Cablegate: Museveni Pushes Unsc Members for Action On Congo

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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKM #1904 3530802
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190802Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9764
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1831
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0279
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 1189
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 2798
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0967
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0175
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0208
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 7066
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0075

UNCLAS KAMPALA 001904

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS UNSC UG
SUBJECT: MUSEVENI PUSHES UNSC MEMBERS FOR ACTION ON CONGO

1. (SBU) President Museveni summoned UN Security Council
representatives (resident in Kampala) to a State House
meeting on December 14 to criticize UN inaction in Congo.
Museveni accused the UN of shirking its responsibility by not
acting to counter "negative forces" in eastern Congo. In a
calm and patient tone, he told the group of assembled
diplomats to &solve it, or tell us and we will solve it.8
Later Museveni suggested, as an alternative to the Ugandan
military, using Angolans as partners to clear eastern Congo.

2. (SBU) At one point in his presentation, Museveni had his
staff hand around color photographs of a collection of hand
grenades, stating that &these were gifts from the Congo,8
to be tossed into bars during the recently concluded
Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) meeting. His
description suggested the grenades were seized from an Allied
Democratic Force (ADF) unit. He asserted that the Ugandan
Government had informed MONUC of 200 ADF in the Congo, but he
had heard nothing back from MONUC.

3. (SBU) Museveni said there had been a tacit understanding
at the December 5 Addis Ababa summit, of the need for
&interim measures8 to deal with the situation in eastern
Congo while training advanced for the Congolese military.
Without looking directly at any diplomatic representative,
Museveni rhetorically asked, &Where are the interim
measures?8

4. (SBU) On the LRA, Museveni restated his conviction that
LRA commander Kony would not give up peacefully, and that any
peace dialogue had to be accompanied by military pressure
(&operations8). He dismissively referred to the
alternative as &dialogue with a holiday,8 and said that
action must be taken by March 2008 or the rainy season would
give Kony another year. He did not think Kony would move to
the Central African Republic at the moment, because the
savannah was too open and less favorable to concealment than
where he currently was in the Congo.
CHRITTON

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