Cablegate: Ambassador Meets with Privy Councillor Prem

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O 191100Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRIVY COUNCILLOR PREM
TINSULANONDA

1. (SBU) Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda hosted
lunch for me today, and we had an in-depth conversation about
the coup and its implications for US-Thai relations. While
Prem is unapologetic about what happened September 19, he is
also sensitive to the international implications and
especially to the US angle. He is very close to the coup
leadership as well as to Prime Minister Surayud. Both
General Sonthi and Surayud are considered acolytes of Prem.
(While it does not appear that Prem was part of the coup
planning, it seems likely that his blessing was sought a few
days before the event, and Prem no doubt gave the King at
least some advance notice about what was coming.)

2. (SBU) I described for Prem US unhappiness over the fact
of the coup and outlined the measures we had taken to date in
response. Like most, he accepts that the US would be opposed
to the military overthrow of an elected government, and
understands the suspension of military assistance such as
IMET, FMF, GPOI and section 1206. He assured me that
Thailand was heading back toward democratically elected
government and thus anticipated the restoration of the
suspended programs at that time.

3. (SBU) I told him we had noted various actions in the
month since the coup, such as Surayud's appointment, the
interim constitution, the new cabinet and the selection of
the interim assembly. In each case, there were just enough
elements to leave the impression that perhaps the military's
timeline for returning power might be lengthening rather than
shortening. These included:

-- the fact that the PM was a retired military officer;

-- the many references in the interim constitution to the
coup council and its various continuing responsibilities;

-- the lack of "upcountry" representation in the cabinet; and

-- the large percentage of military officers in the interim
assembly.

4. (SBU) While disagreeing that the military had in mind a
lengthy exercise of power, Prem conceded that the optics of
these various elements, taken together, could create that
impression. He asked what Washington's view was. I told him
we were watching closely for signals that things were in fact
moving in a more positive direction. Such signals would
include lifting martial law and restoration of civil
liberties, a shorter timeline to elections, indications of
positive headway on the drafting of a new constitution and
evidence that the new civilian interim government and
assembly were indeed acting independently of the military.

5. (SBU) I said we would reassess in early November the
degree to which progress was being made in these areas.
Possible further actions we might take in the absence of
progress or if things got worse could include canceling Cobra
Gold, suspending ship visits, limiting senior military
interaction and cessation of commercial sales of military
equipment. There was also the issue of how to deal with
Thailand at APEC in Hanoi, I added.

6. (SBU) Prem was very interested in the APEC angle. He
understood instantly the equities at stake on the US side,
with the President's strong commitment to our democracy
agenda. (It is widely commented upon here that the Thai coup
coincided with the President's speech on democracy at the
UN.) He asked how I thought our deliberations would come
out. I told him much of it depended on actions the interim
government would take in the next couple of weeks -- lifting
martial law would be a huge signal, for example. Prem did
not push back with the line that other have used on this
point (General Sonthi, for example) that martial law must be
maintained to prevent "dark influences" associated with
Thaksin from stirring up trouble. Indeed, he was responsive
to my point that existing legal authorities should be
sufficient to control and punish anyone breaking the law.

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7. (SBU) Comment: We talked about various other issues, but
Prem should take away from the meeting the need for an
increased sense of urgency between now and early November if
there is to be a successful encounter at APEC, and for that
matter if the bilateral relationship is to avoid further
friction.

BOYCE

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