Cablegate: Uk Consultants On Ddr: Mistrust and Inaedquate Capacity
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
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O 070622Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
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INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001363
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TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU SU
SUBJECT: UK CONSULTANTS ON DDR: MISTRUST AND INAEDQUATE CAPACITY
THREATEN DDR IMPLEMENTATION
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 1296
B) KHARTOUM 1071
C) KHARTOUM 987
D) KHARTOUM 927
E) KHARTOUM 517
1. (SBU) Summary: Over the past two weeks, a team of UK-funded
consultants assessed UN, GNU, and GoSS capacity to carry out a
mammoth disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program
planned to commence in January 2009. They found that while the GoS
has sufficient capacity to start the multi-year, multi-million
dollar program in northern Sudan, the GoSS' DDR team needs
additional training in order to carry out the program in the south.
Furthermore, the UN lacks sufficient experienced DDR staff. The
consultants expressed concern that there is a glaring lack of trust
between the northern and southern DDR commissions. They also are
concerned that because both the 2009 elections/2011 referendum and
2009/2012 DDR programs draw upon the same limited UNMIS resources
that there might be insufficient resources to do both. End
2. (SBU) UK consultants Ted Morse and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot
interviewed GNU, GOSS and UN DDR officials over the past two weeks
to independently assess the capacity of these organizations to carry
out the planned DDR activities scheduled to start January 2009. The
consultants briefed poloff on August 24 on their preliminary
findings and said that they intend to use the findings for
additional discussion with the GNU, GOSS and the UN. The primary
question they focused on is whether the various organizations have
sufficient capacity to start the four-year USD 410 million DDR
program for 180,000 combatants on January 1, 2009.
THE NORTHERN COMMISSION ON DDR
3. (SBU) The Northern Commission on DDR (NCDDR) has sufficient
capacity to begin the program in January, the consultants said.
Morse and Gebrehiwot claimed that NCDDR senior management is
experienced, highly educated and well trained. They observed that
the NCDDR includes SAF military personnel, which, according to the
UK-funded team, is an advantage in planning and executing DDR.
However, while the Khartoum-based NCDDR top echelon leadership is
strong, the NCDDR's state-level teams are understaffed and lack
THE SOUTHERN COMMISSION ON DDR
4. (SBU) According to Morse and Gebrehiwot, the Southern Commission
on DDR (SCDDR) lacks sufficient capacity to conduct DDR programs,
but if provided with a robust training program now, the SCDDR could
be ready by January. Overall, the SCDDR needs additional trained and
experienced staff at all levels who are able to conduct the broad
range of DDR program planning and execution (capacity is a major
problem plaguing the GOSS across the board). Plagued by turnover,
the SCDDR would benefit from the recruitment of top-level
professional technical managers who are experienced in planning and
operating large programs.
THE UN DDR PROGRAM
5. (SBU) The UN DDR program, which is split into DPKO-operated
programs and UNDP programs, does not have sufficient capacity on the
UNDP side to plan DDR programs, but can develop them if sufficient
qualified staff are recruited and trained, claimed the UK-funded
team. While UN leadership is capable, UN efforts are undermined by
lack of sufficient staff and a high turnover rate. The UN has said
it will recruit a sufficient number of staff by January, but new
staff, even if technically competent, will need local area training.
Morse and Gebrehiwot pointed out that the UN must recruit
experienced financial staff to establish a financial system for the
anticipated large number of transactions associated with the hiring
of 1,000 caseworkers, multi-million dollar contracts with an
estimated 200 NGOs, and payments to 52,000 beneficiaries.
6. (SBU) The consultants observed that, not surprisingly, a degree
of tension and mistrust exists arisen between the SCDDR and the
NCDDR. The Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), a key organizing
body with a mandate to develop clear roles, responsibilities and
procedures for the commissions, has not met in three years.
According to the Morse and Gebrehiwot, the lack of a neutral
technical coordinating body has made the SCDDR skeptical that the
Khartoum-based NCDDR dominates the planning process and marginalizes
the Juba-based SCDDR.
KHARTOUM 00001363 002 OF 002
7. (SBU) The consultants said that while DPKO has adequate funding
for the disarmament and demobilization aspects of DDR, UNDP does not
have sufficient funding for its part of the re-integration programs.
UNDP and DPKO appear to have planned their programs separately from
each other. Furthermore, the two DDR commissions and the UN (both
DPKO and UNDP) are forcing top-down planning in local offices
without regard for local needs. The result is a classic case of bad
planning: the UN has imported thousands of office trailers for local
DDR offices, but state-level DDR offices have not yet secured land
for the trailers.
THE WAY FORWARD
8. (SBU) Based on their preliminary findings, the UK-funded team
will recommend that there should be a tripartite north-south-UN DDR
workshop on the planning process to deal with tangible deficiencies.
The consultants suggested that developing a trusting north-south
relationship is important and that any relationship-building program
should include the TCC, whose participation is critical. With
regards to level of trust between the northern and southern DDR
commissions, the consultants said that "if you want someone to agree
with you on the execution, they need to be there for the planning."
9. (SBU) The UK-funded team suggested that additional local level
commitment would further the goals of both northern and southern DDR
programs. They suggested that veteran groups be more involved and
that localities aggressively take part in planning DDR programs.
"The variation of local needs are too great for top-down planning
to work effectively," said one consultant who gave the example that
some southern states have 100,000 soldiers who want to do farming,
while other states might have only 200 farmers. "Besides, more
local planning would go a long way to reduce southern mistrust."
POSSIBLE CHALLENGE: SIMULATANEOUS ELECTIONS AND DDR
10. (SBU) The consultants said that the multi-year 2009-2012 DDR
program and the anticipated 2009 elections and 2011 referendum
follow parallel timelines. They expressed concern that given
existing shortfalls in capacity, the near simultaneous resource
requirements will exceed UNMIS limited capacity to support both DDR
and the elections and referendum programs at the same time.
11. (SBU) Concerns linked to Sudan's DDR program include not only
the classic north-south reluctance to commit to the implementation
of the program, but are compounded by the South's lack of capacity
to carry out the program effectively and the UN's lack of
preparedness and inter-agency coordination to manage the program
appropriately. The UK-funded team's assessment has highlighted only
a few of the daunting obstacles facing the start of this massive,
costly effort. In order to address some of the logistical and
capacity issues that exist, enhanced donor support is needed, which
in the wake of the June 25 DDR donor appeal (ref C) conference, has
not yet materialized. This team's latest report will likely be used
for another appeal for donor DDR support.