Cablegate: Ambassador Meets with Restrepo to Discuss

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH RESTREPO TO DISCUSS
EXTRADITION AND JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW PROCESS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Ambassador voiced U.S. concerns to GOC Peace
Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo on August 31 that the GOC's
inclusion of narcotraffickers on its list of paramilitary
leaders seeking Justice and Peace Law benefits threatened our
positive extradition relationship. Restrepo agreed and said
the GOC would extradite soon five, and possibly seven, such
narcotraffickers. He blamed former Interior Minister Pretelt
for trying to undo the Constitutional Court's JPL ruling
through the implementing decree, but said the major challenge
currently facing the peace process is the Fiscalia's
reluctance to begin taking version libres. The meeting ended
with Restrepo noting paramilitary leaders' growing concerns
about their personal security, asking for financial
assistance for GOC efforts to identify and destroy weapons
handed in by demobilized paramilitaries, and providing an
impromptu briefing to President Uribe on the status of the
peace process. End summary

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RESTREPO ON EXTRADITION AND JPL LISTS
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2. (C) The Ambassador met with Peace Commissioner Luis
Carlos Restrepo on August 31 to express his concerns that the
GOC's recent actions undermined our excellent extradition
relationship. Restrepo told the Ambassador that
narcotraffickers who were trying to buy their way into
paramilitary structures to benefit from Justice and Peace Law
(JPL) should be extradited. He said the GOC posted the list
of 24 extraditables on the Presidency's website on August 30
to stimulate popular pressure against their inclusion.
Restrepo said he did not agree with the inclusion of Eduardo
Vengoechea and Juan Carlos Sierra on the JPL lists and blamed
former Interior and Justice Minister Sabas Pretelt for their
inclusion.

3. (C) Restrepo said paramilitary leaders were initially
upset with the publication of the lists. Paramilitary leader
(Resistencia Tayrona Bloc) and narcotrafficker Hernan Giraldo
Serna, who had included seven well-known, imprisoned
narcotraffickers on his bloc's demobilization list for
possible receipt of JPL benefits, had called him to complain
about the government's action. Restrepo said he also had met
the previous day with the paramilitary leaders in La Ceja to
explain the decision. He had emphasized to the para leaders
that the process needed to be transparent to be credible.
After the meeting with Restrepo, the leaders reversed their
stance and issued a statement supporting the GOC's decision
to publicize the lists.

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JPL DECREE SHOULD REFLECT COURT'S DECISION
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4. (C) Restrepo insisted the JPL implementing decree must reflect the Constitutional Court's decision. He blamed Pretelt for trying to create a decree that circumvented key elements of the Court's decision and charged that Pretelt had created false expectations for the paras. Still, he said the decree--based on the Court's assertion that its decision was not retroactive--should preserve the JPL provision stating that up to 18 months of the time spent in Santa Fe de Ralito should be applied to alternative sentences issued under the law. Restrepo said this had always been understood to be a key part of the peace agreement between the GOC and the paras to encourage demobilization. He hoped Uribe's decision to make public the draft JPL decree and the lists would boost public confidence in the process. The Ambassador agreed the decree should track the Constitutional Court ruling, saying this would avoid the problems that would be caused by a subsequent decision by the State Commission (Consejo de Estado) declaring the JPL decree invalid because it contradicted the Court's decision.

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VERSION LIBRES REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY
-----------------------------------

5. (C) Restrepo said he was having a hard time convincing
the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) to begin taking
version libres, because the office wanted to first fully
investigate the cases. He complained that he had tried
unsuccessfully for over three months to encourage the
Fiscalia to start the process. Further delays could
discredit the process and discourage those paramilitary
leaders who want to talk from doing so. He said 25
paramilitary leaders in La Ceja, three in police stations in
other regions, and 205 mid-level commanders in the 12
concentration zones are ready to give version libres now.
With each delay, however, they are starting to melt away due
to fear of retaliation by renegade para groups.

6. (C) Restrepo expressed concern that the Fiscalia was
hesitating because of an unfounded assumption that it had to
take 2,695 version libres all at once. Instead, the Peace
Commissioner wanted the Fiscalia to focus on the 240 he has
lined up to begin the process. He warned that the GOC knew
nothing about 2,200 of those that have petitioned for JPL
benefits and that the Fiscalia should therefore begin with
those 240 well-known cases. (Note: the list of 2,695
demobilized paramilitaries does not include the more than
2,400 incarcerated paramilitaries who have also requested
JPL.) Restrepo voiced frustration at the Fiscalia's failure
to act on his week-old request that it take the version libre
of the killer of former AUC leader Carlos Castano, Jesus
Rolda (AKA Monoleche), who has offered to cooperate fully.
He said he was worried that if the Fiscalia was unable to act
on a single case, how could it manage the other cases.

