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Cablegate: Darfur: Amis Force Commander Rejects Fjmhq Concept

VZCZCXRO0052
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2936/01 3100558
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060558Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3152
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002936

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO/PSC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER REJECTS FJMHQ CONCEPT
AT NOVEMBER 2 AU DITF BRIEFING

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1736

B. ADDIS ABABA 1581
C. ADDIS ABABA 2610
D. ADDIS ABABA 2523

1. (SBU) SUMMARY. African Union civilian and military
officials, including the new AMIS Force Commander, had few
conclusions to share from a recently concluded internal
"brainstorming" session on operational challenges facing the
AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Sudan's recent acceptance
of 105 UN personnel to augment AMIS may signal its
willingness to tolerate additional UN resources and staff, AU
officials said, if they are "co-deployed" rather than placed
strictly under UN command and control. AU officials
highlight that, in any case, no additional forces may be
deployed to enhance AMIS unless the United States fulfills
its USD 116 million pledge made in July and agrees to the
construction of additional camps. The construction of
additional civilian police (CIVPOL) stations is also on hold,
due to lack of promised funds from primarily European donors.
To date, the AU has only received one-fifth of the cash
pledges promised in May and is still struggling with
logistical constraints, such as having only a 10-day supply
of aviation fuel. Compounding these challenges is the AMIS
Force Commander's recent announcement that he is rejecting
the AU Commission's call to establish a Forward Joint Mission
Headquarters (FJMHQ) under the civilian control of the AMIS
Deputy Head of Mission. Such a structure had been approved
in May (refs A-B), and was intended to strengthen command and
control of AMIS, as well as to lay the groundwork for
transition to a UN operation. END SUMMARY.

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2. (U) On November 2, the African Union Commission's Darfur
Integrated Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners
(US, UK, Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical,
and security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
New AMIS Force Commander Major General Luke K.F. Aprezi, in
Addis Ababa for consultations with AU DITF, after nearly one
month in Darfur, also attended.

---------------------------------
"CO-DEPLOYMENT" vs. UN TRANSITION
---------------------------------

3. (SBU) AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes began by noting that
AU Commission officials, the AMIS Force Commander, and AMIS
personnel from the field, had met at AU Headquarters in Addis
on October 30 for an internal "brainstorming" session. The
session provided a comprehensive view of problems faced by
AMIS, he said, including management, financial
accountability, and the failure of computer systems.

4. (SBU) Gomes asserted that Sudan's recent acceptance of
"light" UN assistance to AMIS, through the provision of
equipment and 105 UN personnel, provided a mechanism for
further strengthening of AMIS with UN resources. He noted
that a June 1995 UN paper on peace-keeping discussed two
concepts: joint operations, and "co-deployment." UN support
did not end at 105 personnel; one needed to "keep the door
open," he said, although adding 20,000 in this manner may be
unrealistic. Instead of insisting only on transition to a UN
operation, the international community needed to think of
ways to circumvent Bashir's opposition, Gomes said. Noting
the appointment of U.K. and U.S. envoys to Sudan, Gomes said
he had proposed the appointment of additional envoys from
both the AU and partners to push Sudan's President Bashir to
reconsider his position. Gomes noted that transition had
begun with a decision by the AU Peace and Security Council
(PSC); the problem lay in Khartoum. The focus had to be on
enhancing the capabilities of AMIS. He noted that either
UNSCR 1706 or the relevant UN Secretary-General's report
provided for AMIS to be assisted with 4 attack helicopters;
the UN could provide such items, not just personnel.

--------------------------------------------- --------------
AMIS ENHANCEMENT AWAITING USG RESPONSE ON CAMP CONSTRUCTION
--------------------------------------------- --------------

5. (SBU) Enhancement of AMIS continued to be frustrated by
political considerations, Gomes said. He noted that
contractor PAE had informed the AU that it had not been given
instructions to construct accommodations for additional

ADDIS ABAB 00002936 002 OF 004


battalions; this was an important matter for the enhancement
of AMIS and of significant concern to the AU Commission.
Deputy pol-econ counselor acknowledged receipt of the AU's
October 10 note verbale requesting the USG to instruct PAE to
construct such camps (emailed to AF/SPG and NSC), noted it
was still under review in Washington, and cited budgetary
constraints that could influence the U.S. decision.

