Cablegate: Japan's Initital Media Response to Announced Dprk

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 005876

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KNNP PGOV KN JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S INITITAL MEDIA RESPONSE TO ANNOUNCED DPRK
NUCLEAR TEST

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1. Summary. The public and media reaction to the DPRK's
October 9 announcement of a nuclear test was universally
condemnatory. Press coverage throughout the day highlighted
the cool, unflappable responses of Prime Minister Abe and his
aides, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the
counterproductive nature of Kim Jong-il's efforts to gain
U.S. attention. End summary.

2. The public response to North Korea's announced nuclear
test, predictably, was one of universal outrage and
condemnation. Because the test occurred on one of Japan's
press holidays, the immediate media response was limited to
television and the internet. (Note: No newspaper reports
will appear until late Tuesday afternoon.) Japanese
television featured special news reports throughout the day,
with the NHK evening news extending from 30 minutes to an
hour to accommodate intense interest in the story. The news
broadcasts were filled with Japanese and international
reaction, including what was portrayed as the cool,
unflappable responses of Prime Minister Abe and his aides.

3. The intense discussion and analysis presented on
televisions news and talk shows included speculation on Kim
Jong-il's motive, the nature of the underground explosion and
its international consequences. NHK, for example, featured
military affairs analyst Kensuke Ebata explaining the
technical aspects of the test. He stated that, based on
available information, the explosion appeared to be small,
much smaller than the bomb which was detonated over
Hiroshima, and speculated that the test may have been a
failure. On one talk show, most participants expressed faith
in the Japan-U.S. alliance and the UN Security Council. Talk
show guests also called for further toughening of sanctions
against the DPRK. No one argued for Japan to go it alone:
i.e., the nuclear option. Reactions of the people on the
street interviewed by NHK and TV-Asahi reflected anger,
dismay and disgust. Like the talk show "experts," ordinary
Japanese citizens saw the solution in Japan's alliance with
the United States, the UN and Japan's postwar peace record.
No one called for Japan to react to the nuclear threat by
developing its own nuclear capability.

4. The media coverage of the international response to test
featured assurances by Ambassador Schieffer that the U.S.
would honor its security commitments to Japan. News reports
also highlighted the responses of Beijing and Seoul, where
Abe was just going into his summit meeting with ROK President
Roh when the news hit the street. Commentators noted that,
with the push of a button, Kim had managed not only to add
even more epoxy glue to the already solid U.S.-Japan
alliance, he had also contributed greatly to Japan's
rapprochement with China and the ROK. Television coverage
suggested that President Roh, who was viewed here as "soft"
on Pyongyang, had finally seen the light, based on the joint
statement issued with Prime Minister Abe that used the word
"threat" repeatedly. Commentators also noted that China's
spokesman used some of the strongest words ever in protesting
the purported test, reflecting official anger and
embarrassment, particularly for the country that shepherded
the 6-party talks and had placed itself out on a limb
defending Kim in past actions.

5. Keio University Professor Masao Okonogi, one of Japan's
foremost experts on North Korea, argued that North Korea's
intention all along in its missile and nuclear programs has
been "survival" and not necessarily to use the weapons
against Japan or the United States. Okonogi insisted that

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Kim Jong-il believes that possessing nuclear weapons will
allow North Korea to be recognized as a nuclear power
internationally and that this will buy it protection. The
timing of the nuclear test had been carefully calculated to
occur just when Abe was visiting Seoul, he said. Kim
apparently judged that the time was right, in that the United
States had its hands full with such major issues as Iraq's
security, Iran's nuclear obstinacy, and the upcoming U.S.
congressional election.

6. Okonogi further insisted that Kim is already resolved to
accept more sanctions from the international community. The
DPRK leader thinks that ultimately his nuclear card will
force other countries to seek dialogue with him since he has
a strong hand. Kim may even believe that this move will help
him tighten his own domestic authority and control and place
more confidence in him by the military. He did not think
China and Russia would cooperate in a Chapter VII resolution
in the UNSC and believes the United States' only recourse now
is to contain North Korea through political and economic
measures. Okonogi also expected more nuclear tests before
the North's first round of testing was complete.
SCHIEFFER

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