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Cablegate: Dprk Nuclear Test Threat: Views of Chinese

VZCZCXRO3155
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1220/01 2801122
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071122Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9064
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2952
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1066
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0658
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 021220

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, IO, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL MNUC CH KN KS JA RU
SUBJECT: DPRK NUCLEAR TEST THREAT: VIEWS OF CHINESE
ACADEMIC AND MEDIA OBSERVERS

REF: BEIJING 20988

Classified By:
Classified by Political Minister Counselor Daniel
Shields. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

1. (S) Chinese academic and media observers are
concerned about North Korea's threat to conduct a
nuclear test and generally believe the DPRK will
actually carry out its threat to test at some point.
Some observers expressed skepticism that a test would
come soon. The official China Daily ran on October 7
an AP report quoting Li Dunqiu of China's State
Council Development Research Center as commenting that
a North Korean nuclear test is ""unavoidable"" unless
the United States eases tensions by removing
""sanctions."" Embassy contacts told us China is angry
and frustrated with the DPRK, but ""unable"" to renounce
its traditional friendly ties to the North. Contacts
who were willing to discuss possible Chinese reactions
to a North Korean test said that China would work more
closely with the United States in the aftermath of any
such test. One contact predicted tht China would not
veto a post-test resolution calling for sanctions
against the DPRK, but would abstain. End Summary.

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2. (S) Official Chinese media coverage of the DPRK's
October 3 statement threatening a nuclear test focused
on Beijing's efforts to urge restraint by Pyongyang,
although at least two prominent Chinese DPRK scholars
have been quoted as stating that the DPRK will
actually implement at some point its decision to carry
out a nuclear test. Beijing's official English-
language newspaper China Daily carried an AP article
on October 7 quoting State Council Development
Research Center scholar Li Dunqiu as stating that,
""North Korea has already made a decision to carry out
a test ... but if the United States removes
sanctions...then tensions can be eased. Otherwise
launching a nuclear test is unavoidable for North
Korea."" Shanghai's Oriental Morning Post quoted
Central Party School DPRK expert Zhang Liangui on
October 4 as indicating that ""since the DPRK has made
development of nuclear weapons its policy, a nuclear
test is certain to happen and it is only a matter of
time."" Comment: Embassy contacts indicate that strict
guidance has been issued to Chinese media outlets (see
below) prohibiting reporting on the DPRK issue outside
of official Xinhua agency releases. Publication of
comments by authoritative scholars outside of the
Xinhua rubric is therefore significant. End Comment.

3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
(strictly protect) told poloff on October 7 that he
believes it unlikely that the DPRK will conduct a
nuclear test soon. He acknowledged that he had heard
speculation about a test being conducted on either
October 8 or October 10, but said he thinks the North
Korean statement of October 3 suggests that the test
will not be conducted in the near future. Kim Jong-Il
might now wait to see whether the statement itself
would bring any result before moving to a test, he
said.

4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect) said he XXXXXXXXXXXX was not up to
speed on the DPRK situation as of October 7. He cited
U.S. researcher Selig Harrison's statement at a
September 28 lecture in Washington that the DPRK is
looking for a ""package deal"" and commented that the
DPRK is ""posturing."" He said he would be attending
official meetings on the issue in the next few days.

5. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
(strictly protect), just returned from XXXXXXXXXXXX
said China is very concerned about
a possible DPRK nuclear test and argued that the
ramifications of a test are even worse for China than
for the United States. China is caught in a terrible
bind, he said, unable to renounce its traditional
friendly relations with North Korea and unable to
influence the DPRK's actions.