6. (SBU) AU DITF Administration Control and Management Center
(ACMC) Chief, Commodore Binega Mesfin, clarified that a
contract for the upgrade and maintenance of CIVPOL stations
was ready for signature; however, the contract would not
cover the construction of an additional 35 stations, due to
lack of available funds.

--------------------------------------------- -------------
FINANCES: ONLY ONE-FIFTH OF CASH PLEDGES RECEIVED TO DATE
--------------------------------------------- -------------

7. (SBU) AU Budget Analyst Biscut Tessema reviewed AMIS
finances. If all donors honored pledges made, then the
mission could be sustained through December. If the League
of Arab States did not deliver its pledge, then AMIS would
experience a shortfall of USD 27-30 million. AMIS required
USD 329 million from April to December 2006 (USD 198 million
of which was cash requirements). Expenditures from April to
August 2006 totalled USD 69 million. A total of USD 322
million had been pledged at the July 18 Brussels pledging
conference, including USD 33 million pledged by the League of
Arab States (LAS). Other pledges from the LAS combined to
total USD 50 million. Of the total pledges made at Brussels,
cash pledges (including USD 50 million from the LAS) totalled
USD 217 million. To date, however, the AU had received only
USD 44 million in cash, primarily from the EU, Ireland, and
China.

8. (SBU) A contribution from the UK would cover personnel
costs (salaries and allowances) after October 18.
Discussions were also underway with the Netherlands on
additional contributions. However, as funds from a
contribution agreement with the EU to cover those costs
through October 17 had not yet been received, the AU had
reprogrammed USD 15 million that was to have gone to troop
contributing countries. Biscut explained that the AU was
recruiting additional financial staff to complete outstanding
financial reports. The AU had only reported to the EU on its
second contribution agreement (the sixth is now being
finalized), or up to November 2005; some USD 70 million was
thus being held by the EU pending the submission of financial
reports from the AU.

9. (SBU) Mesfin reported that USD 7.5 million had been paid
to contractor PAE on November 1 (presumably for food
services). The AU had signed a new contract with PAE calling
for payments to be made within 15 days of invoices, and thus
needed funds from the UK, he said.

--------------------------------------------- ------
GROUND CONVOYS TO DELIVER AVIATION FUEL WILL RESUME
--------------------------------------------- ------

10. (SBU) Mesfin reported that AMIS now had 10 days stock of
aviation fuel, but required a 15-day minimum; AMIS was still
seeking to obtain fuel bladders to establish a reserve under
its control. Asked when ground convoys to deliver aviation
fuel would resume, AMIS Force Commander Aprezi said small
convoys had resumed but not large ones, for which he would
recommend accompanying helicopters and APCs. Some 22
vehicles awaited escort to El Fasher; their movement awaited
his return to Darfur on November 4. "Don't worry about it; I
will do it," he said.

11. (SBU) DITF J4 Movements Officer Lieutenant Colonel Roger
Kuitche reviewed rotations: 2 Nigerian battalions had
rotated, as had Nigerian and Ugandan CIVPOL; the Rwandan
battalion had not. The rotation of the Senegalese battalion
had been put on hold (due to the lack of aviation fuel
several weeks earlier). The repatriation of Ghanaian CIVPOL
was underway today. Germany was seeking to rotate the
Senegalese and Gambian battalions together, after November
27, due to the unavailability of German aircraft from
November 12-16, and of French aircraft after November 16.

ADDIS ABAB 00002936 003 OF 004


Malian CIVPOL would have to rotate later. Dr. Gomes said
Rwanda had formally asked the AU for aircraft to support
additional supplies for its troops (who had not rotated).

-------------------------------------
AMIS FC REJECTS FJMHQ, TIGHTENS OPSEC
-------------------------------------

12. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander MG Luke K.F. Aprezi, in Addis
to attend internal AU Commission "brainstorming" sessions on
challenges facing AMIS and due to return to Khartoum on
November 3 before proceeding to El Fasher, outlined his
strong opposition to the formation of a Forward Joint Mission
Headquarters (FJMHQ) to be headed by the civilian Deputy Head
of Mission (DHOM) of AMIS, calling the concept of a joint
headquarters "over-bloated" and redundant. As "decisions
have to come back to me for implementation," having decisions
made first at the political level would simply waste time and
impede AMIS operations, he said. The (civilian) head of
mission had a headquarters at Khartoum; "my headquarters,"
Aprezi explained, was at El Fasher. Immediately upon his
arrival in Darfur one month ago, Aprezi received a briefing
on the AMIS Joint Operations Center (JOC), which he said had
not met his expectations. Aprezi criticized the need for
having up to 200 officers man a joint headquarters for a
mission of only 5,000 troops. Coordination could be done
under the direction of the Chief of Staff in Khartoum; the
JOC needed to be under "my control" at El Fasher, Aprezi
said. Asked if he was therefore proposing the cancellation
of the FJMHQ, Aprezi replied in the affirmative, and
questioned the need for a large body under the DHOM. All
operational control should be under the Force Commander, he
said.

