Cablegate: (S) Additional Information On Shipment of Uavs
DE RUEHC #6825 1042136
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 142117Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0000
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0000
S E C R E T STATE 036825
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS ETTC TU VE IR
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SHIPMENT OF UAVS
FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA
REF: A. ANKARA 3
B. ANKARA 126
C. STATE 28302
D. ANKARA 450
Classified By: EUR/PRA Acting Director Kathleen Morenski,
Reason 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)
1. (S//NF) On March 25, we alerted Turkey to Iranian plans
to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Venezuela (ref C).
The GOT expressed appreciation for the information and
promised to share it with select officials in other agencies
at a previously-scheduled GOT interagency export control
taskforce meeting taking place later that same day (red D).
The GOT had already warned Iran about a previous shipment
from January bound for Venezuela (ref b) "at the highest
levels" and specifically cautioned Iran against shipping
proscribed materiel through Turkey. Turkish officials agreed
to take the necessary action to prevent this shipment and
requested additional information about the timing and
possible companies involved in order to help the GOT prevent
2. (S//NF) The U.S. now has additional information to share
with Turkey. Specifically, Venezuelan officials were
continuing preparations to transfer the Mohajer-2 UAVs and
related equipment. In addition, while the dismantled UAVs
and associated components were intended to be transported
through Turkey, the Venezuelans also were considering
alternative routes should a transfer via Turkey prove too
risky. The U.S. believes this shipment constitutes arms and
related materiel, which Iran is prohibited from transferring
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5.
While UAVs are not directly included in the UN Register of
Conventional Arms, they are included in the Wassenaar
Arrangement's list of arms (Section 4.2), which Turkey is a
3. (S) Department requests post approach appropriate-level
Turkish officials and deliver the talking points in paragraph
4 and report response. (Talking points may also be left as a
non-paper). If the cargo is found to be in violation of
UNSCR 1747, post should urge the GOT to use all available
means to prevent the transshipment of this cargo by detaining
4. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:
-- Provide Turkish officials with additional information
regarding Iran's attempt to ship unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and related material to Venezuela via Turkey;
-- Emphasize to Turkish officials that UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, operative paragraph 5, prohibits
Iran from transferring any arms or related materiel;
-- Emphasize that these goods are produced by an Iranian
entity listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1747.
-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to interdict and take
positive action with regards to this and a separate shipment
in January. As a NATO Ally, we try to provide Turkey with as
much information as possible on these issues, which could
help lead them to take action in detaining shipments; and
-- Emphasize that, should we receive additional information
regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously
5. (S//REL Turkey) Begin talking points/non-paper:
--We would like to thank you for your willingness to take the
necessary action to prevent a shipment of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) from Iran to Venezuela.
-- We would now like to share some additional information
with you to ensure that Iran does not make use of your
territory to transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council
resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803.
-- Venezuelan officials were continuing to prepare for the
transfer of Iranian Mohajer-2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
and related equipment from Iran prior to May.
-- Though the primary transport route for the dismantled UAVs
and associated components continued to include Turkey, the
Venezuelans were also considering alternative routes should
transfer via Turkey prove too risky.
-- We believe these reconnaissance UAVs and the related
items, produced by the UN-designated Qods Aviation (or
Aeronautics) Industries, will be used by the Venezuelan
military and constitute arms and related materiel captured
under UNSCR 1747 and subject to the asset freeze called for
in UNSCR 1737, "if owned or controlled by Qods Aviation."
-- UN Security Council Resolution 1747, operative paragraph
5, prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any
arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of
-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
cooperation, support and willingness to enact prompt and
thorough efforts in promoting interdictions designed to
prevent the transfer of sensitive materials by Iran.
6. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts
as soon as possible.
POINTS OF CONTACT
7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are and
Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR and Matt Hardiman, EUR/PRA.
8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please
slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, IO, WHA, and T.