Focus on Abe
------------

6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect)
told poloff on October 7 that the biggest event in the
next few days, despite the DPRK's statement and the
opening of the Party's 6th Plenum on October 8, would
be the visit to China of Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe on October 8-9. Many of XXXXXXXXXXXX's colleagues
and friends in media and official circles regard the
announcement of Abe's visit as quite sudden, but all
see the visit as positive. China will be Abe's first
overseas visit as Premier, even before a visit to
Washington, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed, and Beijing sees this as
highly significant. China's top leaders are well-
disposed to Japan, regard the relationship as crucial
to China's development and have been looking for a way
to get around the history impasse and move forward, he
said.

7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the Abe trip was put together
before the DPRK's announced its intent to conduct a
nuclear test and is not connected to the situation in
the DPRK. He said, however, that Chinese leaders and
Abe would discuss the DPRK during their talks,
particularly in light of the DPRK statement. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that they would also discuss Iran, as both China
and Japan have major economic interests in Iran.

Test Will Push China to Cooperate
---------------------------------

8. (S) On the issue of potential reaction in China to
a DPRK nuclear test, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had heard discussion
that there could be a test on October 8. In the event
of a test, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he expects that China would move
to cooperate more closely with the United States in
the UN Security Council with regard to the DPRK issue.
While he predicted that China would not cast a vote in
support of sanctions against the DPRK, he judged that
China would abstain. This would be a ""major shift,""
XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. Previously, China would certainly have
vetoed any DPRK sanctions resolution, he stated.

9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed some frustration that China
continues to feel obliged to support the DPRK out of
""traditional ideological ties"" when China's interests
""clearly dictate"" that it should be tougher on the
DPRK than on Iran, for example. ""The DPRK is a rogue
state and everyone knows it,"" XXXXXXXXXXXX said. ""But China
is unable to renounce its special relationship with
the DPRK.""

10. (S) Any North Korean nuclear test will prompt the
Chinese government to work more closely with the
United States on North Korea issues both bilaterally
and at the United Nations, predicted XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX He
related that in meetings, DPRK officials were ""almost
impossible to communicate with."" He was surprised, he
recalled, at how much they complained about hina.
China's vote in favor of UN Security Concil
Resolution 1695, which condemned the Norh Korean
missile launches on July 4-5, caused particular
consternation, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.

Media Restrictions Issued
-------------------------

11. (S) The Propaganda Department has issued strict
guidelines ordering all media outlets to publish only
state-run Xinhua News Service wire copy, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.
XXXXXXXXXXXX added that frustration reigns among scholars and
think-tankers he has spoken with about the North Korea
situation. The July 4-5 missile launches and the
October 3 announcement both came as surprises and gave
""hard lessons"" to Chinese foreign policy
practitioners, he said. XXXXXXXXXXXX related that there is
considerable official anger at the DPRK for
undermining the Six-Party Talks process, on which
China has staked its reputation. In fact, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
leading foreign policy scholars plan to hold an urgent
meeting this week in Shanghai to discuss
recommendations for China's leadership on how to
handle the North Korea nuclear issue. ""There is a
feeling that we are at a crossroads,"" he said.

Chinese Public Opinion Shifting on North Korea
--------------------------------------------- -

12. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told poloff October 7 that
support for North Korea as the country ""most friendly""
to China has slipped to 32 percent from over 50
percent five years ago. (Note: North Korea was
nevertheless the number two friendliest country in
2006 polls, following Russia.) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that
most Chinese do not think much about North Korea, so
polling results should be viewed cautiously. However,
he noted that 30 percent of those polled in 2006 said
they viewed the DPRK as a threat to China and XXXXXXXXXXXX
predicted that, if the DPRK conducts a nuclear test,
this number would increase.

13. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he has been monitoring
Internet chat rooms and he has been struck by Chinese
netizens' cool reaction to North Korea's test plans.
A primary concern in Internet forums is where the test
might take place, with many worrying that the site
will be close to Chinese territory. Although there is
a strong emotional bond still exists between the two
countries because of the Korean War, public sympathy
toward North Korea is deteriorating. ""People are all
very disappointed,"" XXXXXXXXXXXX observed.
SEDNEY

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