Cablegate: Sit Rep 1 - Nicaraguan Elections
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8133
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: SIT REP 1 - NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
1. (U) Summary: With the Liberal vote split between the
Liberal Nicaraguan Alliance (ALN) and the Liberal
Constitutional Party (PLC), Sandinista Liberation Front
(FSLN) presidential candidate Daniel Ortega appears to
be the likely victor in Nicaragua's November 5 national
elections. The latest results from the Supreme
Electoral Council (CSE) shows Ortega leading by 7
points over his closest competitor, and thus could
win the election on the first round unless Ortega's
numbers drop below 40% and/or the margin between him
and Montealegre narrows. We will report following the
CSE's next release of results. End summary.
Quick Count Suggests First Round Victory for Ortega
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2. (U) At 6:40 a.m., with only 6 voting tables (JRVs)
impugned, ET publicly issued the results of their quick
count:
FSLN - 38.49%
ALN - 29.52%
PLC - 24.15%
MRS - 7.44%
3. (SBU) Local NDI Director Deborah Ulmer privately reported
that
only six of the 1,042 polling stations sampled by ET
experienced official challenges -- not enough
to significantly influence the results. ET observers
witnessed some irregularities, but the size and scope
of these anomalies, according to NDI technical advisors,
will not change overall results.
4. (SBU) Around 10 a.m., Embassy privately received the
latest
results from the CSE's vote tally center (Centro de
Computo) in Managua. With 33.4% of the votes tallied,
the FSLN still leads by 5.6%.
FSLN - 38.9%
ALN - 33.31%
PLC - 19.95%
Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) - 7.23%
5. (U) However, at 12:15 p.m., the CSE released
its latest figures (with 40.46% of the vote counted).
Results currently are:
FSLN - 40.01%
ALN - 32.72%
PLC - 20.33%
AC - 0.29%
MRS - 7.50%
(Comment: The difference between the public
CSE results and those of the CSE's Centro de Computo
could suggest that the CSE may be front-loading results
in its favor to demonstrate that they have reached the 40%
threshold. End Comment.)
6. (C) According to the coordinator of the ALN's quick
count at 10 a.m., with 60% of the results in (they polled
820 JRVs), the FSLN leads with a 5.91% margin.
FSLN - 38.86%
ALN - 32.95% (with a 1.4% margin of error.)
In addition to performing the quick count, the ALN
is currently tallying the results from each JRV.
They expect to have 90-95% of the JRVs tallied by
around 7 p.m. this evening.
7. (SBU) According the OAS' quick count, conducted with
their approximately 200 observers throughout the
country, the PLC is in the second place in contrast to
the other quick counts.
FSLN - 36.41%
PLC - 29.8%
ALN - 26.8%
MRS - 6.4%
Alternative for Change (AC) - 0.37%
The OAS is reporting 70% turn-out, much lower than
in 2001 when it was over 90%. (Comment: PLC party
sources also claim that they are in second place,
within one point of Ortega. End comment)
Slow Voting and Other Irregularities Reported by Embassy
Observers
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8. (SBU) The biggest problem reported by the media, U.S.
Embassy observers, and others was that polls opened late
and in some places even closed early. Scheduled to open
at 7:00 a.m. on election day, only 44 percent opened by
7:30, although the OAS reported that 96 percent opened
by 9:00 a.m. Further, JRV officials processed long lines
of voters very slowly in many areas, a phenomenon the media
quickly dubbed "la tortuga loca" (the crazy turtle -- a
reference to the "crazy mouse" debacle during the 2004
municipal elections, in which many voters were sent
from JRV to JRV until they gave up).
9. (C) After the official closing of the polls at 6:00
p.m., several JRVs in Managua, Matagalpa, Chinandega, and
other areas shut the gates of the voting centers on
citizens despite a regulation permitting JRVs to stay open
to accommodate voters already waiting in line at 6:00. CSE
chief of staff Rodrigo Barreto later admitted to poloff
that up to 15 percent of JRVs in Managua closed with voters
still in line between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. He blamed the
closures on power outages, which he implied were
deliberately caused by the PLC to generate chaos.
ET's quick count sample revealed a nationwide trend
of 2 percent of the JRVs blocking voters in line
at the 6:00 p.m. closure. The actual number of voters
disenfranchised is still unknown, although estimated
by ET at around 2%.
10. (SBU) The 60-member USG observer team (16 with OAS and
44 independent) and 20 Embassy FSNs accredited domestically
with ET reported in Saturday evening throughout the day on
Sunday from every department and region. A summary of
noted anomalies follows:
-- Missing or Unretrieved Cedulas and Temporary Voting
Documents: ALN and PLC fiscales (poll watchers) in
Matagalpa and Jinotega complained to observers that the
Municipal Electoral Councils in those cities "lost" or
incorrectly distributed (to FSLN agents they claim) 9,500
cedulas in Jinotega and 6,000 in Matagalpa. In the
municipality of Leon, only 5,000 of 11,000 cedulas
and temporary documents were retrieved. This information
from Leon came directly from Oscar Somarriba, president
of the Leon's municipal CSE authority.
--Admission of Observers and Party Poll Watchers: Some JRVs
incorrectly refused to admit national and international
observers and party poll watchers into the opening and
closing (i.e. vote count) procedures of the JRV.
In addition of admission of observers and poll watchers,
it was also noted by Leon electoral president Oscar
Somarriba that 100 out of 416 electoral police were
substituted at the last minute (less than 6 hours before
the polls opened). According to other sources in Leon,
most of these were not FSLN supporters.
--Confusing Ballot Boxes: The ballot boxes for departmental
deputies and Central American Parliament (Parlacen)
deputies were labeled with black and dark gray stripes,
which were difficult for most voters to differentiate.
This led to the inadvertent but incorrect
placement of ballots in the wrong boxes, delays in the
vote count, and an opportunity for official vote
challenges (impugnaciones).
--Application of Ink: Teams reported the inconsistent
application of indelible ink that is supposed to prevent
multiple voting. Some JRV officials would cover the entire
thumb, while others would apply only a superficial amount
or mark the wrong (left hand) thumb.
--FSLN Dominance: Observers noticed that the FSLN JRV
officials and poll watchers were, in most instances, better
trained and more aggressive than their counterparts from
the other parties. Additionally, many Managua and Leon
JRVs had "observers" from the FSLN-controlled Office of the
Human Rights Ombudsman (PPPH) who functioned like officials
and in many cases running the show, even though
the JRVs are clearly beyond their jurisdiction. (Note: Human
Rights Ombudsman Omar Cabezas, a noted human rights abuser
from the 1980s, warned international observers before the
elections that they would be monitored by his office. End
Note.)
Observer Response
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11. (SBU) Other international and national observer groups,
such as the OAS, Carter Center, European Union, and IPADE,
have publicly noted some complaints and irregularities, but
have generally endorsed the conduct of the elections so
far. No group has made a final statement on the fairness
and transparency of the elections. Former Peruvian
President Toledo, with the OAS mission, asked candidates
and political parties for their patience with respect
to final election results.
Comment
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12. (C) Other quick counts conducted by observer groups,
political parties, and civil society organizations, show
different results from the ET quick count, but we believe
none of those are taken from a random, representative
sampling of JRVs. We also note with interest that the ALN
has announced it will wait for 100% of the election returns
due to irregularities. Montealegre also observes that this
election is only the beginning for the ALN, with the ultimate
goal for the ALN to serve as a new political alternative
that will transform Nicaragua regardless of the outcome.
He views this process as a long-term effort. The composition
of the National Assembly is certain to change as a result
of this election.
TRIVELLI