Cablegate: Egypt: Country Team Assessment On the Release Of
DE RUEHEG #3255/01 3181418
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141418Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7446
INFO RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS CAIRO 003255
STATE FOR NEA/ELA(IRWIN) AND PM(ARCHETTO)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON THE RELEASE OF
AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVG)
REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST
04/LP/022 03 MAR 06
B. DRAFT PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA (P&A) FOR
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) CASE
C. EGYPTIAN NAVY ARMAMENT DEPARTMENT LETTER
F-07-350 10 SEP 07
Sensitive but unclassified. Please protect accordingly.
1. (SBU) Description: In Ref A, the GOE requested price and
availability data for sixty-six (66) replacements for Night
Ranger Viewers and associated spare parts to support two (2)
ex-Knox Class Frigates and four (4) ex-Oliver Hazard Perry
Class Frigates. The Night Ranger Viewers were originally
transferred to the GOE during the transfer of ex-Oliver
Hazard Perry Class Frigates. These Night Ranger Viewers are
now obsolete and the AN/PVS-7B (NVG) has been identified by
the program manager as the appropriate replacement (Ref B).
These NVGs and spare parts are intended to help modernize
Egyptian Naval Forces and aid in counter-terrorism
activities. Comment: Ref B has not been finalized and will
not be presented to the GOE until the release authorization
for these NVGs has been approved.
2. (SBU) Reason the purchaser desires NVGs: The Egyptian
Navy (EN) requires the upgraded NVGs to operate effectively
at night. The NVGs would improve the EN's capability to
operate with U.S. Forces in a coalition environment. The
AN/PVS-7B is also more easily sustainable through the U.S.
3. (SBU) How the NVGs would affect Egypt's force structure:
These NVGs will replace older Night Ranger Viewers already
present in Egypt. There will be no increase in force
structure, however there will be an increase in EN capability
to operate effectively at night.
4. (SBU) How the NVGs would contribute to both U.S. and
Egyptian defense/security goals: NVG sales are consistent
with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the
territorial security of regional states. It also supports
three of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt:
(1) enabling allies and partners, and (2) protecting U.S.
and partner interest. This NVG purchase would also support
two of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE)
-- SCDE 3.2 "Support the defense modernization and
transformation of allies or partners to reduce their
vulnerability external aggression and coercion"
-- SCDE 4.2 "Improve their capability to operate
independently or in coalition with U.S. Forces"
5. (SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of NVDs
requested: 66x AN/PVS-7B are consistent with the quantity of
NVDs required within the U.S. Navy to operate two (2) ex-Knox
Class Frigates and four (4) ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class
Frigates. This quantity would allow the EN to equip each
operational ship with minimum night vision capability for a
fully manned pilothouse navigation team and to provide
6. (SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the
introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation
or region: Combatant Commander's concurrence will be
7. (SBU) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations:
Release of NVGs should not impact the regional balance of
power or cause negative reactions from any of Egypt's
neighbors. This sale does not introduce new technology to
Egypt or the region and will not impact Israel's qualitative
8. (SBU) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for,
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: The
Egyptians have demonstrated the intent and ability to protect
sensitive, classified military technology over an extended
period. Egypt signed a General Security of Information
Agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and
protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons
systems. Egypt has procured night vision technology in the
past to include AN/PVS-7Bs and has met all previous security
and monitoring requirements.
9. (SBU) Training required either in-country or in the U.S.
and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S.
trainers in-country: No additional training would be
required for the sale of these NVGs. There is no additional
presence that would be required beyond normal U.S.
interaction with the EN personnel.
10. (SBU) Source of financing and the economic impact of the
proposed acquisition: Egypt plans to procure NVDs utilizing
Foreign Military Financing and has already allocated
sufficient funds within their FY07/08 funding priority
listing to finance a potential NVG purchase.
11. (SBU) Human rights considerations relevant to the
proposed acquisition: None.
12. (SBU) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for
compliance verification: The Office of Military Cooperation
(OMC) Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden
Sentry point of contact, working in close coordination with
the security assistance program officer, will review and
maintain copies of the purchaser's physical security and
accountability control plan, maintain a serial number list of
all NVGs and intensifier tubes that may be offered or
transferred, and stands ready to assist with or conduct
inventories and inspections as required. The Egyptian
military currently has over 2500 Night Vision Devices of
various configurations in-country and has maintained
accountability and security of those devices without
unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date.
13. (SBU) Operational Plan and specific end-users: The
operational plan for the NVGs states that the devices will be
issued to those ships conducting Surface Ship Warfare
operations two (2) ex-Knox Class Frigates and four (4)
ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates. The EN will increase
its interoperability with U.S. Forces as demonstrated by
combined training exercises Bright Star and Eagle Salute.
The extent of anti-terrorism missions may include countering
intrusions of terrorists through the territorial waters of
Egypt to include the Suez Canal. The GOE has indicated a
willingness to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability and
security of NVGs, and the Office of Military Cooperation will
conduct End Use Monitoring (EUM) of the devices if the
transfer is approved.
14. (SBU) Recommendation whether the USG should approve the
transfer of NVGs: The country team recommends USG approval
for transfer of the NVGs. This is a coordinated mission