Cablegate: Scenesetter for a/S Boucher's December 6 Visit To

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TAGS: PREL PGOV AF NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BOUCHER'S DECEMBER 6 VISIT TO
THE NETHERLANDS

Assistant Secretary Boucher:

1. (SBU) My embassy and I warmly welcome you to the
Netherlands. Your visit comes at a time when the Dutch
political landscape is undergoing significant change. The
November 22 national elections have left the country divided,
with no party or group of parties having a clear majority.
In the short run, we do not expect any major changes in Dutch
policies relevant to the U.S., including especially the Dutch
deployment to Afghanistan as part of NATO's ISAF mission.
But Dutch voters' dissatisfaction with the status quo could
have troubling implications for the long term relationship.
Your visit provides an excellent opportunity to reach out to
Dutch parliamentarians, officials, and press on Afghanistan,
as well as other issues across South Asia, including border
security with Pakistan and the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperative
Agreement. In addition, your interlocutors will be very
interested in hearing your views regarding U.S. positions on
Afghanistan, especially following the recent U.S. elections,
the NATO summit in Riga, and the recently released DoD-State
report critical of Afghan police training efforts.

Dutch Elections: Polarization and Uncertainty
---------------------------------------------

2. (SBU) Last June, the fragile coalition government of Jan
Peter Balkenende collapsed over the mishandling of the
citizenship status of Ayaan Hirsi Ali -- a former member of
Parliament and outspoken critic of Islam who now lives in the
U.S. -- forcing early elections on November 22. Although
Balkenende's Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) emerged as
the putative "winner" of these elections, the 41 seats they
control in the 150-seat Dutch Parliament are far too few to
command a majority, and there are no obvious partners with
which to form a new coalition government. Observers here
believe the difficult negotiations could take weeks or months
-- if they succeed at all. In the meantime, Balkenende will
continue to head a caretaker minority government until a new
coalition emerges or new elections are held.

3. (SBU) The biggest electoral losers were the Center-Left
Labor Party (PvdA) headed by Wouter Bos, and the conservative
Liberal Party (VVD) headed by Mark Rutte. Both were
supportive of the Dutch deployment to Afghanistan and had
been perceived as potential partners in a future
Balkenende-led cabinet. But with 33 and 21 seats,
respectively, neither now has enough support to reach the
necessary 76 seats. The surprising success of fringe parties
on the right and left, meanwhile, are pushing both parties
away from the center, further complicating the prospects of
the sort of centrist government coalition favored by
Balkenende. On the left, the formerly Maoist Socialist Party
grew from 9 to 25 seats overnight and now poses a serious
threat to the PvdA for leadership of the Dutch left. On the
right, the new Party of Freedom (PVV) successfully exploited
deep-seated anti-immigrant and anti-EU emotions to capture a
surprising 9 seats.

4. (SBU) The election results reveal a deeply divided Dutch
electorate that is becoming even more so. The voters' swing
to the fringes reflects the same broad dissatisfaction with
the traditional political establishment that shot down the EU
Constitutional Treaty in the Dutch referendum in 2005. This
frustration is particularly striking at a time when the Dutch
economy is performing better than it has in decades,
consistently outperforming eurozone averages: GDP is expected
to grow by 2.5 to 3 percent this year, and unemployment has
fallen to 5.5 percent. Balkenende owes much of his
relatively strong performance in the elections to these
positive trends. Many have credited his government's
implementation of painful structural reforms for this
economic turnaround. This positive economic picture,
however, was clearly not enough to overcome many voters'
concerns in other areas. Your lunch with Dutch
parliamentarians affords the opportunity to ask them how the
coalition process will unfold, and whether issues like
Afghanistan will be affected.

Afghanistan: "To The Letter"
----------------------------

5. (SBU) Despite a contentious parliamentary debate last
winter and low public support, the Dutch deployment to the
southern Afghan province of Uruzgan as part of NATO's ISAF
III mission did not emerge as a difficult election issue for
the caretaker government. In retrospect, the lengthy debate,

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in which the PvdA ultimately voted in favor of the deployment
despite serious reservations, effectively neutralized most
serious critics of the mission early and locked all major
parties into supportive positions. In an effort to destroy
this consensus, opposition parties to the left of Labor,
notably Green Left and the Socialist Party, continue to argue
noisily that the GONL has failed in its promise to maintain a
clear line between ISAF and OEF operations, and that the
focus of the mission has shifted from reconstruction -- which
the public largely supports -- to a far more controversial
combat mission.

6. (SBU) While PvdA leaders did not take the bait from
parties further to the left during the elections, they will
be hard pressed by the Socialists' strong election showing
and their own disappointed grassroots members to reexamine
the Dutch deployment given the perception that the security
situation currently makes it impossible to conduct a
successful reconstruction mission. Afghanistan could emerge
as a coalition formation issue. However, time appears to be
on the caretaker government's side -- given the complicated
election outcome, coalition formation is expected to be a
long, arduous process, allowing the "stay the course"
argument to build momentum. GONL officials have told us on
several levels that the Dutch will honor their deployment to
Uruzgan "to the letter," meaning they will remain in Uruzgan
for their two-year commitment, but will most likely not opt
to extend the deployment.

