Cablegate: Update On Policing and Security Issues

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PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0592/01 3420331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080331Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3157
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0752
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RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
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RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0722
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0549
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0582
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0660
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0445
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2495

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000592

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DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KPKO ASEC MARR UN TT
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON POLICING AND SECURITY ISSUES

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1. (SBU) Summary: UNMIT reports that the situation in and around
Dili IDP camps, which previously have been the main flashpoints
for violence, largely has returned to "normal," with only
sporadic rock fights and disturbances. However, they remain
concerned that government plans to utilize PNTL and F-FDTL in
IDP relocation operations could provoke new security issues.
UNMIT reports that a much-delayed operation to move IDPs from
the four most problematic camps should begin in the coming week
and the possible onset of heavy rains adds to the urgency.
Meanwhile, the past week has seen a significant upswing in
violent clashes between martial arts groups in Dili and in some
districts. The reactivation of screened PNTL continues to
proceed slowly due the high number of those rejected due to
allegations of past misconduct. There is evidence of increasing
pressure from GOET and unscreened PNTL themselves for police to
be reactivated outside the screening mechanism. In this mix,
the increasing visibility of armed F-FDTL soldiers in Dili
presents a further element of risk. End Summary.

2. (SBU) At recent briefings for local diplomats and
international agencies, UNMIT and UNPOL officials reported a
major reduction in incidents involving the IDP camps in Dili,
and fewer crimes overall in most districts of Dili. UNPOL noted
its increased operational presence around the camps and at newly
reopened police stations in the Dili suburbs. However, they
warned that the IDP situation could become volatile at any time.
UNMIT reports that after a number of delays the GOET has agreed
to an UNMIT operational plan to begin relocating residents of
the four most problematic IDP camps in Dili (i.e., the hospital,
port, Obrigado barracks, and airport camps). As of December 7
UNMIT was only awaiting the final GOET list of ten new sites to
which IDPs unwilling or unable to move back to their homes will
be relocated and UNMIT hopes that the process will begin in the
coming week. As an incentive for IDPs to relocate, the UN has
announced that blanket foot distributions in Dili will cease and
henceforth food will only be provided to vulnerable gourps. The
GOET has announced that no further assistance will be provided
to any IDP camp residents who fail to register for relocation by
December 15. Heavy precipitation on December 7 underlined the
threat of the coming rainy season, and there are fears that
flooding of the camps could result in a humanitiarian crisis as
well as a security concern if desperate IDPs were to attempt to
occupy government facilities or local hotels.

3. (SBU) GOET plans to utilize PNTL and F-FDTL in the relocation
operation have raised additional concerns. UNMIT has received
assurances that no F-FDTL personnel mentioned in the UN
Commission of Inquiry report will be involved but remains
seriously concerned that some of the F-FDTL elements will be
armed, despite assurances from the Prime Minister to the
contrary. F-FDTL standard operating procedures calls for armed
escorts for any F-FDTL carrying out such operations. The GOET
plan calls for 150 F-FDTL and and a like number of PNTL to be
involved in these operations, bu given the relatively small
number of screened PNTL available this does not seem possible.

4. (U) While IDP-centered incidents have abated, Dili has
nonetheless seen a number of violent incidents in the pst week
involving martial arts groups (MAGs) and similar
organizations/gangs. A series of clashes between PSHT and 7-7
members have taken place over the last few days in the Taibesse,
Kampung Baru and Bebonuk neighborhoods of Dili respectively.
These have resulted in two deaths, one stabbing and one gunshot
in Taibesse, and one stabbing death in Bebonuk, as well as a
handful of gunshot and stabbing wounds. Several house burnings
have also occurred. These MAG clashes represent a significant
shift in conflict dynamics as the East v. West element that has
characterized much of the violence of recent months seems to be
entirely absent. Interestingly, organizations working in IDP
camps report that their employees are feeling safer to move
freely around Dili as they currently do not expect to be singled
out for being from one or the other part of the country, and
instead assess that only members of the MAG groups and gangs
with tell-tale tattoos, scars or markings are now vulnerable to

DILI 00000592 002.2 OF 003

targeting.

