Cablegate: Canada's Take On Global Initiative to Combat
DE RUEHOT #3010/01 2772018
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O 042018Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4006
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE 0090
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 3270
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0080
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0564
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0247
UNCLAS OTTAWA 003010
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER KGIC KNNP MCAP PINR PINS PTER CA
SUBJECT: CANADA'S TAKE ON GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT
NUCLEAR TERRORISM KEY DOCUMENTS
REF: STATE 155988
1. (SBU) On October 4, Janice Fitchett (Senior Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Advisor at Foreign Affairs) provided POL
M/C with initial Canada's comments on the GI draft documents,
which she said had been widely cleared throught the
Department. She confirmed that these comments were also
being shared with the action officer at the Russian Embassy
here in Ottawa. She noted the GoC's appreciation for being
briefed and consulted at the early stages and expressed
Canada's full support for the initiative. Her comments
2. (SBU) General Points of Clarification:
--If the group is to make decisions, then it will be
necessary to clarify the decision-making rules, e.g.
consensus vs. voting. If not, then we recommend making this
--The Statement refers only specifically to "nuclear
materials" and does not appear to deal with "devices" or
"nuclear devices" or their parts or components. Perhaps a
broader wording should be considered to also encompass
related equipment and technologies.
--There are several places in the document(s) that mention
the enhancement of security at civilian nuclear facilities.
If it is your intention to exclude military facilities, we
would suggest that this be more explicit.
3. (SBU) Statement of Principles
--Principle two: It may be useful to clarify what is included
in the definition of "nuclear facilities" i.e., we assume not
only nuclear power facilities but also other facilities that
handle such materials such as schools, labs, etc.
--Principle three: We believe this bullet should refer to
"nuclear and other radioactive materials" rather than
"nuclear materials and radiological substances."
--Principle four: We would suggest "material" be replaced
with "nuclear and other radioactive materials." We would also
question whether "establish safe control over unlawfully held
material" is broad enough wording. (i.e., what if it is in
transit between persons, etc.) and does it adequately capture
"used, disposed, altered, transferred" or should these be
elaborated elsewhere such as under principle six?
--Principle five: It would appear that all the words
"response, mitigate and investigate" in cases of terrorist
attacks involving the use of materials are post-event, yet
the explanatory notes seem to indicate that this bullet also
would target pre-strike capabilities (to stop imminent
terrorist attacks). Should other words like "prevent, deter,
etc." be added? Also, should "prosecute" or "impose
liability" be added since they also contemplate "just
--Principle seven: Grateful for clarification of &other
--Principle eight: Given the sensitivities of States with
respect to the sharing of information on nuclear security
activities, do you foresee agreements to enforce
confidentiality among partner nations?
4. (SBU) Explanatory Notes to the Statement of Principles:
--We assume there is a typographical error in the first
paragraph, line 12: date reference should read "December 2006
or January 2007."
--With respect to references to international conventions
(e.g. the International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism), we would encourage the consistent
use of the legal titles rather than abbreviations.
--Principles one and two: We note that the revised Convention
on the Physical Protection for Nuclear Material and
Facilities (CPPNM) specifically addresses sabotage and would
like clarification on whether sabotage, as well as theft, is
considered as part of "unauthorized access." We also note
that INCIRC 225, Revision 4, and the Safeguards Agreements
are two key international documents related to accountancy,
and suggest that you may wish to list these in the
--Principle six: We note that the standard for denying
financial and economic resources to persons seeking to carry
out terrorist attacks is "reasonable belief." This standard
mayor may not be sufficient depending on the mechanisms
employed, e.g. it would not be sufficient for a criminal
conviction. We also note that there is reference to nations
maintaining a "capability to identify all suspicious activity
related to terrorist efforts...." This should be reworded to
reflect a standard that can more realistically be met - e.g.
"...maintain a robust capability to identify all suspicious
activity related to terrorist efforts..."
--Principle seven: With respect to the reference to "swift
extraditions", we note that in Canada the length of
extradition procedures is mostly determined by the courts and
may not be "swift", given the legal protections afforded by
our system. Therefore, we suggest alternate wording such as
"expeditious extraditions pursuant to law."
--Principle eight: We believe that consistency with national
law should encompass all of the information sharing, i.e.
both the release and receipt of information. Therefore, we
suggest that the phrase "consistent with their national laws"
should be inserted at the beginning of the sentence:
"Consistent with their national laws, promote information
sharing pertaining ..."
5. (SBU) Terms of Reference:
--In the Canadian context "shall" means mandatory and is
reserved for legally binding documents
only. As the Statement of Principle does not use "shall", we
would prefer that for the sake of consistency the Explanatory
Notes also refrain from using "shall" and use the term "will"
--We suggest leading with the second bullet ("working to
improve capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism") and moving
the first bullet to the bottom. We also suggest that the
bullet be revised to read "working to improve assistance to
partner states where appropriate possible
--The fifth bullet talks about national reporting but needs
some clarification. For example, to whom would reports be
submitted and with what frequency? Would states be compiling
some kind of year end report for the IAG? There should be
something in the Terms of Reference or in the IAG function to
talk about international reporting. It is critically
important to have a political discussion, even in a general
way, on an international basis by rolling up the national
reporting to the international level. This approach has been
very helpful in the G8, after the national reporting has been
--We suggest revising the last bullet as follows: "Reviewing
on a continuous basis and strengthening on a continuous basis
Qon a continuous basis and strengthening on a continuous basis
as necessary." This is to reflect the fact that if a review
finds that national authorities to already be strong, there
may be no need for further strengthening at that point.
6. (SBU) Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG)
--While membership of initial partner countries in the IAG
seems automatic upon delivery of a diplomatic note, it is not
clear how additional members might be integrated. Will IAG
participation automatically broaden with new memberships?
What process of admission to IAG is foreseen for potential
members that are not initially enumerated? Could individual
IAG representatives not also serve as points of contact?
--For point one under function of the IAG, we suggest
alternate wording as follows: &IAG participants will take
concrete steps as appropriate to assist other states8. This
reflects that taking concrete steps to assist may not always
be possible or feasible in every situation and measures will
be dependent on acceptance of assistance by the receiving
--Point four regarding participation needs further
clarification as to who observes the training exercises and
who actually does the exercises (i.e. observation of Global
Initiative exercises by non-members of the initiative as
opposed to members of the initiative observing exercises in
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