7. (SBU) Meanwhile, the caretaker government is satisfied
with the first phase of its mission in Afghanistan and has
sought to address the reconstruction vs. combat mission
divide. GONL officials have maintained on all levels that
the Dutch deployed to Uruzgan "with their eyes open," knowing
that they would be tested by the enemy and will be required
to fight. To date, the Dutch have engaged and killed the
enemy during combat missions. Nevertheless, the Dutch
acknowledge a "difference of opinion" with their NATO allies,
notably those deployed to the south. Instead of initiating
major military operations, the Dutch emphasize winning
"hearts and minds," and have employed an "ink blot" strategy
by building secure areas within the province and connecting
these areas through reconstruction projects. During a
December 1 press conference, Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn and
Dutch Ambassador to Afghanistan van de Geer noted that the
frequency of skirmishes in Uruzgan is decreasing, while the
GONL has invested six million euros in reconstruction
projects in Uruzgan this year. Dutch Major General van Loon,
commander of NATO ISAF forces in the southern provinces, and
NATO Senior Civilian Representative Daan Everts -- a Dutchman
-- have both stressed that success should not be measured by
body counts, but by bolstering the Afghan local government.

8. (SBU) This Dutch "dissenting opinion" has led other Allies
to question whether the Netherlands has the will to actively
seek out and destroy the Taliban, especially after the Dutch
assumed regional command of the southern provinces in
Kandahar in November. The fact that the Dutch have yet to
lose a soldier in combat exacerbates this perception. The
Canadians and Brits have suffered casualties in heavy
fighting in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, while Uruzgan
initially was rather quiet. The Dutch have responded
emphatically to these "soft" and "gutless" assertions,
claiming they have fought effectively when deemed necessary,
and to have actively patrolled in Uruzgan and supported the
Canadians in Kandahar. Nevertheless, Dutch concerns about a
"negative spiral of violence" has resulted in at least one
occasion in which the Dutch policy of not pursuing enemy
fighters -- even after having been fired upon -- led to chain
of command issues among NATO allies.

9. (SBU) The Dutch have differed vocally with Allies on
several other issues. They have been highly critical of
Afghan President Karzai, and have expressed a willingness to
talk to all Afghan parties. During a recent trip to
Afghanistan, Dutch FM Bot said NATO should be willing to
engage with moderate Taliban forces. The GONL also values
its bilateral MOU with Afghan authorities regarding detainee
transfers over ISAF policy. According to the Dutch-Afghan
MOU, the Dutch will turn over any detainees to Afghan
authorities within 96 hours. However, Afghan authorities
must obtain Dutch approval prior to transferring detainees to
third parties, i.e., the "anti-Guantanamo" clause. Finally,
the Dutch are opposed to poppy eradication efforts, unless
the poppy crop can be replaced by an alternative.

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Riga NATO Summit
----------------

10. (SBU) Despite these differences, the Dutch continue to
work effectively with Allies in the south. Dutch PM
Balkenende and Canadian PM Harper together made a joint plea
prior to the NATO Summit, citing the many reconstruction and
democratic governance accomplishments, but stressing the need
to ensure better security. They called on the Afghan
government to extend its reach into remote areas and support
governance at the local level, and stressed the importance of
the Afghan national army and police force. Most importantly,
they called for Allies to consolidate NATO resources, and
work with the international community, including especially
the UN and EU, to achieve better cooperation and unity of
effort. The Dutch joined us at Riga in calling out Allies to
contribute more towards the fight in the south. Your
roundtable meeting with Dutch MFA, MOD, and the Prime
Minister's office presents the opportunity to discuss
cooperation and differences in southern Afghanistan, as well
as next steps post-Riga in the effort to get other Allies to
engage in the south and the recent joint DoD-State report
critical of Afghan police training efforts.

Pakistan/India
--------------

11. (SBU) Much of the Dutch interaction with Pakistan can be
seen through the Afghanistan prism. During his recent
October trip to the region, Dutch FM Bot harshly criticized
his Pakistani counterpart for the lack of security along the
Afghan-Pakistan border. Bot also has expressed interest in
building a fence along certain portions of the
Afghan-Pakistan border in an effort to achieve better
security. The Dutch were highly supportive of NATO
humanitarian and disaster relief efforts following the
earthquake in Pakistan in late 2005.

12. (SBU) Most Dutch comment on India has been focused on the
US-Indian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The Dutch remain
skeptical of the deal, especially regarding India's ability
to honor commitments to IAEA safeguards. They also remain
concerned regarding how the deal will affect the NPT.
However, they have expressed a willingness to listen to USG
arguments, and appear ready to play a constructive role.

Short-term Continuity; Long-term Questions
------------------------------------------

13. (SBU) In the short term, the lack of a new national
consensus means policies of the previous, pro-Atlantic
government will continue -- at least as long as Balkenende
remains caretaker Prime Minister. Any new government will
also be cautious about overturning or reversing commitments
made by the previous government. Over the long run, however,
the clear desire for change expressed by Dutch voters cannot
be ignored. The traditionally close relationship between the
U.S. and the Netherlands is one obvious target of frustration
(as are NATO, the EU and the Dutch political establishment),
and recent high-profile events -- Abu Gharib, Guantanamo,
"CIA Flights," etc., have not made our jobs any easier. We
are actively working to develop and maintain solid
relationships across the political spectrum in an effort to
refocus the relationship back on our core shared values,
history, and future potential. Your visit here comes at a
crucial stage in this effort, and outreach to Parliament, the
current caretaker government, and the press will be very
helpful.

ARNALL

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