13. (SBU) Coordination among the elements that were to be
part of the FJMHQ (including CIVPOL, CIMIC or
civilian-military cooperation, and the protection force)
could now be done at the daily briefings held at
headquarters, Aprezi asserted, particularly since such
briefings were now restricted to AMIS personnel only. He
explained that previously AU partners, signatories to the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and Government of Sudan (GOS)
representatives had all attended the AMIS briefings, which
was not conducive to coordination and gave parties access to
operational details affecting AMIS effectiveness. For
example, GOS and DPA signatories were present when AMIS
discussed reinforcing its presence at Tine; on another
occasion, an AMIS helicopter conducting reconnaissance of the
border with Chad was immediately followed by a GOS
helicopter, as the reconnaissance had been discussed at an
open AMIS briefing.

14. (SBU) The retired Zambian general originally named in
August to serve as the Joint Chief of Staff (JCOS) and to
lead partner advisor/experts assigned to the FJMHQ, was
introduced. Asked what the JCOS's role would be in AMIS
(given Aprezi's opposition to establishing a FJMHQ), Aprezi
said it would be up to the political leadership of AMIS.
Gomes noted that the UN Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE) had two Deputy Special Representatives of the UN
Secretary-General (DSRSGs), but that its JOC was under

SIPDIS
UNMEE's Force Commander in Asmara.

15. (SBU) Saying he had "no problem" with the UN assistance
package (whereby 105 UN officers, military and civilian,
augment AMIS), Aprezi said additional officers from the UN or
other partners would be "used properly": they were not
needed at joint headquarters, but rather on the ground to
verify disarmament of the Janjaweed. MILOBs now served as
staff officers, he noted. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Burke,
deputy military advisor to the EU Special Representative for
Sudan, noted that the EU was providing 3 experts to the FJMHQ
in response to a formal request by the AU; the FJMHQ had been
proposed by the AU, not imposed by partners. Burke requested
clarification on the future of the Force Headquarters and the
FJMHQ. Canadian poloff noted that all partners shared with
AMIS the common goal of peace in Darfur. (NOTE: The AU
formally announced the formation of the FJMHQ and requested
advisor/experts from the U.S., NATO, and European partners on
May 18. END NOTE.)

16. (SBU) Following the Force Commander's remarks, AMIS

ADDIS ABAB 00002936 004 OF 004


officers briefed partners on the current security situation
in Darfur, outlined the need for 9 additional battalions for
AMIS to cover its large area of operations, and discussed
progress in clearing the backlog of ceasefire violations
being addressed by the Ceasefire Commission (septel). AMIS
officers also discussed how joint operating structures in
NATO and UNMIS (JOC and JMOC respectively) were under
military command, raising the question of why AMIS required a
different structure under civilian control.

17. (SBU) COMMENT: In recent weeks, AU military planners
have managed to address several significant logistical
challenges that threatened to scuttle the AU's peacekeeping
mission in Darfur: from running out of aviation fuel and
having to postpone the rotation of troops, to not being able
to pay for the extension of food services (refs C-D).
Through a combination of ad hoc measures and last-minute
intervention by donors (e.g., Canada and the UK,
respectively, on aviation fuel and food), AMIS has continued
to limp on. The future of AMIS beyond December, however,
remains uncertain. The AU PSC will meet at the head of state
level on November 24 to consider Darfur, but it is unclear
whether the PSC will continue to push for AMIS transition to
a UN peacekeeping operation, or will simply acknowledge
Sudan's lack of consent and extend AMIS again, as it did at
its previous summit-level meeting on September 20. Allied
partners note that while cumbersome in the Force Commander's
eyes, the establishment of a Forward Joint Mission
Headquarters would be a key element in any transition to UN
command and control. The United States is currently
providing two military officers to assist the AMIS FJMHQ with
intelligence and civil-military cooperation (J2 and J9). END
COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON

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