Cablegate: Prt Tikrit: Scene Setter for Salah Ad Din Province

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OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3946/01 2940632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210632Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7598
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003946

SIPDIS

SBU
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV ECON PINR EAID IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: SCENE SETTER FOR SALAH AD DIN PROVINCE

1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable.

2. (SBU) INTRODUCTION. Salah ad Din province, best known as
Saddam's homeland and the Sunni heartland of Iraq, is
struggling to find a new political identity and economic
vigor in a free Iraq. Believing themselves to suffer
unfairly from assumed associations with the past regime and
to be victims of unfair de-Baathification policies, SaD
residents are down in but not out of the political process.
They still see themselves as the best educated and most
experienced leaders in Iraq and have entered a "wait and see"
mode to determine how they will be incorporated in the
current political process.

3. (SBU) Of the province's estimated 1.2 million residents,
most are Sunnis living in the principal cities of Tikrit,
Bayji, and Samarra. There are two Shia enclaves in the
southeast in Balad and ad Dujeel and a Kurdish and Turkoman
area in the northeast around al Tuz. With the dismantling of
the former regime's security apparatus and the
de-Baathification policies in place, unemployment in the
province has soared, and the overall economic situation is
worsening. Although the province has great agricultural
potential, it has not been tapped.

4. (SBU) The provincial government's executive and
legislative branches are active, but do not have well defined
roles or a clear separation of power. With SaD's vote
against the constitution and the Sunni boycott of the
previous election, the provincial government is neither
representative nor respected. The security situation is
worsening and remains the single greatest obstacle to
development. Although the provincial government and the
Iraqi security forces cooperate well with the Coalition
Forces, the environment is generally non-permissive. END
INTRODUCTION.

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Governance, Rule of Law, and the Political Situation
--------------------------------------------- -------

5. (SBU) Democratic political structures are nascent in SaD.
Democratic principals and processes, with safeguards and
checks and balances in the system, have not been fully
embraced, resulting in the legislative branch's assumption of
many executive branch powers, such as contracting and project
execution. While active, the executive branch does not have
a clear role or a defined mandate. As the national
constitution does little to clarify the duties and
responsibilities of each branch and of elected officials, it
is largely left to the officials themselves to define their
offices. This tips power into the hand of the more ruthless
players who are able to assemble power by intimidation, and
reinforces tribal and religious power bases of elected
officials. The Directorates General (DGs) of the ministries
are functioning, but decentralization has caused confusion,
mismanagement, and inefficiency. Many of the DGs are also
demoralized by the confusion within the provincial government
that results in misuse or non-use of their experience and
training. The judicial branch, particularly the civil court
system, is largely functional, but suffers from over-crowded
jails, inefficient courtroom procedures, and insufficient
security for judges. In addition, corruption is commonplace
and expected.

6. (SBU) Political parties lack structure and are largely
personality driven. Religious sheikhs and tribal leaders
maintain significant influence. Many of the province's
former elites feel marginalized in the national political
process, and this sense of disaffection has aided many
insurgent elements in the province.

7. (SBU) The leadership of the provincial government
cooperates well, if sometime superficially, with the USG.
Defining the independent roles of each branch of the
provincial government, increasing transparency and
accountability, and helping make elected leaders answerable
to their constituents are the USG's principal governance
objectives in SaD.

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The Economic Situation
----------------------

8. (SBU) Salah ad Din's once strong, but state-dependent
economy is in decline. Deteriorating infrastructure,

BAGHDAD 00003946 002 OF 002

inadequate banking systems, corruption, and a non-permissive
legal framework have stifled both state-owned and private
businesses. Unemployment province-wide is an estimated 40
percent and reaches as high as 70 percent in some cities.
The once functional state-owned businesses are failing due to
inefficiency and lack of necessary inputs, and the private
industries do not have access to capital markets. The
provincial government's institution of a fuel rationing
system based on gas coupons, in cooperation with the GOI,
recently provided a boost to the economy, particularly the
agricultural sector where irrigation is managed through
fuel-driven pumps. This new system appears to have largely
alleviated the previous gas shortages that resulted from
extensive black market operations.

9. (SBU) SaD's agricultural sector has great potential, but
suffers from aging irrigation equipment as well as production
and distribution problems. According to local contacts, when
the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program began in the
mid-nineties, Saddam discouraged food production, and
agriculture production and development slowed significantly.
The beneficiaries of the former regime's centrally-planned
economy, many SaD residents see the province's economic
development coming through state-owned companies, rather than
through agricultural development or private businesses.

10. (SBU) To date the USG and Coalition Forces have allocated
over USD 975 million in reconstruction projects, principally
in infrastructure, in SaD; however, the impact on the
infrastructure and on the economy has not been significant.
Encouraging growth in the agricultural and private business
sectors, improving the business climate, and assisting
establishment of a functional and sustainable infrastructure
are the USG's principal economic objectives in the province.

----------------------
The Security Situation
----------------------

11. (SBU) The single greatest obstacle to political reform
and economic growth is the poor security situation.
Continued attacks on Iraqi security forces (ISF) and targeted
assassinations and kidnappings of provincial leaders hamper
efforts to increase participation in governance and improve
business opportunities. The Iraqi Army maintains a
relatively good reputation throughout the province, while the
Iraqi police are considered corrupt and biased. Latent
tensions, unemployment, and political frustration have
contributed to insurgent activities in SaD. Although both
the Iraqi police and army cooperate well with the Coalition
Forces, the environment remains generally non-permissive.

-------
Comment
-------

12. (SBU) The reach of the central government to the
provinces is not strong or uniform. This is compounded by
the fact that the authorities and responsibilities of the
provinces have not yet been defined adequately, and therefore
there is uncertainty over roles and direction at the
provincial level. As such, governance, economic, and
security issues in SaD may not unfold as the central
government anticipates. This cable establishes a baseline
assessment for where SaD is at present. Septel reporting
will analyze the situation and developments in these sectors
in more detail. END COMMENT.

13. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad
Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog:
http://blogs.csp.sgov.gov/blojsom/blog/ salahaddin/.

SPECKHARD

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