5. (U) The current clashes in Dili follow a number of incidents
in the districts in the last couple months, usually involving
the Colimau 2000 group and PSHT. These clashes likewise have
resulted in some deaths and house burnings, including an
incident last month in Ermera district in which a PSHT member
and several members of his family were killed in a single
attack. Colimau 2000, 7-7 and a third group, Korka, reportedly
have a loose alliance with a focus against PSHT. However, it is
unclear to what extent the recent district incidents are linked
to current developments in Dili. Humanitarian aid sources note
that the delayed onset of the rainy season, and consequent food
shortages in the districts are already an issue and are likely
to worsen in the coming months. Food security issues are
expected to exacerbate community conflict in the districts.

6. (SBU) Screening and reintegration of PNTL officers is
proceeding at a slow pace, despite pressure from GOET leaders
who are demanding that PNTL be more quickly put back on the
street. The main problem is that the screening process is
turning up numerous complaints of misconduct and even criminal
behavior among PNTL officers that must be investigated further.
There are 600 PNTL previously working in Dili now in some stage
of the screening process of over 1,000 registered who have
registered. The files of some 60 per cent of these have been
set aside for further investigation. Of a list of 150 PNTL
submitted by the GOET for the IDP camp operations, only 36
passed muster.

7. (SBU) It should be noted that only those with absolutely no
allegations are currently making it through the screening
process. According to members of the Australian UNPOL
contingent, it is possible, in fact likely, that a large number
who have not passed have allegations that can be quickly cleared
up once attention is given to this process. That said, there is
also an expectation that there are plenty of cases where
allegations are well founded. So far UNPOL has not begun work
on this front. Leaving this more intensive stage of the vetting
unaddressed poses some real risks given the number of suspended
police officers involved. Combined with the fact that their
F-FDTL counterparts are essentially back to business as usual
with no restrictions on their movement or activities, resentment
at being indefinitely sidelined could fester.

8. (SBU) Acting Police Commissioner Antero Lopes acknowledges
that there are ongoing threats by some unscreened PNTL to
reoccupy their offices. There is also some agitation among the
unscreened personnel of the special units to whom the message
has been conveyed that the current priority for PNTL is
community policing not rapid reaction forces. Lopes
acknowledged that "a majority" of the PNTL who participated in
the November 16 "Peace March" with FDTL were unscreened,
supposedly non-active personnel. He said a number of unscreened
PNTL were going about in their uniforms but mostly in connection
with ceremonial occasions. The unscreened "non-active"
leadership of PNTL is only supposed to participate in ceremonial
events out of uniform, as non-active Commander Paulo Martins did
on November 28. The leadership did not appear at the December 1
ceremony to inaugurate the UNPOL-PNTL headquarters and according
to Martins, he was neither invited nor informed. In contrast,
F-FDTL commander, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak was there in
full uniform.

9. (SBU) In this mix of changing and complicated security
issues, a PNTL that appears likely to remain in institutional
limbo for months to come, and impatience on the part of both
police and GOET for national police to be back on the streets,
the visible reemergence of the F-FDTL introduces a further
element of risk. So far, their appearances at various meetings
and ceremonies, including the November 28 independence day and
December 7 Invasion day celebrations, have gone off without
incident, but the large number of armed F-FDTL involved in these
events raised concerns. Armed F-FDTL members present in Dili and

DILI 00000592 003.2 OF 003

in official ceremonies was the pre-crisis norm and there is
currently no available evidence indicating clear intent on the
part of F-FDTL to intentionally destabilize the current status
quo. However, there are worries of potential intent to expand
the role of the F-FDTL beyond its pre-crisis norm.

10. (SBU) Comment: As has been repeatedly in evidence in recent
months, there is a continual gravitational pull away from
legitimate state institutions and processes toward the more
informal networks, especially among the security forces. The UN
has conveyed a strong message to GOET that any involvement in
policing operations by unscreened PNTL is unacceptable and that
any F-FDTL members involved in community or IDP outreach or
operations should under no circumstances be armed. We should
encourage the UN to be firm on these issues and provide
diplomatic support vis-`-vis the GOET. Likewise, we should
strongly encourage the UN to move ahead with the next stage of
PNTL screening to ensure that police with false or insufficient
allegations of misconduct can return to duty while those with
serious violations are appropriately disciplined. Extended
delay of this process will serve no one and presents further
risks. End comment.
GRAY

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