharon. Everyone tends to forget that then-NSC
chief Giora Eiland proposed an international force for Gaza
three years ago, but Sharon would never allow it. Now, he
said, Israel has Italian Carabinieri General Pistolese and
his team manning the Rafah crossing with no mandate because,
under Sharon, no planning for international participation was
done. Had Israel been prepared in November, when the
Agreement on Movement and Access was being finalized, the
Pistolese team could have come in with a clear mandate.

---------------
THE PERETZ TEAM
---------------

7. (C) Medan said that he is one of several unofficial
advisors to Peretz. Others include former MK and Minister of
Labor Uzi Baram, David Kimche, and to a lesser extent, Dalia
Rabin. Medan said that he gives open, unvarnished advice,
carries no official duties, and does not in any way speak for
the minister. He said that he has not been tasked with any
"envoy work" to date, but could be so tasked in the future,
as he anticipates Kimche will also be. Ranking Peretz's
advisors in terms of importance, he put in first place new
MOD DG Gabi Ashkenazi, whom Medan pointed out was the
unsuccessful contender against Dan Halutz for the IDF COS
slot. Asked about the potential for conflict between Halutz
and Ashkenazi, Medan said the possibility would be small as
long as Ashkenazi sticks with the DG's traditional job
description. In second place, he put political advisor
Haggai Alon, whom he said enjoys a close relationship with
Peretz, but who has only limited experience and knowledge.
Medan termed himself Alon's mentor, and said that he is
trying to teach both Alon and others "how to look at policy."
Medan put himself in third place as a Peretz advisor.

8. (C) Asked about the rest of the evolving Peretz team,
Medan said that little will change as long as the war
continues. He characterized the current team as "all good
guys. At some point, present Military Aide Eitan Dangot will
probably leave, to be replaced by someone that Peretz knows.
Retired Brigadier General and current advisor to the minister
Ami Shafran, will probably go back to the military, be
promoted, and move on to another slot, probably as head of
military research and development. Amos Gilad may be moved
out, since "he's not Amir's man." Peretz, he said, is a
quick learner, and the day after the war there will be a lot
of re-examination. Olmert and Peretz, having only recently
come to office, are not responsible for the preparations for
this war and the results of that re-examination could affect
senior jobs throughout the military.

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