7. (C) The Ambassador recognized the need for the version
libre process to begin, but said the Fiscalia's task of
taking more than 5,000 version libres was overwhelming. He
said the Fiscalia had asked for more manpower and the
breaking up of the lists, as well as more resources for the
section of Colombia's Supreme Court that will hear JPL
appeals.

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CARLOS CASTANO'S DEATH
----------------------

8. (C) Restrepo said he was in Monteria, Cordoba Department,
on the day of Carlos Castano's murder, preparing the area
that was to later become the site of the concentration zone
in Santa Fe de Ralito. He learned immediately from one of
Castano's bodyguards that Monoleche had killed Castano. Five
days later, Restrepo said he met with para leaders, including
Salvador Mancuso and Vicente Castano, at an isolated location
near Ralito, where he was told that Castano "was on
vacation." They allowed him to question Monoleche who, at
the time, had denied his participation in Castano's murder.

9. (C) Restrepo said para spokesman "Ernesto Baez" had been
very helpful in convincing Monoleche to now cooperate with
him in locating Castano's body. He attributed this to Baez'
shame over what the paras had done to Castano. Restrepo said
the para leaders wanted Monoleche to assume complete guilt
for Castano's murder. Still, Restrepo said Castano's
brother, Vicente Castano, had played a role in the death. He
added that Vicente, who he called an astute businessman who
made money off of everything, was not close to the other para
leaders. Restrepo speculated that if Vicente turned himself
in under President Uribe'S ultimatum, he would insist on
being held apart from his colleagues.

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PARAS PARANOIA JUSTIFIED
------------------------

10. (C) Restrepo warned paras were feeling ever more
vulnerable about their security. He said the GOC recognized
the need to offer some sort of protection for them and their
families. Few para leaders trusted each other, and
internecine wars within the para community were threatening
the lives of the leaders and their subordinates. In the past
week, Macaco's second in command was murdered in Medellin.
Para leader "Cadena" had also been killed after expressing
his interest in testifying about crimes committed by his
group. Restrepo said the paramilitary leaders' fear was
causing them to remain in La Ceja; some mid-level commanders
were abandoning the process. He dismissed press reports that
five para leaders had left La Ceja for medical conditions.

11. (C) Restrepo said confidence building was necessary. He
thought the Catholic Church's National Reconciliation
Commission could be very helpful. Unfortunately, the
Commission's focus on the FARC made it unable it to play a
constructive role with the paramilitaries.

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REQUEST FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR ARMS DESTRUCTION
---------------------------------------------

12. (C) Restrepo asked for U.S. financial support for the
destruction of arms turned over by the paramilitaries. For
judicial purposes, Restrepo said the GOC would need USD
50,000 to conduct ballistic testing before destroying these
weapons. The arms have been in 24 military bases around the
country; the GOC was concerned with the security of the arms.
The consolidation and destruction of these weapons remained
stalled. The GOC hoped to begin the process in the coming
weeks and expected to be finished by November.

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URIBE CALLS RESTREPO FOR UPDATES
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13. (C) As the Ambassador wrapped up the meeting with
Restrepo, President Uribe called Restrepo on his cell phone
for an update on the peace process. Restrepo in a brief, but
precise summary told Uribe the following: (1) he would
accompany Monoleche to the site of Carlos Castano's remains
on September 1 with the DIJIN and the Fiscalia; (2) para
leader Jorge 40 planned to turn himself in to Congress's
Peace Commission in Cesar Department on September 4; (3) GOC
intelligence officials had told him Vicente Castano continued
to ask for judicial assurances and was complaining about his
economic situation; (4) Los Mellizos sent out a communique
asserting their para affiliation; (5) a para leader (AKA
Cuchillo) was threatening to rebuild his group in Meta
Department; and (6) the Fiscalia was still not moving forward
on taking version libres. He also said the GOC needed to
increase public forces in Uraba where the FARC had kidnapped
five civilians in an area formerly controlled by demobilized
para leader El Aleman.
WOOD

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